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by
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Professor Nicholas G. Onuf, Major Professor
Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and 
development, undermines government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of 
recent anti-corruption efforts o f intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations 
(IGO/NGOs), Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be worsening in the 
post-Cold War period. This dissertation discovers why IGO/NGO efforts to arrest 
corruption are failing by investigating the domestic and international causes o f political 
corruption in the Caribbean. The dissertation’s theoretical framework centers on an 
interdisciplinary model o f the causes o f political corruption built within the rule-oriented 
constructivist approach to social science. The model first employs a rational choice 
analysis that broadly explains the varying levels o f political corruption found across the 
region. The constructivist theory o f social rules is then used to develop the structural 
mechanisms that further explain the region’s levels o f political corruption. The
dissertation advances its theory o f the causes o f political corruption through qualitative 
disciplined-configurative case studies o f political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica. 
The dissertation finds that IGO/NGO sponsored anti-corruption programs are failing 
because they employ only technical measures (issuing anti-corruption laws and 
regulations, providing transparency in accounting procedures, improving freedom of the 
press, establishing electoral reforms, etc.). While these IGO/NGO technical measures are 
necessary, they are not sufficient to arrest the Caribbean’s political corruption problems. 
This dissertation concludes that to be successful, IGO/NGO anti-corruption programs 
must also include social measures, e.g., building civil societies and modernizing political 
cultures, for there to be any hope o f lowering political corruption levels and improving 
Caribbean social conditions. The dissertation also highlights the key role o f Caribbean 
governing elite in constructing the political and economic structures that cause their 
states’ political corruption problems.
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Preface
My first encounter with corruption in the Caribbean occurred just after I began my 
United States Coast Guard career. On graduating from the US Coast Guard Academy in 
1974,1 was assigned to the US Coast Guard Cutter Dauntless (WMEC 624) at Miami 
Beach, Florida. Soon after I reported aboard Dauntless, we were dispatched to the 
Bahamian capital city o f Nassau to retrieve several hundred pounds o f seized marijuana 
that was needed for a court case in Miami. When we moored in Nassau the next day, we 
found that half the seized marijuana had been stolen the night before from the Bahamian 
Police jail cell where it was being stored. This was just the first o f many personal 
encounters with Caribbean official misconduct and corruption problems.
Caribbean corruption was an ever-present factor during my career in the US Coast 
Guard. I spent over 20 years involved in the Drug War, either aboard cutters conducting 
counter-drug patrols in the Caribbean or in staff jobs providing intelligence support to US 
and allied counter-drug forces. It was standard practice to consider the corruption factor 
whenever planning maritime drug interdiction operations with Caribbean governments 
and before sharing sensitive information with Caribbean officials. It took considerable 
time to confirm who we could and could not trust in most Caribbean states— and 
sometimes we never figured it out.
The problem with corruption was especially evident during my assignment as the 
US Coast Guard Attache in the US Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, from 1990 to 1992. 
Corruption was everywhere in Colombia. Some o f the corruption was understandable 
because of the meager salaries the Colombian government paid lower ranking military
and civilian officials. Even simple interactions with the Colombian bureaucracy, like
buying local car insurance, required a small bribe. It was common for Colombian
National Police traffic officers to stop automobiles in hopes of extorting bribes in
exchange for not issuing trumped-up traffic citations. We also experienced a seemingly
endless flow o f information into the US Embassy about drug-related corruption in the
Colombian military, police, and government agencies. A Colombian naval officer friend
offered an explanation for this corruption:
The system makes us corrupt. Selection as a Colombian military or police 
officer is a ticket to a middle class lifestyle. The salary is not that great, but the 
social standing that comes with being an officer, plus benefits such as 
subsidized housing, commissaries, and officer clubs makes for a good life. 
Unfortunately, the military retirement system does not allow you to continue in 
this middle class existence after you leave the service. Therefore, to live well 
after retirement most military and police officers have three options: (1) marry 
money, (2) work yourself into several foreign assignments and save the inflated 
per diem [viaticos] that officers living outside Colombia are paid, or (3) be 
corrupt.
I found my Colombian Navy friend’s explanation of his country’s military and 
police corruption quite insightful. It applied equally to Colombian government civil 
servants who also seemed to be forced into corrupt behavior to prepare for retirement. 
These insights helped me understand the corrupt behavior o f Colombian military, police, 
and government officials. It also made me wonder what structural factors contributed to 
the corruption o f senior Colombian government officials— people who were mostly from 
the wealthy upper and upper-middle classes and did not need the resources gained from 
corruption to ensure a comfortable retirement.
During my Colombia assignment, I also noticed the wide disparity in how US 
government officials approached the corruption problem. I met numerous members of
the US law enforcement community who saw the corruption monster under every rock 
and behind every tree. US law enforcement officials were often paralyzed into inaction 
by the thought that corruption might compromise one of their ongoing investigations. I 
found a completely different attitude toward corruption among US officials involved in 
international development and military aid programs. US aid officials generally ignored 
the corruption problem, even when there was solid evidence that resources from their aid 
programs were being pilfered for the personal benefit o f Colombian government officials.
The cloud o f Caribbean corruption that I saw hovering over US counter-drug and 
aid programs in the region planted the seed for this dissertation. I was most puzzled by 
the political corruption occurring in the upper echelons o f the Caribbean governing elite. 
Before beginning my doctoral studies, I read many of the writings o f Anthony P. Maingot 
o f Florida International University (FIU) who specializes in US-Caribbean relations and 
regional security issues including: corruption, drug trafficking, and money laundering.
His work further sparked my interest in the subject of corruption and helped steer me 
toward FIU for my doctoral studies. My future as an FIU doctoral student was sealed by 
the offer o f an Andrew Mellon Foundation Doctoral Fellowship in Caribbean Studies 
from the FIU Latin American and Caribbean Center.
I am greatly indebted to those who helped me in this dissertation project. I start 
with my FIU dissertation committee. I owe special thanks to my advisor, Nicholas G. 
Onuf. He expertly guided me throughout my entire doctoral program. He is also the 
creator o f the rule-oriented constructivist analytic frame that is the intellectual engine of 
this dissertation. Anyone who reads this dissertation should want to learn more about his
rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. I thank Emily A. Copeland who 
taught me the intricacies of international political economy and without whose help I 
would have overlooked several inconsistencies in my arguments. I thank Eduardo A. 
Gamarra who taught me the complexities o f democratization and governance. As the 
Director o f FIU’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, Dr. Gamarra also graciously 
supported my fieldwork in Jamaica and Costa Rica. I also thank Anthony P. Maingot and 
Ivelaw L. Griffith, true subject matter experts on all things Caribbean. Both guided me 
through my Caribbean area studies, helping me to understand not only the region’s 
diversity, but also the intriguing relationships among political, economic, and cultural 
factors that make the Caribbean such an exciting place to study. Although not a formal 
member o f my dissertation committee, I also want to thank William O. Walker, III, an 
expert on US foreign policy and the history o f drug trafficking, for reading and 
commenting on several o f my draft chapters.
I owe an intellectual debt to many whose work preceded mine. I rely heavily on 
the work o f several scholars in the development of my theory o f the causes o f political 
corruption— a central element o f this dissertation. Political culture is one o f the key 
concepts in my theory. Although many scholars have studied political cultures, the work 
o f Daniel J. Elazar had the most influence on my thoughts on this subject. I had the 
pleasure to meet the late Dr. Elazar and discuss my ideas with him while he was a visiting 
professor at FIU in 1999. My theory also draws heavily on the corruption scholarship of 
Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and Robert Klitgaard. Dr. Heidenheimer 
contributes the approach I use to tackle the sticky problem of cultural relativity in
corruption theory. Dr. Johnston’s work identifies the key institutional factors that play a 
central role in my theory. Dr. Klitgaard provides a powerful agency model for explaining 
corrupt behavior, one that has become the standard used by intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations developing anti-corruption policy. The success of my 
theory o f the causes o f political corruption is determined by its ability to contribute more 
to anti-corruption policy development than does Dr. Klitgaard’s seminal work.
I owe a debt o f gratitude to those who helped me in my field research. I am most 
indebted to Beth and Martin Aub who were gracious hosts during my fieldwork in 
Jamaica. Members o f the Jamaican chapter o f Transparency International and Jamaicans 
for Justice, the Aubs were instrumental in arranging my interviews with a number of 
Jamaica politicians and journalists. The Aubs also provided key comments on my case 
study o f political corruption in Jamaica. I thank Orville Taylor, sociology professor at the 
University o f the West Indies, who coordinated my research at that university. I found 
that anyone doing research on the British West Indies in general, or Jamaica in particular, 
must spend time in the West Indies Collection o f the University o f the West Indies-Mona 
library— it is simply spectacular. I thank Luis Guillermo Solis, political science professor 
at the University o f Costa Rica and Director o f The Foreign Service Foundation for Peace 
and Democracy (FUNPADEM), who coordinated my fieldwork in Costa Rica. Dr. Solis 
went beyond the call o f duty in arranging my Costa Rican housing, providing 
FUNPADEM office and computer support, scheduling interviews with several Costa 
Rican government officials, and commenting on my case study o f corruption in Costa 
Rica.
I must also thank my loving wife Gloria. This Ph.D. is as much hers as mine. She 
willingly traipsed all over the Caribbean and South America with me during my US Coast 
Guard career. She supported my plans to return to graduate school in the quest for a 
Ph.D. after my US Coast Guard retirement. She expertly proofread the final draft of this 
dissertation and now knows more about political corruption and Caribbean politics than 
she ever imagined possible. I could not have completed this program without here love 
and support.
Although there were many who helped me through this dissertation project, any 
errors remaining in the analysis or facts are my own.
Finally, I want to save the reader from having to search for my particular biases 
that might affect this dissertation. I admit to being a believer in liberal-democracy and 
free trade. These beliefs developed over a lifetime o f personal and professional 
experience. I grew-up in a rural area o f west-central Missouri. The primacy o f 
democracy, as defined by a mix of individualistic and egalitarian values, permeated the 
region’s institutions. I spent my early professional career in the US Coast Guard, which 
has its own culture and set of values. I was socialized into a US Coast Guard culture that 
combines a hierarchical military structure and its associated strict discipline with a strong 
egalitarian approach to its primary missions of maritime search and rescue and law 
enforcement. Strengthening the rule o f law in developing states in the Caribbean Basin 
was one o f my primary endeavors while serving in the US Coast Guard. My graduate 
studies also introduced me to the range o f world governing and economic systems, 
allowing me to compare each to the tenets o f democracy and free trade. From my early
life experiences, US Coast Guard service, and graduate studies, I developed a strong 
belief that liberal-democracy and free trade are the best conditions for the betterment of 
mankind.
Chapter 1 
Introduction
Political corruption has been a Caribbean problem for centuries. It was not until 
the early 1990s, however, that the need to address the corruption problem became part of 
regional political discourse. Under increasing international and domestic pressure to do 
something about their corruption problems, the 34 Western Hemispheric heads o f state 
and government attending the 1994 Miami, Florida, Summit o f the Americas I (all less 
Cuba) established Combating Corruption as one o f the 23 action items in their final 
declaration. This led to the March 1996 signing of the Organization o f American States’ 
(OAS) Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. By the late 1990s, the regional 
interest in anti-corruption programs appeared to be waning. At the 1998 Santiago, Chile, 
Summit of the Americas II, the Combating Corruption action item received only minimal 
discussion. By mid-2000, four years after its initial signing, only 18 OAS member states 
had ratified the Convention. At the same time, no OAS member had adopted the 
comprehensive package o f domestic legislation required for the Convention’s full 
implementation. The lack o f sustained anti-corruption interest was especially evident in 
the Caribbean where many states neither signed nor ratified the OAS Convention.1
Political corruption is an extremely complex behavior constituting a number of 
social factors. It is not a subject that is easy to study. Disagreements over political 
corruption definitions, theories, and measurement all contribute to the difficulties in its 
study. This does not mean that the study o f political corruption should be forsaken.
Instead, we must find new theories and methods to help us understand this complex social 
behavior.
This study investigates the research question: What are the domestic and 
international causes o f political corruption in the Caribbean? The study argues that we 
cannot understand the many puzzles about political corruption unless we first have a 
comprehensive theory o f its causes. The study adopts O nuf s (1989) rule-oriented 
constructivist analytic frame to investigate the research question. The study finds that 
while international factors such as colonialism, neo-imperialism, transnational 
corporations, foreign businesses, drug trafficking, etc., contribute to the Caribbean’s 
continuing political corruption problems, the main cause o f contemporary Caribbean 
political corruption are local governing elite who manipulate their society’s political and 
economic development and plunder state resources for their own benefit at the expense of 
their citizenry. The key role o f a state’s governing elite in fostering political corruption is 
a factor that has not been sufficiently emphasized in Caribbean political discourse.
Caribbean Political Corruption Issues
The end o f the Cold War helps explain the recent growing interest in political 
corruption. In the Western and Soviet Cold War struggle for spheres o f influence, 
political corruption in the superpowers’ client states was treated like the proverbial 
elephant standing in the living room, an anomaly obvious to everyone but that no one 
dared talk about. The superpowers seldom addressed corrupt behavior in their client 
states to avoid alienating friendly leaders. Robert McNamara, former President o f the 
World Bank, highlighted the Cold War political incorrectness o f raising political
corruption issues when he asserted in the early 1990s that “the subject o f corruption could 
not have been discussed [in international forums] 20, 15, or even 5 years ago” (quoted in 
Vogel, 1993).
As post-Cold War trends toward democratization and neoliberal economic 
reforms lifted the veil o f silence surrounding political corruption, international 
organizations; including the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary 
Fund, among others; confirmed that high levels o f political corruption adversely affect
'j
societal development. Political corruption undermines the legitimacy o f political 
institutions (see Ryan, 1998, p. 51; Leiken, 1996, p. 55). It reduces economic growth by 
diverting state resources toward inefficient (white elephant) projects and away from 
needed economic infrastructure projects (roads, ports, etc.). High levels o f political 
corruption also reduce economic growth by decreasing investor confidence in corrupt 
governments, thus lowering foreign and domestic investment rates (see Mauro, 1995, 
1996, 1997a, 1997b; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, 1998; Tanzi, 1998). It also seriously 
degrades the welfare o f a society’s poorest citizens by diminishing the resources allotted 
to education and health programs and by fostering policies that increase income 
inequalities (see Mauro, 1997a; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, 1998; Tanzi, 1998).
Moreover, political corruption becomes a threat to the national security o f many societies 
when, in alliance with transnational criminal organizations, it supports terrorism, arms 
smuggling, drug trafficking, and money laundering (Leiken, 1996, p. 55).
The post-Cold War openness about political corruption helped uncover numerous 
examples o f the problem that reached the very top o f Caribbean governments. In 1992,
Antigua and Barbuda’s prime minister o f 11 years, Vere Bird, Sr., agreed not to run again 
for public office, partly as the result o f a string of government corruption scandals dating 
back to the mid-1980s that implicated either him or his two cabinet minister sons. In 
1993, Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez was impeached by Congress, and later 
convicted, on charges he misused a secret US$17 million government fund to pay for 
campaign debts and a lavish 1989 inauguration. In 1996, Colombian President Ernesto 
Samper was charged with knowingly financing his election campaign with US$6 million 
donated by the Cali Drug Cartel. Samper was later absolved of these charges by the 
Colombian Chamber o f Deputies, tainted by allegations of their own bribery by the drug 
lords. Also in 1996, over US$120 million in unexplained funds were found in the foreign 
bank accounts o f Raul Salinas, brother and political confidant o f former Mexican 
President Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). While Raul Salinas was charged with illicit 
enrichment, money laundering, and drug-trafficking, his brother Carlos escaped into self- 
imposed overseas exile. These few examples are just the tip o f the much deeper 
Caribbean political corruption problem.
The increasing post-Cold War exposure o f political corruption problems led to the 
establishment o f the Miami Summit o f the Americas I Combating Corruption action item 
and the 1996 OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. The Miami Summit 
declaration acknowledged that “ [cjorruption...weakens democracy and undermines the 
legitimacy o f governments and institutions” (Feinberg, 1997, p. 222). The 1996 OAS 
Convention calls for a variety o f Western Hemispheric state actions intended not only to 
prevent corruption, but also to strengthen states’ abilities to prosecute those suspected of
corrupt acts (OAS, 1996). Amid a fanfare of international publicity, 21 OAS members 
initially signed the Convention. One analyst deemed the OAS Convention “the most far- 
reaching document o f its kind in the w orld .. .the only treaty instrument addressing the 
problem o f corruption... the first cooperative agreement on this issue negotiated by 
developed and developing countries” (Elliott, 1996, p. 7). As discussed earlier, interest in 
hemispheric anti-corruption reforms appeared to wane by the late 1990s. This was 
highlighted in the aftermath o f the 1998 Santiago Summit, when The Leadership Council 
for Inter-American Summitry (1999, p. 13) observed “there is little evidence of 
implementation [of the 1996 OAS Convention] in the sense of countries bringing their 
national laws into conformity with the Convention’s articles and then enforcing them.” 
Since the initial signing o f the 1996 OAS Convention, Caribbean political 
discourse related to political corruption presents two general reasons why interest in the 
subject has waned. First, Caribbean leaders continue to argue that their political 
corruption problems are due to international and not domestic factors. Caribbean and 
South American political leaders lobbied to have the Combating Corruption item placed 
on the 1994 Miami Summit agenda (Fienberg, 1997, pp. 50-51). They intended for this 
agenda item to deflect the blame for their states’ high political corruption levels from 
domestic factors onto transnational corporations and foreign businesses that were bribing 
foreign government officials. The Hemispheric leaders were surprised when the majority 
of the anti-corruption measures called for in the 1996 OAS Convention dealt with 
domestic and not international reforms. Thus, the OAS Convention undermined the
populist approach to political corruption intended by hemispheric leaders outside the 
United States and Canada.
Caribbean leaders regularly adopt populist approaches to their societal problems, 
such as political corruption, that downplay domestic causes and blame their states’ 
problems on international factors outside Caribbean control. Populist approaches play to 
strong nationalistic feelings in most Caribbean states and offer that political corruption is 
a product o f the region’s history o f colonialism and the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century US interventions. Caribbean leaders are also quick to attribute their political 
corruption problems to the neo-imperialism o f continuing US and European political and 
economic involvement in the Caribbean. A major target o f the Caribbean anti-corruption 
discourse is Western-based businesses (transnational corporations, etc.) that bribe 
Caribbean officials in the quest to secure lucrative local government contracts or markets.
Caribbean leaders’ uncertainty over the effects o f neoliberal reforms on political 
corruption levels is a second area o f recent discourse. Many Caribbean leaders are 
uncomfortable with world trends toward neoliberal economic reform and international 
financial institution demands for good governance reforms (see IMF, 1997; Wesberry, 
1998). As a counter to developed state pressure in these areas, Caribbean leaders are 
quick to point out that recent regional economic and political reforms coincide with 
increasing Caribbean political corruption levels. Neoliberal market-based economic 
reforms, such as lowering tariffs and privatizing state-owned industries, and good 
governance reforms aimed at strengthening Caribbean democracies, are hypothesized as 
measures to decrease opportunities for graft and theft o f state resources. However,
Caribbean states implementing neoliberal reforms and transitioning from military- 
authoritarian regimes to representative democracies often experience the opposite effect. 
For example, Mexico, one o f the Caribbean states employing aggressive privatization 
programs, experienced several o f the region’s most flagrant corruption scandals. 
Additionally, Panama’s transition from military-authoritarian to democratic rule in the 
1990s did little to lessen its political corruption problems.
Are the causes o f Caribbean political corruption primarily international as many 
Caribbean leaders argue? Do neoliberal economic and good governance reforms increase 
opportunities for Caribbean political corruption? Are there deeper domestic or 
international factors that cause political corruption? What contributes to the lack o f 
political will and/or political capacity that undermines Caribbean interest in anti­
corruption reforms? These questions cannot be adequately answered, nor can effective 
Caribbean anti-corruption policy be devised, without first developing a comprehensive 
theory o f the causes o f political corruption.
Key Definitions
Corruption is a complex, multifaceted, and contentious concept. Among the 
hundreds o f scholarly studies o f political corruption, there appear almost as many 
proposed definitions o f this complex phenomenon. The lack o f a single accepted 
definition o f political corruption is one reason a comprehensive theory o f its causes never 
emerged. Johnston (1994, p. 3) refers to the repeated attempts to conceptualize political 
corruption as a definitional quagmire and argues that we are unlikely to ever find a 
satisfactory single definition of corruption (also see Johnston, 1996b; Johnston, 1998, p.
89; Philp, 1987; and Philp, 1997, pp. 22-30). Many political corruption studies have 
foundered simply on definitional issues. Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, p. 77) submit that 
a definition o f political corruption must be “general enough to allow cross-cultural 
comparison yet precise enough to be empirically useful.”
In an attempt to overcome the many conflicting definitions o f political corruption, 
the World Bank takes a reductionist approach and simply defines the concept as the 
“abuse o f public power for private gain” (World Bank, 1997a, 1997b). This World Bank 
definition addresses public corruption that includes behavior such as bribery, extortion, 
and theft occurring within public, official, or governmental domains. It does not include 
private corruption relating to fraud or theft occurring solely within the realm o f private 
commercial or financial transactions. It is all but impossible to explain both public and 
private corruption behavior in one study, as the two concepts differ in not only the actors 
involved in the corrupt activity but also in actor incentive structures (willingness and 
opportunities) to be corrupt. This study focuses only on a selected form o f public 
corruption commonly referred to as political corruption.
Building upon the World Bank definition, this study defines political corruption 
as the abuse o f  public power by a governing elite fo r  their private (personal) monetary, 
material, or non-material gain. Corruption scholars and policy analysts also refer to 
political corruption as grand corruption, or corrupt behavior by senior government 
officials who possess the decision-making authority to make policy allocating a state’s 
resources (Moody-Stuart, 1996). Political corruption is differentiated from the second 
form o f public corruption known as bureaucratic-administrative or petty corruption that
involves mid and low-level government officials who gain personally from their roles in 
executing government policies and programs. While the interdisciplinary theory o f the 
causes o f political corruption developed in this study has some applicability to both 
private and bureaucratic-administrative corruption, neither o f these phenomena is 
addressed other than anecdotally in this study.
The above definition o f political corruption focuses on the governing elite as the 
principal actors in corrupt or non-corrupt behavior. In conceptualizing a governing elite, 
this study draws upon the work o f Bottomore (1964, p. 12) who notes “/« every society 
there is, and must be, a minority - the “political c lass” or “governing elite, ” composed o f  
those who occupy the posts o f  political command and, more vaguely, those who can 
directly influence political decisions...(emphasis added).” Bottomore refines his concept 
o f governing elite into two categories— political class and political elite. Political class 
refers to “those groups which exercise political power or influence, and are directly 
engaged in struggles for political leadership” (Bottomore, 1964, p. 14). He sees the 
political elite as a subset o f the political class that include “members o f the government 
and of the high administration, military leaders, and, in some cases, politically influential 
families o f an aristocracy or royal house and leaders o f powerful economic enterprises” 
(Bottomore, 1964, p. 14). The political class includes the political elite and “counter­
elites comprising the leaders o f political parties which are out o f office, and 
representatives o f new interests or classes (e.g., trade union leaders), as well as groups o f 
businessmen, and intellectuals who are active in politics” (Bottomore, 1964, pp. 14-15).
This study defines Caribbean in its geopolitical sense that includes those states 
and territories that touch upon the Caribbean Sea or have similar cultural or demographic 
characteristics to other Caribbean states. This Caribbean definition is similar to the 
Caribbean Basin geopolitical conceptualization that United States foreign policy circles 
began using in the region in the 1980s. This Caribbean definition includes the island 
states and territories o f the Greater and Lesser Antilles, Mexico, Central American states, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname, French Guiana, the Bahamas, and Bermuda. 
Table 1-1 summarizes the states and territories included in this Caribbean definition.
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The Caribbean was selected for this study not only because it is the area with the 
most resistance to the OAS-led corruption reforms, but also because (1) it contains the 
majority o f Western Hemispheric states, and (2) it displays wide diversity. If the study 
was expanded to the entire Western Hemisphere, the political corruption problems o f the 
medium and small Caribbean states and territories, and their reasons for resisting 
corruption reforms, could become lost in the analysis o f the more serious corruption 
problems in some o f their larger Hemispheric neighbors. Table 1-1 demonstrates the 
diversity o f the Caribbean in terms o f state and territory size, population, health, 
education, incomes, official languages, and type governments. By first building a theory 
of the causes o f political corruption that applies to a region as diverse as the Caribbean, it 
should take only minor modifications to later revise the theory into one that applies to all 
of the Western Hemisphere.
Diversity in political corruption levels, this study’s dependent variable, is another 
issue that drew attention to the Caribbean for this study. Not all Caribbean states are 
systemically corrupt. For example, as Chapter 4 develops, Barbados, Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, Dominica, and Costa Rica are among the least corrupt states or territories in the 
Caribbean. On the other hand, Honduras, Panama, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, and 
Haiti are among the most corrupt regional states. One challenge o f this study is to 
develop a theory o f the causes o f political corruption that is useable across the entire 
Caribbean.
Explanations for Political Corruption
The modem scholarly study o f the causes o f political corruption began in the 
1960s and 1970s, spurred by the inclusion of corruption as an important factor in 
modernization and democratization studies. Since the 1960s, there have been hundreds 
o f scholarly studies in the academic fields o f anthropology, criminology, development 
studies, economics, financial management, international relations, public administration, 
political science, and sociology, all attempting to explain the causes and consequences of 
political corruption. These studies have adopted a variety o f theoretical approaches. 
While the hundreds o f mostly single-discipline corruption studies have produced rigorous 
theorizing and many useful case studies, the overall findings about the causes and 
consequences o f corruption have been quite contradictory (Johnston, 1986, p. 985).
Most scholarly corruption studies consist o f single case studies that provide few 
theoretical generalizations that transfer to the study o f corruption in other states.
Lancaster and Montinola (1997, p. 185) highlight that “problems o f definition, 
operationalization, and measurement have thus far constrained most students of 
corruption to ideographic single case studies.. ..the lack o f cross-national empirical 
studies prevents a more complete understanding o f general causes o f political 
corruption.” Another scholar laments in her bibliography o f political corruption that 
“high expectations about (corruption) theory [are] misplaced by a search for confirming 
data” (Johansen, 1990, p. 35). This study addresses both the theoretical and empirical 
problems in corruption scholarship.
A convenient method for summarizing past corruption scholarship is to categorize 
it within the ongoing philosophy o f science debate over whether agency or structure is 
the primary explanation for human behavior (see Gould, 1998). Those on the agency side 
of the debate argue that human agency is the moving force behind the actions, events, and 
outcomes o f the social world (Dessler, 1989, p. 443). The agency argument attributes 
social behavior to the free will (voluntarism) o f individual human agents. Those adopting 
an agency approach explain variances in social behavior as a result of both the disposition 
o f individual agents and differing incentive structures agents face. Differing incentive 
structures usually result from varying organizational arrangements. The structure side of 
the debate is more deterministic. Structuralists argue that social behavior is determined 
by concrete historical circumstances that condition the possibilities for agent behavior and 
influence its course (Dessler, 1989, p. 443). Structuralists downplay the role of 
individual agents in explaining human behavior. Instead, they explain variances in social 
behavior as primarily the result o f differing political, economic, or cultural conditions 
(institutions) that bound agent behavior.
Figure 1-1 highlights the major agency and structuralist approaches found in the 
corruption literature. These approaches are described in more detail below.
^  Moralist
Agency Approaches
(Rotten Apples) ^  Economic (Rational Choice)
* Revisionist
Structural Approaches— — ► Modernization A---- *■ Radical
(Rotten Barrels)
* Culturalist
Agency explanations for the causes o f political corruption include moralist and 
economic approaches. The moralist approach adopts a normative stance that views all 
corruption as bad and corruption’s sources as bad individuals. These bad individuals, or 
rotten apples (see Johnston, 1982, p. 12), are usually depicted as weak-charactered or 
poorly trained government officials (see Leys, 1965; Caiden & Caiden, 1977; Bollens & 
Schmandt, 1979; Nas, Price & Weber, 1986; and Alatas, 1990). The economic approach 
normally refers to rational choice theory explanations for the causes o f political 
corruption. The rational choice approach, in its purest form, refers to behavior by agents 
designed to further the agent’s perceived self-interest, subject to information and 
opportunity costs (Monroe, 1991, p. 1). The rational choice approach includes a variety 
o f cost-benefit (see Nye, 1967), principal (patron)-agent-client (PAC) (see Rose- 
Ackerman, 1978; Lui, 1986; Klitgaard, 1988; Groenendijk, 1997; and Khan, 1998), and 
game theory (see Geddes, 1991. 1994; Bicchieri & Rovelli, 1995; Manion, 1996; and 
Bicchieri & Duffy, 1997) analyses o f the causes o f political corruption. Proponents o f the 
economic approach highlight its rigorous theorizing processes and its ability to identify
specific causal mechanisms for the sources o f political corruption. These causal 
mechanisms are then used to design anti-corruption programs.
Klitgaard’s (1988) PAC analysis is the most widely used rational choice study for 
designing anti-corruption programs. PAC analyses develop their causal mechanisms 
through transaction analyses of the relationships between principals (patrons), agents, and 
clients. Klitgaard’s PAC analysis begins with a principal that selects an agent to provide 
a service to either the principal or a client. The principal is a state’s citizenry, agents are 
the state’s governing elite, and clients are domestic or international actors desiring access 
to state resources. Klitgaard’s PAC analysis develops causal mechanisms revealing that 
an agent’s corrupt behavior flourishes when the agent is given monopoly power over 
clients, when the agent has great discretion, and when accountability o f the agent to the 
principal is weak (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 75). His conclusions result in the following 
stylized equation for the causes o f corruption:
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion - Accountability (or C = M + D - A).
To lower state corruption levels, Klitgaard calls for the restructuring o f the 
C = M + D - A causal relationships. This has been the primary formula for devising 
modern anti-corruption programs, including the 1996 OAS Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption. The need to eliminate monopolies and institute transparent and free 
competition in the management o f state resources is a frequent topic in corruption 
literature. Rose-Ackerman’s (1978) PAC analysis is the most sophisticated and thorough 
o f these studies. Rose-Ackerman finds, however, that corruption can exist even in the 
most open and competitive political-economic systems. She also concludes that reducing
corruption in systems with extensive corruption requires not only a political system with 
competition, but also an informed electorate that can hold elected officials accountable 
for their corrupt actions (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 55). Other studies reveal how not 
only electoral accountability, but also administrative and judicial accountability o f agents 
are critical to holding a governing elite accountable for corrupt behavior (see Schedler et 
al., 1999). As to agent discretion, Della Porta and Vannucci’s (1999) study o f the 1990s 
Italian political corruption scandals (Clean Hands investigation) reveals the importance of 
restricting a governing elite’s ability to manage state and societal property rights, thereby 
reducing their opportunities to generate rents.3 In states without restrictions on governing 
elite discretion, these rents become the agents’ corrupt payoffs. Placing limits on the 
governing elite’s discretion to manage state and societal property rights goes to the very 
heart o f politics in determining who gets what, when, and how (see Lasswell, 1950).
There are numerous problems with agency approaches to explaining the causes of 
political corruption. Moralist analyses rely too much on the normative stance that 
corruption is bad, and fail to develop causal mechanisms that explain corruption’s causes 
as anything beyond bad individuals. The rational choice approach is often too 
reductionist (see Green & Shapiro, 1994). Rational choice analyses tend to identify key 
micro-level causal mechanisms that empirically correlate with state corruption levels. 
However, most rational choice analyses ignore the existence o f deeper institutional 
structures that condition agent behavior. Even Klitgaard’s influential C = M + D - A 
formula fails to recognize key factors such as types o f political and economic systems,
types o f political cultures, and different paths to modernization that structuralists 
hypothesize as important causes o f political corruption.
Structural explanations for the causes o f political corruption are also referred to as 
the political or rotten barrel approach (see Johnston, 1982, p. 14). Structural explanations 
often follow a political or economic modernization approach. Modernization sub­
categories include the revisionist, radical, and cultural schools which all provide their 
own specific propositions for the most significant structural causes o f political corruption.
Huntington (1968), Scott (1972), and Theobald (1990) provide important 
contributions to the general modernization approach that sees the character o f a state’s 
political system and the nature and rate o f its socioeconomic change as the major causes 
of political corruption. A major assumption o f the modernization approach is that as 
states reach a developed status, their corruption levels will subside. Huntington (1968, p. 
64) argues that the degree o f corruption in a developing state is dependent upon: (1) the 
nature o f the state’s traditional society, and (2) the nature o f the state’s political and 
economic modernization processes. He offers that “ [cjorruption is. ..one measure o f the 
absence o f effective political institutionalism” (Huntington, 1968, p. 59). Huntington 
further states:
Corruption varies inversely with political organization, and to the extent 
that corruption builds parties, it undermines the conditions o f its own 
existence. Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective 
political parties, [and] in societies where the interests o f the individual, 
the family, the clique, or the clan predominate. In a modernizing polity 
the weaker and less accepted the political parties, the greater the 
likelihood o f corruption (Huntington, 1968, p. 71).
Huntington’s (1968) analysis also offers that not only poor economic performance, but 
also new surges in economic prosperity, can result in high levels o f corruption in 
developing states.
Three major critiques can be levied toward the modernization approach. First, 
modernization analyses often focus on macro-level concepts that provide few causal 
mechanisms allowing the construction o f anti-corruption programs. Second, due to the 
lack o f causal mechanisms in modernization analyses, there are few empirical studies to 
support modernization theories o f the causes o f political corruption. Third, political and 
economic modernization has not reduced corruption levels in all developed states as their 
theories assume. For example, developed states such as Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, 
Japan, and the United States still experience significant levels o f political corruption.
The structural-revisionist school follows closely with the modernization approach 
but takes a functional view toward explaining the causes o f political corruption (see Leff, 
1964; Nye, 1967; Huntington, 1968; Merton, 1968; Scott, 1972; and Friedrich, 1972).
This school is labeled revisionist as their analyses develop that the effects o f corruption 
may be good—offering that corruption can, at times, contribute to the adaptation and 
functioning o f ineffective economic and political systems. M erton’s (1968) analysis of 
US urban machines reveals how corruption develops from the functional need to provide 
urban citizens basic services where their public institutions are unable or unwilling to do 
so. Huntington (1968) also develops the possible good aspects o f corruption in relation to 
its functional ability to facilitate a state’s economic and political modernization. He 
argues that some political corruption can be good when it allows new groups to integrate
into society, thereby helping build political organizations. Moralists condemn the 
revisionist views based on the normative stance that all corruption must be bad. Other 
critics o f the revisionist school argue that these theorists, “often rely too much on 
anecdotal evidence, hypothetical cases, and speculative linkages between corruption and 
social outcomes” (Johnston, 1986, p. 985).
The structuralist-radical school attributes the causes o f corruption to conditions of 
colonialism and neo-imperialism, dependency relationships between the developing and 
developed world, and global trends toward capitalism and liberal-democracy (see Frank, 
1967; Dos Santos, 1970). The Caribbean governing elite populist discourse falls within 
the structural-radical view o f the causes o f corruption. There have been only a few 
scholarly Caribbean works that relate Caribbean corruption to structural-radical 
arguments (see Jacobs, 1978; Munroe, 1999b). Outside the Caribbean, Girling (1997) 
adopts a structural-radical view in arguing that corruption is a natural occurrence o f the 
tensions rising between the self-interested approach o f market-capitalism and the more 
egalitarian approach of liberal-democracy. Others o f the structural-radical school follow 
a general Marxist paradigm in explaining corruption as a natural result o f capitalism or of 
bad groups or classes, normally the state’s governing elite and government bureaucrats 
(see Gould, 1980). One structural-radical corruption study offers “that corruption and 
underdevelopment are dialectically linked components o f the same process, i.e., 
development at the periphery o f the capitalist mode o f production”(Gould, 1980, p. 7). 
Gould (1980) employs a structural-radical analysis in his case study o f the early 
development o f post-independent Zaire (1960-1979). He concludes that Zaire’s rampant
post-independence political corruption was the result o f a situation where the state was 
almost completely “privatized by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois classes [the 
governing elites, military, and civil servants]” (Gould, 1980, p. 122). A major critique of 
the structural-radical school is that states adopting market-capitalist and liberal- 
democratic systems generally have lower levels o f political corruption than those 
adopting alternative statist or socialist systems.
Finally, the structural-culturalist school argues that the nature o f a state’s culture 
affects its level o f political corruption. Huntington (1968, p. 71) raises the issue of 
culture as a cause o f corruption when he states corruption is more prevalent “in societies 
where the interests o f the individual, the family, the clique, or the clan predominate.” He 
also hypothesizes that state’s with less social polarization and greater senses o f noblesse 
oblige will have less corruption (Huntington, 1968, p. 65). Heidenheimer (1970, 1989) 
addresses the cultural relativity problem that argues different cultures view corrupt acts 
quite differently. He shows that modern civic-cultured based social systems are less 
corrupt because they have a much stricter view o f corrupt behavior than more traditional 
cultural systems (Heidenheimer, 1970; 24). Johnston (1983) finds that regions in the US 
with moralist political cultures are less tolerant o f and more apt to ferret out corruption 
than regions with individualistic and traditionalistic political cultures. Putnam ’s (1993) 
study o f democracy in Italy also provides insight as he finds that in more traditional areas 
where social capital is weak (Southern Italy) there are stronger and more developed 
systems o f patron-clientelism that correlate with high political corruption levels. What is 
clear from the structural-culturalist literature is that there is little consensus regarding
exactly which cultural factors should be used and where they fit in explaining the causes 
o f political corruption.
The above literature review highlights the need for a comprehensive theory o f the 
causes o f political corruption. There are numerous challenges to building such a theory. 
First, the theory must transcend the agent-structure debate, incorporating the most 
important components o f each. Second, it must address the sticky problem of cultural 
relativity. Third, the theory must include all important social factors that affect differing 
levels o f political corruption. Finally, it must provide causal mechanisms that can be 
used to develop anti-corruption policy. This study’s theory of the causes o f political 
corruption developed in Chapter 2 addresses each o f these challenges.
Research Design
This study investigates the domestic and international causes o f political 
corruption in the Caribbean. The state or territory (per Table 1-1) is the unit o f analysis 
for this study. This study’s interest is in the causes o f recurring patterns o f either corrupt 
or non-corrupt behavior by a state or territory’s governing elite. It is not assumed that all 
Caribbean states are corrupt, or even that all government officials in a systemically 
corrupt state are corrupt themselves. This study’s interest is in explaining the recurring 
behavioral patterns, corrupt or not, o f the governing elite in contemporary Caribbean 
states and territories. While this study does not focus on explaining individual Caribbean 
corruption scandals, it uses evidence o f individual corruption scandals to support its 
analysis.
The research design for this study includes the construction of a theory of the 
causes o f political corruption, a historical survey o f Caribbean political corruption, and 
investigations o f political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica that advance the theory. 
The resultant theory is then used to evaluate the important puzzles about Caribbean 
political corruption.
Chapter 2 builds the theory o f the causes o f political corruption. The theory is 
built through the use o f O nuf s (1989) rule-oriented constructivist approach to social 
science. The chapter first presents the constructivist analytic frame that combines the use 
of rational choice (agency) explanations for social behavior with the idea that agent 
choice is bounded by a surrounding institutional structure (i.e., a web o f social rules). 
O nuf s constructivist theory o f social rules is then used to link the agency and structural 
elements o f the analytic frame and to highlight the mechanisms that cause political 
corruption.
Chapter 2 builds a middle-range theory o f the causes o f political corruption. It 
concentrates in the middle, between aggregate global (macro-level) and detailed narrow- 
gauge (micro-level) concepts. There are strong statistical correlations between a state’s 
political corruption levels and individual macro-level concepts such as a state’s level of 
democracy, per capita gross national product, and dominant religion (e.g., Protestant 
states are less corrupt) (see Elliott, 1997, p. 183; Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000, p. 45). 
While interesting, macro-level analyses do not reveal causal mechanisms that explain 
political corruption and are thus o f little use in devising anti-corruption policies. There is 
little utility in telling a state that if  it desires to lower political corruption levels that it
must strengthen its democracy, increase its economic output, and convert its population to 
Protestantism.
There are also a number o f micro-level concepts that strongly correlate with state 
political corruption levels (e.g., tax system efficiency, level o f public sector wages, etc.) 
(see Tanzi, 1998, pp. 10-19). Micro-level analyses usually focus on only a small part of 
the much larger political corruption problem. This study’s middle-level theory approach 
searches for causal mechanisms that spotlight broader areas for anti-corruption policy 
development. This middle-level approach investigates institutional structures affecting 
governing elite decision-making leading to corrupt or non-corrupt behaviors. The 
Chapter 2 analysis concludes with a synoptic table that delineates the range o f political 
corruption behavior expected in Caribbean states and territories and associates them with 
consistent patterns o f several social phenomena (institutions) that cause political 
corruption.
Chapter 3 begins this study’s investigation o f how colonialism and US 
interventions affect contemporary Caribbean political corruption levels. It does this by 
examining how Caribbean political and economic institutions evolved. As Putnam 
(1993, p. 182) highlights “ [sjocial context and history profoundly condition the 
effectiveness o f institutions. Where the regional soil is fertile, the regions draw 
sustenance from regional traditions, but where the soil is poor, the new institutions are 
stunted.” Chapter 3 starts its historical survey of institutional development and political 
corruption behavior in the Caribbean beginning with Christopher Colum bus’s first arrival 
in the region. It surveys institutional development and political corruption behavior in the
colonial period and during the period of nineteenth and early twentieth century US
interventions in the region. Chapter 3 ends its discussion in the 1940s, a major watershed
period when the rules o f political corruption changed significantly in the Caribbean.
Chapter 4 continues the historical investigation o f Caribbean institutional
development and political corruption. It looks at these issues from the 1950s to today.
This last 50 plus year period o f institutional development affects contemporary Caribbean
political corruption levels the most. Chapter 4 includes a Caribbean-wide assessment of
current political corruption levels, the dependent variable in this study.
Effective operationalization o f the political corruption dependent variable
hampers all corruption research. Past research reveals that it is impractical to measure
objectively a state’s political corruption levels. Transparency International (TI), a Berlin-
based nongovernmental organization formed in 1993 to fight world corruption, offers:
An objective approach [to corruption measurement] is almost impossible.
On the one hand, corruption involves concealed actions and data that are 
not revealed publicly. There exist objective data created by the justice 
system and the media. However, these data rather give an impression on 
how effective the media is in discovering and reporting about scandals and 
how independent and well trained the judiciary is in prosecuting. An 
efficient and incorruptible jurisdiction may bring about high numbers of 
convictions. Instead o f acknowledging this, “objective” data would 
“punish” such a country with a bad score [in measuring corruption levels]. 
(Transparency International, 1996)
Over the past several years, however, TI has refined a method to measure 
corruption using respondent perceptions o f state corruption levels. T I’s annual 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is recognized as the single best measure o f corruption 
currently available (see Lancaster & Montinola, 1997). TI advertises their method as a 
poll o f  polls and compiles the CPI by combining their own Internet survey with
corruption surveys conducted by Gallup and several commercial business risk analysis 
firms. For the period 1996-1999, the TI CPI was calculated using up to 10 different 
surveys (polls). The methodology employed by TI in compiling their annual CPI is 
deemed both reliable and valid (see Lancaster & Montinola, 1997). The reliability and 
validity determinations are based upon the strong correlation among different corruption 
polls— correlation that remains strong despite the slightly different definitions o f 
corruption used and the different sampling frames employed among the various surveys. 
Chapter 4 includes the TI CPI in its assessment o f Caribbean-wide political corruption 
levels.
Chapters 5 and 6 advance this study’s theory through qualitative disciplined- 
configurative case studies o f political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica, respectively. 
Disciplined-configurative case studies use theoretically relevant general variables to test 
hypotheses within the cases selected. The results o f each case study are then compared to 
the original theory, and not necessarily to other case studies, to advance the theory’s value 
(see George, 1979; Eckstein, 1975). Qualitative methodology used in each case study 
includes library, archival, and periodical searches; semi-structured interviews; and survey 
data compiled by several academic and commercial research enterprises.
Jamaica and Costa Rica were selected for the case studies due to their diversity 
among both dependent and independent variables o f interest in this study. Jamaica has a 
fairly high level o f political corruption— typical of corruption levels found in many states 
in the Caribbean. Costa Rica, on the other hand, experiences one o f the lowest political 
corruption levels in the Caribbean. Jamaica employs a parliamentary-democracy form of
government, has generally fostered an open economic system, and its English language 
and mix o f religions (56% Protestant) make it culturally similar to other former British 
states and current British dependent territories in the Caribbean.4 Costa Rica differs in 
that it is a republic with a presidential form of government, it retains a largely state- 
owned and highly protected economy, and its Spanish language and Roman Catholic 
religion (95% o f citizens) make it culturally similar to other former Spanish states in the 
Caribbean. Jamaica approaches the status o f a failed state— one unable to provide basic 
services to its citizens and characterized by extreme societal violence, soaring crime rates, 
and a failed formal economy. In contrast, Costa Rica bills itself as the Little Switzerland  
of the region and is known for its strong democracy, strong economy, and low crime and 
violence levels (compared to other regional states). The study o f these two diverse 
Caribbean states highlights the most important factors that explain regional political 
corruption.
The Chapter 7 conclusion first uses the Jamaican and Costa Rican case studies to 
evaluate the utility o f this study’s interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political 
corruption. It next addresses the important questions regarding Caribbean political 
corruption raised earlier in this chapter. Chapter 7 then evaluates the contributions o f this 
study in the larger context o f corruption literature and outlines a further research program 
in political corruption.
Limitations, Delimitations, Contributions
This study is limited to an investigation o f the causes o f political corruption in the 
Caribbean. As such, it does not address all that is wrong with the developing states in the
region— nor does it negate all that is right with these states (Johnston, 1998, p. 88). There
is corruption in all social systems. The uncovering o f corruption is “a symptom of
weakness o f the state.... it is an empirical window to deeper underlying problems”
(Kaufmann, 1998, p. 147). As Scott (1972) concludes:
corruption, like violence, must be understood as a regular, repetitive, integral 
part o f the operation o f most political systems. In practice this simply means 
that an analysis o f who in a society gets what, when, where, and how that relies 
exclusively upon an examination o f those political acts open to public view 
would seldom provide an accurate picture o f political reality. Recurring acts of 
violence and corruption are thus more successfully analyzed as normal channels 
o f political activity than as cases o f deviant pathology.... (Scott, 1972, viii).
Although the study o f political corruption provides a means to uncover the reality o f how
political and economic systems work, political corruption must not be abused as an
explanation for all a state’s problems (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 64).
This study is delimited in several ways. First, the focus is upon political 
corruption and does not address, except anecdotally, bureaucratic-administrative or 
private corruption. To include these other areas of corruption would require a substantial 
expansion o f the above research design. Second, this study focuses only on Caribbean 
states and territories. As noted earlier, expanding the study to all Western Hemispheric 
states would move the focus off the small and medium-sized Caribbean states where 
political corruption is far less studied than in the US, Canada, or the larger South 
American states that do not border the Caribbean Sea. Third, this study only advances 
and does not test its interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political corruption. 
Qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies, like those o f Jamaica and Costa Rica in 
this study, constitute a preferred methodology for advancing new theories (see Ragin,
1994, p. 51). Quantitative research designs, on the other hand, are the preferred method 
to test new theories (Ragin, 1994, p. 51). Because this study does not include a 
quantitative test o f its resultant theory, it cannot be used to make specific inferences about 
the causes o f political corruption in the Caribbean or in other regions. At best, this study 
allows broad generalizations about political corruption in the Table 1-1 Caribbean states 
and territories.
This study contributes to anti-corruption policy in the Caribbean, general 
corruption scholarship, and general theory development. First, it contributes to Caribbean 
anti-corruption policy development by explaining why current OAS anti-corruption 
efforts in the region are foundering. One o f this study’s significant contributions 
demonstrates that while technical anti-corruption measures (new laws and regulations, 
reformed accounting and contracting procedures, etc.) offered by the OAS and other 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are necessary to arrest the region’s 
political corruption problems, they are not sufficient. Besides technical anti-corruption 
measures, an effective anti-corruption policy program must also address important social 
factors (i.e., political cultures and social trust) that are far more difficult to change.
Second, this study contributes to general corruption scholarship by developing an 
interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political corruption, one that combines both 
agency and structural approaches. While past scholarship has addressed separate agency 
and structural explanations for political corruption, this study is a unique attempt to 
combine interdisciplinary agency and structure concepts within one analytic frame, 
thereby highlighting political corruption’s aggregate causal mechanisms.
Finally, this study contributes to general theory development by advancing the 
rule-oriented constructivist approach to theory development (see Onuf, 1989). It 
develops a workable model for rule-oriented constructivist analysis. It then demonstrates 
the use o f this model to develop middle-range interdisciplinary theories o f social 
phenomena. The power o f rule-oriented constructivism as a theory-building framework is 
responsible for this study being able to develop a comprehensive theory o f the causes of 
political corruption.
Endnotes
1. OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption status, as o f May 1, 2000:
a. OAS states not signing the 1986 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. (All located in the Caribbean.)
b. OAS states signing but not ratifying the Convention: Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and the United States.
c. OAS states signing and ratifying the Convention: Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.
d. OAS states signing, ratifying, and complying with the Convention: None.
Source: OAS (2000).
2. Scholars pointed out the effects o f political corruption for several decades before the 
end o f the Cold War. The international financial institutions, however, were some o f the 
first to quantify the effects o f political corruption discussed here.
3. Rent seeking refers to government elite activity aimed at increasing the payment for a 
resource over what the resource would command in a competitive market or other use 
(i.e., through regulations, payoffs, bribes, extortion, etc.) (see Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 
1989).
4. During the Peoples National Party government o f Prime Minister Michael Manley 
(1972-1980), Jamaica adopted a number o f socialist economic features (state-ownership 
o f enterprises, protected markets, etc.). Most o f these socialist initiatives were reversed 
and Jamaica returned to a free market economy in the 1980s under the leadership of 
Jamaica Labor Party Prime Minister Edward Seaga.
A Theory of Political Corruption
This chapter builds an interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political corruption 
using O n u f s (1989) rule-oriented constructivist approach to social analysis. It first 
presents the rule-oriented constructivist analytic frame. Second, using the constructivist 
theory o f social rules, differing normative and behavioral perspectives o f the political 
corruption phenomenon are developed. Third, these normative and behavioral 
perspectives are included in a rational choice agency analysis that partially explains the 
recurring political corruption patterns expected among states. Fourth, this chapter 
advances the structural rule-sets (institutions) that also affect varying levels o f political 
corruption. Finally, the constructivist agency and structural analyses are combined into a 
synoptic table that summarizes the relationships o f the various social phenomena that 
cause political corruption behavior.
This chapter highlights the complexity o f political corruption analysis. The first 
major corruption analytic issue addressed in this chapter is the problem of cultural 
relativity that argues how distinct cultures define and perceive political corruption quite 
differently. The political corruption work o f Heidenheimer (1970, 1989) is used to 
overcome the cultural relativity problem in this chapter’s constructivist analysis. A 
second major corruption analytic issue concerns the need to identify the most important 
social phenomena that must be included in an interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f 
political corruption. Here Johnston’s (1994) work in developing a comparative theory o f 
political corruption is used. Johnston’s work identifies the majority o f important
institutional phenomena that cause political corruption. This chapter highlights the value 
o f the constructivist analytic frame and its ability to link several seemingly unrelated 
single-discipline theories, such as those o f Heidenheimer and Johnston, and develop 
synthesized interdisciplinary theories with strong explanatory powers.
The Constructivist Analytic Frame
The rule-oriented constructivist framework developed by O nuf (1989) in his book 
World o f  Our Making provides its own ontological approach to social analysis. Rule- 
oriented constructivists (hereafter just constructivists) believe that reality is affected by 
both social and material factors and that the properties o f agents and structures are both 
relevant to explanations o f social behavior.1 Constructivism is not a theory in itself, but 
provides an analytic framework that guides the development o f theoretical propositions. 
Methodologically, O nuf s constructivism supports the application o f natural science 
methods to social science analyses and the importance o f empirically validating its 
theoretical explanations.
O nuf s constructivism emphasizes the complexity o f social reality, the 
multiplicity o f causal factors at work in social processes, and the constitutive power of 
language, including the language any agent (observer) uses to characterize social reality. 
He also emphasizes that theories are always partial, explanations always contestable, and 
propositions never fully free from normative implications. He believes that these 
conditions may make it necessary for scholars to tell suggestive stories and use 
interpretive methods— and he insists that scholars should be modest in making claims on
behalf o f their stories, theories, methods, and conclusions (N. Onuf, personal 
communication, July 10, 2000).
A principal constructivist tenet is that people (agents) and society (structure) co-
constitute (construct) each other in a continuous process. Onuf explains this tenet best:
General prescriptive statements, hereafter called rules, are always implicated in 
this process [the co-constitution o f agents and structure]. Rules make people 
active participants, or agents, in society, and they form agent’s relations into the 
stable arrangements, or institutions, that give society a recognizable pattern, or 
structure. Any change in a society’s rules redefines agents, institutions, and 
their relation to each other; any such change also changes the rules, including 
those rules agents use to effectuate or inhibit changes in societies. (Onuf, 1997b, 
p. 7; emphases in original.)
To constructivists, institutions are individual social rules, or sets o f rules, 
established in consonance with material realities. Theoretical explanations emerge from 
the analysis o f the interaction o f social rules, agents, and material resources. 
Constructivists analyze how these interactions cause individual behavior by providing 
agents with direction and incentives for action (Adler, 1997, p. 329). Social rules provide 
the key linkage between agency and structure and help identify the causal mechanisms in 
constructivist analyses.
Figure 2-1 presents a synthesized model o f the constructivist analytic frame. The 
model consists o f both internal (agency) and external (structural) worlds. The internal 
world constitutes the agent’s decision-making (agency) processes. The external world 
constitutes the institutional structure (social rules and patterns o f unintended 
consequences) that bounds the internal world o f agent decision-making. Also included in 
the external world are material resource factors (routine and extraordinary) that affect 
agent information regarding expected benefits and costs leading to agent behavior.
Another way to look at Figure 2-1 is as a complex melange o f factors that define agent 
willingness (internal world) and opportunities (external world) that may cause the agent 
behavior under investigation. Figure 2-1 also displays a feedback loop that symbolizes 
how agent behavior affects both the institutional structure and agent decision-making 
processes (i.e., the constructivist process o f co-constitution).
Figure 2-1. The Constructivist Analytic Frame
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Source: Developed from O nuf (1989); Ostrom (1990); and Ostrom et al. (1994).
The Figure 2-1 internal world displays the basic components o f a rational choice 
decision-making process. Constructivism embraces rational choice theory and its sub­
field o f game theory as methods for analyzing agent decision-making (see Onuf, 1989, 
chap. 8). Game theory assumes that agents are rational, meaning they choose the best 
means to gain a predetermined set o f ends (Morrow, 1994, p. 17). The term agent in this 
study is used generically to refer to either an individual agent making decisions for
himself/herself; a group leader with decision-making (agency) power for the entire group; 
or a group o f individuals (e.g., governing elite) assumed to exhibit similar behaviors, i.e., 
act as one agent. Game theory assumes that agents are able to order their preferences 
based upon their evaluation o f costs, benefits, and discount rates present in a decision 
situation. It also assumes that agent preference orderings are complete and transitive.3 
Expected costs and benefits are determined by either material (money, property, etc.) or 
social (reputation, love, probability o f arrest, probability of job loss, etc.) factors. Agent 
proclivity to accept risks to achieve certain goals is included in the expected cost-benefit 
analysis. Discount rates capture agent impatience for payoffs, i.e., do they want the 
benefits now or are they willing to wait? The constructivist analytic frame employs these 
general tenets o f non-cooperative game theory to show how agent decision processes lead 
to a final agent behavior (see Morrow, 1994).
Social rules provide the linkages between the Figure 2-1 internal and external 
worlds. O nuf s constructivist theory o f social rules helps establish these linkages (see 
Onuf, 1989, 1997a, 1997b). Table 2-1 summarizes the key components o f the 
constructivist theory o f social rules used in this study. Social rules tell people what they 
should do, what they must do, and what they have a right or duty to do. W hen agents fail 
to follow rules, other supporting rules bring consequences. Considering their material 
circumstances, agents follow or disregard rules to achieve their goals. The term 
institution in this study refers to patterns o f stable rules. Structure is a stable pattern o f 
rules, institutions, and their unintended consequences.
Table 2-1. Constructivist Theory o f Social Rules4
Dominant Social Rules Instruction Directive Commitment
R ule’s Purposes Principles, beliefs Specificity, sanctions Create roles
R ule’s Function: What agents: should do. must do. right/duty to do.
Agent Interests Standing Security Wealth
Forms o f  Societal Rule Hegemony Hierarchy Heteronomy
Source: O nuf (1989)
Constructivists offer that complex institutions, like political corruption, consist of 
a constantly changing mix o f three different categories o f social rules (see Onuf, 1989; 
and Table 2-1). Each o f the three categories o f social rules has distinct purposes and 
functions.5 First, instruction rules delineate the principles and beliefs that inform agents 
o f an institution’s purposes. Instruction rules tell agents what they should do. Second, 
directive rules provide specificity to the instruction-ruled principles and beliefs. Directive 
rules support instruction rules by telling agents what they must do. However, for 
directive rules to be effective, they must be supported by other rules (.sanctions) that 
stipulate the consequence if  an agent does not follow a particular rule. Third, 
commitment rules create roles for agents. Commitment rules tell agents what they have a 
right or duty to do. Commitment rules give some agents well-defined powers, while 
ensuring other agents that those powers will not be abused. How well these three 
categories o f rules perform their assigned function depends upon their strength and 
formality. A rule’s strength is determined by how frequently agents follow the rule. A 
rule’s form ality  refers to a variety o f conditions that set the rule apart and emphasize its 
importance.
The three categories o f rules influence an agent’s principal interests in Figure 2-1 
internal world decision-making situations (see Onuf, 1989, chap. 8). Onuf offers that 
there are three principal interests that govern all social decision-making behavior—  
standing , security, and wealth (Onuf, 1989, p. 258). Every agent rational decision­
making process includes consideration o f all three of these interests, however, one 
interest always dominates the final behavior or decision based upon the situation’s 
surrounding structure.
Where instruction rules dominate the decision-making situation, the agent’s 
principal interests are his/her standing among other agents. Standing entails an agent’s 
status or reputation among other agents and engenders feelings o f esteem or envy. Where 
standing is the agent’s principal interest, the agent compares his/her situation with that of 
several other agents and then orders his/her behavioral preferences so he/she can be the 
best among agents.
Where directive rules dominate a decision-making situation, the agent’s principal 
interests are security. Security as an interest presents the agent with an awareness o f 
threat (e.g., war, physical threat, job security, etc.). Where security is the agent’s 
principal interest, the agent compares his/her situation to that o f one other agent (the one 
presenting the threat) and then orders his/her behavioral preferences so he/she can be the 
winner between agents.
Where commitment rules dominate a decision-making situation, the agent’s 
principal interests are wealth. Wealth as an interest presents the agent access to items o f 
value, either tangible (money, land, property, health, etc.) or intangible (love, education,
human rights, etc.). Where wealth is the agent’s principal interest, the agent’s 
comparison is internal, meaning the agent looks within himself/herself for the desired 
level o f wealth. In an agent’s wealth calculations, the situations o f other agents are seen 
only as resources for or obstacles to the agent’s ordering o f his/her preferences to get as 
much as I  need or want.
The three categories of rules also foster three distinct forms o f rule— or methods
that govern society. While all three categories o f rules exist in every society, those
societies with a higher proportion o f instruction rules are ruled by hegemony. The
concept o f hegemony used here follows the analysis o f Gramsci who argues that a
governing class has to persuade other classes in society to accept its moral, political, and
cultural values, making a society’s ideology central to the characteristics o f its governing
system (see Gramsci, 1971). As Onuf describes:
Hegemony refers to the promulgation and manipulation o f principles and 
instructions by which superordinate powers monopolize meaning which is then 
passively absorbed by the subordinate actors. These activities constitute a stable 
arrangement o f rule because the ruled are rendered incapable o f comprehending 
their subordinate role. They cannot formulate alternative programs o f action 
because they are inculcated with the self-serving ideology o f the rulers who 
monopolize the production and dissemination o f statements through which 
meaning is constituted (Onuf, 1989, pp. 209-210).
Societies with a higher proportion o f directive rules are ruled by hierarchy. Onuf
offers:
Hierarchy is the paradigm of rule most closely associated with W eber because, 
as an arrangement o f directive rules, it is instantly recognizable as bureaucracy. 
The relations o f bureaux, or offices, form the typical pattern o f super- and 
subordination, but always in ranks, such that each office is both subordinate to 
the one(s) above it and superordinate to the ones below .... The visualization o f 
this arrangement o f ranks linked by directives is the familiar pyramid o f 
organization charts (Onuf, 1989, pp. 211).
Finally, societies with a higher proportion of commitment rules are ruled by 
heteronomy. The use o f this term is traced to Kant who referred to heteronomy as a 
condition o f not having autonomy (see Onuf, 1989, p. 212). Heteronomy defines a 
condition where rational decision-makers are never fully autonomous, and whose 
decisions toward particular ends are bounded both by societal rules and their material 
means. Commitment rules stipulate promises by some agents, promises that become the 
rights (i.e., promises kept) of other agents. Conditions o f formal and strong commitment 
rules massively restrict agent autonomy.
Theories explaining social behavior are built using the Table 2-1 constructivist 
theory o f social rules in conjunction with the Figure 2-1 constructivist analytic frame.
This chapter next develops a middle-range interdisciplinary theory o f the causes of 
political corruption using the above constructivist framework. The theory concentrates in 
the middle, between aggregate macro-level and detailed micro-level concepts. The 
objective is to isolate middle-level rule-sets (institutions) associated with the political 
corruption concept. From this analysis a set o f coordinates (synoptic table) o f social 
phenomena emerges that explains the recurrence o f consistent patterns o f political 
corruption behavior.
A Political Corruption Agency Analysis
Constructing the Normative Principle. The instruction-ruled principles governing 
political corruption can be traced to the republican thought o f ancient Greece and Rome 
and their preoccupation with ensuring liberty and justice while resisting corruption.
Resisting corruption meant resisting forms of government that served selfish private 
interests rather than the common good (Wilson, 1989, p. 1). Aristotle (384-324 BC) 
offers:
The true forms o f government, therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, 
or the many, govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which 
rule with a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or o f the few, or of 
the many, are perversions (Aristotle, 1943, p. 298).
Corruption was also a topic central to M achiavelli’s (1469-1527 AD) discourses 
on virtu (civic morality) in republican government (see Machiavelli (1970); Dobel 
(1978); and Onuf, 1998, pp. 44-47). In analyzing M achiavelli’s works, one analyst 
offers:
One dimension o f [Machiavelli’s] political corruption is the privatization both 
o f the average citizen and those in office. In the corrupt state, men locate their 
values wholly within the private sphere and they use the public sphere to 
promote private interests (Shumer, 1979, p. 9).
Rousseau (1712-1778 AD) also embraced the idea that government officials,
selected by the people to manage society’s business, must carry out their duties in a
manner transcending personal interests (Rousseau, 1978, pp. 59-64). N oonan’s (1984)
historical treatise on bribery and corruption reveals that as the concept o f official bribery
developed from ancient times, it became correlated ever closer with the idea that public
officials must put aside their private interests when dealing with public matters. In his
treatise’s conclusion Noonan offers:
The notion o f fidelity in office, as old as Cicero [Roman, 106-43 BC], is 
inextricably bound to the concept o f public interest distinct from private 
advantage. It is beyond debate that officials o f the government are relied upon 
to act for the public interest distinct from private advantage (Noonan, 1984, pp. 
704).
As Western ideas o f good governance evolved, a primary anti-corruption 
instruction rule emerged asserting the normative principle that public officials must 
separate their public duties from their private interests. Nevertheless, the directive and 
commitment rules that different societies developed to support this fundamental anti­
corruption instruction rule vary widely. This is referred to as the cultural relativity 
problem in studying political corruption— the very real problem that behavior seen as 
corrupt in one culture may not be seen as corrupt in another.6
The Role of Political Culture. Mexican Nobel laureate Octavio Paz once remarked 
“[t]he Rio Grande marks the divide ‘between two distinct versions o f Western 
civilization.’ In the Anglicized north the work ethic, enterprise, the critical spirit, 
democracy, and capitalism prevail...in the Iberian south, hierarchy, ritualism, centralism, 
orthodoxy, and patrimonialism reign...” (quoted in Leiken, 1996, p. 64). Paz thus 
highlights some o f the differences in the cultures o f the Western Hemisphere.
Different cultures view political corruption in far different ways. In its most 
general sense, culture defines the social rules surrounding lifestyles, beliefs, customs, and 
values that influence a society’s pursuit o f its goals. Political culture, a sub-set o f overall 
culture, defines the general process used by a society to reach its political goals (i.e., 
decisions about who gets what, when, and how (see Lasswell, 1950)). Classifying 
political cultures includes determining how a society is politically organized, both 
formally and informally; how political decisions are made; how political power flows 
within the societal organization; how both the governing elite and the mass citizenry view
their roles in politics; and how citizens interact, both with the government and among 
themselves, to reach their political goals (see Diamond, 1993).
Since Almond and Verba’s (1963) groundbreaking work The Civic Culture first 
associated culture and modernization, there have been many scholarly attempts to both 
classify differing political cultures and to use political culture as an independent variable 
explaining corruption (see Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1972; Johnston, 1983; Putnam,
1993). A synthesis o f the political culture literature reveals three principal categories of 
political cultures— collectivist, individualistic, and egalitarian. Understanding the mix 
o f social rules that constitute these three categories of political cultures is a first step in 
understanding the varying views o f political corruption in different societies.
Collectivist (traditional) cultures generally exist in states with hegemonic forms o f 
rule and are dominated by instruction rules. Collectivist societies are simple and 
segregated. Social and economic transactions in collectivist societies are organized 
around small groups defined by familial, kinship, tribal, ethnic, religious, class, linguistic, 
or other social relationships. Each group tends to have its own narrow base o f interests. 
Paternalism is the main intra-group controlling concept in collectivist cultures, i.e., the 
father or group leader decides what is best for the family or group. The best interest of 
the group is the single most important governing rule in collectivist societies. Loyalty to 
the group and maintaining the traditional status quo are other important rules in 
collectivist cultures. With most social and economic transactions carried out within 
groups (intra-group), inter-group social trust in collectivist cultures is extremely weak.
Paz’s description o f the Western hemisphere’s Iberian south corresponds to the 
characteristics o f collectivist cultures that exist in most Caribbean states.
Collectivist political cultures place power in the hands of a small and self- 
perpetuating governing elite who often inherit the right to govern through family ties or 
social position (Elazar, 1966, pp. 92-93). The hegemonic rule in collectivist states is 
often personalistic. The method o f rule often relies on strong patron-client systems of 
informal reciprocity, where the clients (citizens or specific groups) pledge their economic 
and political support to patrons (governing elite) for access to government resources (see 
Klitgaard, 1988, pp. 69-74). Political competition in collectivist societies is primarily 
among the small group o f self-perpetuating governing elite. Politics is considered a 
privilege in collectivist political cultures and those active in politics are expected to 
benefit personally from their efforts. Collectivist polities are centrally organized with the 
powerful governing elite constituting the central core o f the most dominant societal 
group. The rule o f law is weak in collectivist political cultures, focused primarily on 
controlling the masses and offering little accountability for the governing elite.
Individualistic cultures exist in hierarchical ruled states and are dominated by 
directive rules. Individualistic societies are more integrated and complex than collectivist 
societies. Within individualistic cultures, social and economic transactions are conducted 
among people from different groups. Individuals frequently shift from one group to 
another and have a broader range o f interests. Individual self-interest is the governing 
rule o f these cultures. The need to interact with persons from other groups in order to 
serve one’s own self-interest results in a moderate level o f social trust. Characteristics of
individualistic cultures are found among the stronger democratic states in the Caribbean, 
i.e., Costa Rica and in a few o f the Anglophone Caribbean states.
Individualistic political cultures view government as strictly utilitarian— to 
provide those functions demanded by the citizens it serves (Elazar, 1994, pp. 230-232). 
Individualistic political cultures see politics as a business— another means by which 
individuals can improve themselves socially and economically. Political competition 
revolves around individual attempts to gain and maintain political or economic power. 
Politicians in individualistic societies are more interested in public office as a means for 
self-interested advancement than as a chance to build a better society. Political life in 
individualistic political cultures is based upon systems o f mutual obligation rooted in 
personal relationships. These systems o f mutual obligation are usually harnessed through 
the interactions o f political parties and interest groups. Citizen participation in political 
decision-making is conducted through networks of political parties and interest groups 
that attempt to influence government policy. Patron-client relationships generated by the 
system o f political parties, interest groups, and large government bureaucracies emerge in 
individualistic political cultures. Individualistic political cultures are extremely legalistic. 
However, the rule o f law, while stronger than in collectivist societies, remains focused 
primarily on controlling the masses and generates only limited accountability for the 
governing elite.
Egalitarian (civic) cultures are ruled by heteronomy and are dominated by 
commitment rules. Egalitarian societies are the most integrated and complex. Social and 
economic transactions in egalitarian cultures are conducted widely among a variety of
differentiated groups. Individuals belong to several political, economic, and social 
groups and have a large array o f interests. Due to the widespread horizontal interactions 
across differentiated groups, high levels of social trust develop in egalitarian cultures. 
Egalitarian cultures characterize Paz’s Anglicized north and are generally found in states 
receiving both their population stream and political ideology from Northern Europe—  
none o f which exist in the Caribbean.
Egalitarian political cultures see politics as a public activity centered on the idea 
o f the public good and devoted to the advancement o f the public interest. The search for 
the common good is the controlling rule o f politics. Egalitarian political cultures view 
politics as healthy and promote the wide-scale involvement o f civil society in political 
decision-making. Egalitarian political officials vie for power just as those in other 
societies; however, their ultimate objective is not self-interested advancement but the 
search for the good society. Egalitarian political cultures flatly reject the notion that 
politics is a legitimate realm for private economic enrichment. While political parties and 
interest groups exist in egalitarian political cultures, their influences on political decision­
making are weaker and they have less impact on government policy than in 
individualistic societies. Political competition is focused on societal issues. Egalitarian 
government structures are organized hierarchically, however, their bureaucracies tend to 
be smaller than similar sized individualistic societies and their political decision-making 
processes tend to be more horizontal, including both public and private groups. The rule 
of law is strong in egalitarian political cultures, applying equally to the masses and 
governing elite.
The Behavioral Realities. Each o f the above three types of political cultures—  
collectivist, individualistic, egalitarian— generates different normative perceptions about 
corrupt behavior. Heidenheimer (1970, pp. 18-28) provides a useful method for 
understanding these differences. He classifies differing cultures’ perceptions regarding 
political corruption along a normative continuum using three color-coded categories—  
from white, to gray, to black. White corruption indicates that the majority o f both elite 
and mass opinion would probably not support attempts to punish a particular governing 
elite behavior. Gray corruption indicates that some societal elements, either the elite or 
certain mass groups, may want to see a particular governing elite behavior punished, 
while others may not, and the majority of elite and mass opinion may well be ambiguous. 
Black corruption indicates that the majority o f both the elite and masses would condemn 
a particular governing elite behavior and want it punished. Table 2-2 lists 10 types of 
behavior commonly associated with Western conceptualizations o f political corruption 
and rates each in terms o f its incidence and evaluation (white/gray/black) across the three 
classifications o f political culture. The table was compiled from a content analysis of 
corruption literature by Heidenheimer (1970) that was updated and adapted for this study. 
The table highlights the cultural relativity problem in studying political corruption.
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The Table 2-2 types o f political corruption behavior range from minor deviations 
from the rules to benefit friends and supporters, to outright theft from the public treasury. 
The table reveals a significant variance in both the incidence and evaluation o f political 
corruption across different political cultures. Collectivist political cultures have the most 
frequent incidence o f the listed behaviors and the weakest (predominantly white) 
evaluation o f the behaviors being corrupt. Egalitarian political cultures have the least 
frequent incidence o f the listed behaviors and the strongest (predominantly black) 
evaluation o f the behaviors being corrupt. Individualistic political cultures fall between 
the collectivist and egalitarian categories with moderate (predominantly gray) evaluations 
of the behaviors being corrupt. Another way to use Table 2-2 is as a method to evaluate 
the boundaries that separate a governing elite’s public duties from their private 
interests— rated as weak (white), moderate (gray), or strong (black). The Table 2-2 
results can also be used in a Figure 2-1 internal world (agency) analysis to help predict 
the conditions that lead to different corruption patterns. This analysis takes the form o f a 
rational choice Political Corruption Game.
The Political Corruption Game. The objective o f the Political Corruption Game is to 
delineate the range o f a governing elite’s corrupt behavior by presenting a game-theoretic 
analysis o f the Figure 2-1 internal world agent decision-making process. The Political 
Corruption Game develops the range o f a state’s political corruption patterns as a series 
o f game equilibriums (solutions) that identify differing levels o f potential political 
corruption (see Calvert, 1995, pp. 58-59). The game includes an analysis o f both
governing elite and citizen behavior. As an iterated (repeat play) game, the Political 
Corruption Game highlights the long-term strategic advantage in resources some agents 
seek to gain vis-a-vis other agents— distributional effects that become institutionalized by
o
governing elite rule-making power (Knight, 1992, p. 40).
The Political Corruption Game includes three groups o f players: the governing 
elite and two groups o f citizens, A and B. The game assumes that the governing elite’s 
primary goal is to remain in office, with a secondary goal to maximize their share o f the 
state’s social surplus. The social surplus is an abstract concept defining a state’s political, 
economic, and cultural resources or products that are available for distribution among 
public and private entities (see Weingast, 1997, p. 247). Social surplus includes not only 
a state’s economic product generated from private or state resources, but also basic 
citizen rights, e.g., human rights, free and fair elections, economic freedom, access to 
government services, press freedom, religious freedom, etc., that are products o f the 
state’s political and cultural systems.
The two citizen groups, A and B, represent the most important groups in a state 
that compete for state resources. This could include a variety o f political (political 
parties, state bureaucracies, security forces, etc.), economic (commercial sector, financial 
sector, etc.), or cultural (ethnic groups, religious groups, etc.) groupings. The exact 
combination o f citizen groups competing for state resources differs among individual 
states. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, the citizen groups would represent the two 
major ethnic groups (Afro-Caribbean and East Asian). In Haiti, the groups would 
represent the commercial and financial (business) elite on one hand and the poor mass
citizenry on the other. It is assumed that the primary goal o f citizen groups is to 
maximize their share o f the social surplus. The game assumes that if  the governing elite 
lose the support o f both citizen groups, they lose office by either electoral defeat or forced 
removal. It is also assumed that the governing elite retain office if  they maintain the 
support o f at least one citizen group. Thus, the citizenry exert some leverage over the 
governing elite’s hold on power.
The game assumes that the governing elite and both citizen groups have values 
and beliefs about the nature o f political corruption (per Table 2-2). This does not assume 
that there is a societal consensus about political corruption. There may be differences in 
perceptions concerning political corruption both among and within groups o f players. It 
is assumed that sufficient political, economic, and cultural rules (institutions) exist to 
provide a minimal level o f social surplus. How players share in the quantities and 
distribution o f social surplus depends upon their interactions in the Political Corruption 
Game.
The Political Corruption Game begins with the governing elite holding political 
power. The governing elite move first and have strategies to: (1) transgress against both 
citizen groups (A and B), (2) transgress against only one citizen group (either A or B), or 
(3) not transgress against either citizen group. A transgression signifies that the 
governing elite engage in corrupt behavior (e.g., per Table 2-2) such that the citizen 
groups transgressed against lose social surplus while the governing elite gain social 
surplus. By holding power and moving first, the governing elite have the opportunity to 
gain social surplus at the citizens’ expense, e.g., from the full range o f Table 2-2
behaviors. When the governing elite transgress against the citizen groups, there is a 
resultant social surplus loss, reflecting the potential destruction of political, economic, 
and cultural resources due to the governing elite’s corrupt behavior— an assumption 
consistent with recent corruption research findings that demonstrate corruption degrades a 
state’s economic and political growth (see Mauro, 1995, 1996, 1997; Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1997, 1998; Tanzi, 1998). Citizen groups A and B move second. The citizen groups 
move simultaneously and may either (1) acquiesce, or (2) challenge the governing elite’s 
transgressions (corrupt behavior). Citizen groups lose social surplus if  they challenge the 
governing elite.
The Political Corruption Game is diagrammed in Figure 2-2. Total social surplus 
is maximized in Figure 2-2’s Subgame 4 (upper left cell) where there are no governing 
elite transgressions (corrupt behavior) and neither citizen group challenges, indicated by 
the governing elite receiving 2 units o f social surplus and each citizen group receiving 8. 
This acknowledges that the governing elite receive some minimal social surplus (2 units) 
from holding power. The Subgame 4 (upper left cell) payoff is Pareto-optimal for the 
citizen groups, as there is no other payoff position where both groups are better off. This 
Pareto-optimal payoff is the starting point for calculating all other Figure 2-2 payoffs.
Governing Elite (GE) Move First
Induced Subgame Between Subgame 
A and B (Payoffs: GE, A, B) Number
B
Acquiesce Challenge
Transgress A
Acquiesce
Challenge
8 ,2 ,2 * * 8, 2 , 1
8, 1,2 0, 7 , 7
Subgame 1 
(GE Pirates)
B
Acquiesce Challenge
Acquiesce
Challenge
4 , 2 ,9** 4 , 2 , 8
4 , 1 , 9 0, 7 , 7
Subgame 2 
(GE Pariahs)
B
Acquiesce Challenge
Challenge
Acquiesce
Challenge
4 , 9 , 2** 4, 9,1
4, 8 ,2 0, 7 , 7
B
Acquiesce Challenge
2, 8, 8** 2, 8 ,7
2, 7 ,8 0, 7 ,7
Subgame 3 
(GE Pariahs)
Subgame 4 
(GE Paragons)
** Single-Play Subgame Solutions (Equilibriums)
Political Corruption Game social surplus distributional consequences begin when 
the governing elite transgress against one or both citizen groups, and the citizen groups 
begin to challenge the transgressions. The governing elite lose 2 units o f social surplus
whenever both citizen groups challenge their behavior, indicating removal o f the 
governing elite from power. The governing elite increase their social surplus payoff for 
each citizen group they transgress against. Corrupt behavior destroys half o f all social 
surplus involved. When the governing elite successfully transgress against both citizen 
groups (Subgame 1), it costs each citizen group 6 units o f social surplus (3 go to the 
governing elite and 3 are lost). When the governing elite successfully transgress against 
only one citizen group (Subgames 2 & 3), the other group shares some o f the benefits in 
exchange for their support (not challenging) the governing elite. Where the governing 
elite successfully transgress against only one group, that group loses 6 units o f social 
surplus, the governing elite gain 2, the citizen group not transgressed against gains 1, and 
3 are lost. All challenges to governing elite transgressions cost the group challenging 1 
unit o f social surplus. The Figure 2-2 payoffs for the Political Corruption Game are 
determined by the strategies employed by the three players.
In the iterated (repeat play) version o f the Political Corruption Game, the “folk 
theorem” solution scheme applies, meaning that virtually any outcome shown in the 
Figure 2-2 payoff matrixes can be sustained as an equilibrium (solution). On closer 
analysis, however, the Political Corruption Game reveals several important lessons. The 
structure o f the game highlights that overcoming governing elite transgressions (corrupt 
behavior) is essentially a coordination problem among citizens. The governing elite fail 
in their transgressions whenever citizen groups cooperate and both challenge the 
governing elite’s corrupt behavior. When a coordination mechanism does not exist 
between citizen groups and players have only the past history o f citizen group moves on
which to base their strategies, when players have a sufficiently high discount rate (i.e.,
they are interested more in short-term than long-term gains); and when there are
opportunities for citizen groups to punish one another as this game structure allows; the
following are the Pareto-optimal (best payoff) strategies for each player in an iterated
game (see Weingast, 1997, p. 250):
Governing Elite: If either A or B has ever acquiesced to a transgression, the 
governing elite should transgress against both A and B. Otherwise, if  A and B 
have always challenged transgressions, the governing elite should not transgress 
against either group. (With this strategy the governing elite have the most 
certainty o f obtaining their largest payoff (8 units o f social surplus) while still 
protecting their hold on power.)
Group A: If B has challenged every previous transgression by the governing 
elite, then A should challenge if  the governing elite transgress, otherwise A 
should acquiesce. If B has acquiesced to a previous transgression by the 
governing elite, then A should always acquiesce. (This strategy provides A its 
best payoff chances.)
Group B: If A has challenged every previous transgression by the governing 
elite, then B should challenge if  the governing elite transgress, otherwise B 
should acquiesce. If A has acquiesced to a previous transgression by the 
governing elite, then B should always acquiesce. (This strategy provides B its 
best payoff chances.)
The above Pareto-optimal strategies highlight that unless a citizen group is certain 
that the other group will challenge a governing elite transgression, then the best citizen 
group strategy is to always acquiesce. Citizen group acquiescence is also always the best 
strategy when the governing elite are certain o f the citizen group moves. In fact, when the 
ruling elite are confident o f citizen group reactions to their first move, the single-play 
subgame solutions present the most likely multiple equilibriums for the overall game as 
shown by the solution analysis o f each subgame.
Elite Pirates and Systemic Corruption. In a single-play Political Corruption Game, 
Subgame 1 is similar to the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (see Morrow 1994: 
77-81). In Subgame 1, citizen groups receive higher social surplus payoffs (7 units) if 
they coordinate their behavior and both challenge the governing elite’s transgressions. 
However, without a coordination mechanism— some type of binding agreement among 
the citizens— Subgame 1 has a dominant strategy solution where both citizen groups are 
better o ff acquiescing to the governing elite’s corrupt behavior. When the governing elite 
are relatively certain at least one citizen group will not challenge a transgression against 
both groups, their optimal strategy is to transgress against both groups (i.e., engage in the 
most Table 2-2 corrupt behaviors). When Subgame 1 conditions exist, the governing 
elite most likely rule by hegemony and a collectivist political culture exists.
In a hegemonic-ruled society with a collectivist political culture, the principal 
interest o f the governing elite is standing (reputation). With hegemonic control over their 
society, the interest in standing concerns the governing elite’s position in relation to the 
governing elite in other societies. Here standing is measured primarily by the political 
power a governing elite wields and the tangible wealth (land, property, armed forces, etc.) 
it controls. Subgame 1 and Table 2-2 collectivist conditions provide the governing elite 
the maximum opportunities to extract wealth (social surplus) from their society. 
Hegemonic governing elite have only minimal worries about security (i.e., threats to their 
political power) as they have either ideological or coercive control over their society’s 
masses.9 They also do not have to worry about tangible wealth accumulation— as with 
little or no sustained elite or mass opinion against governing elite corrupt behavior (per
Table 2-2), the governing elite are free to extract unlimited resources from their society to 
support their personal quests for standing among other governing elite. Thus, in 
hegemonic-ruled societies with collectivist political cultures, the governing elite are most 
likely to act as pirates— social predators free to exploit their own societies and to pillage 
the resources they need to achieve or maintain standing.10 Such corruption is categorized 
as systemic, “a situation in which the major institutions and processes o f the state 
[society] are routinely dominated and used by corrupt individuals and groups, and in 
which many people have few practical alternatives to dealing with corrupt officials” 
(Johnston, 1998, p. 89).11
Elite Pariahs and Institutional Corruption. In a single-play Political Corruption 
Game, Subgames 2 and 3 exhibit asymmetrical solutions. In each o f these subgames, as a 
result o f one group sharing in the governing elite’s transgression against the other group, 
the citizen group not transgressed against has a dominant strategy to always acquiesce. 
Knowing that the group not transgressed against will always acquiesce (and will even 
support the governing elite in its corrupt behavior), the citizen group transgressed against 
will also always acquiesce to the governing elite’s corrupt activity. Again, as with 
Subgame 1, the Subgame 2 and 3 dominate solutions can only be overcome by 
coordination between both citizen groups. However, because o f the high social surplus 
payoff (9 units) to citizen groups not transgressed against, the Subgame 2 and 3 solutions 
are extremely robust. The citizen group allying with the governing elite and receiving an 
extra share o f the social surplus in these subgames has no incentive to coordinate with the 
other citizen group. Therefore, constructing citizen coordination mechanisms when the
governing elite transgress against only one group is extremely difficult. Because the 
Subgame 2 and 3 solutions are so robust, in the iterated Political Corruption Game these 
solutions are considered the game’s natural equilibriums, i.e., the most likely to occur in a 
world o f self-interested agents. Once a Subgame 2 or 3 equilibrium is reached in an 
iterated game, that equilibrium will persist as the citizen group not transgressed against is 
likely to resist building any coordination mechanism with the other citizen group. On the 
other hand, having established coordination with one citizen group, and knowing the 
other will always acquiesce, makes transgressing against only one citizen group an 
optimal governing elite strategy. Subgame 2 and 3 conditions are most likely in societies 
ruled by hierarchy and possessing individualistic political cultures.
In hierarchical-ruled societies with individualistic political cultures, the principal 
interest o f the governing elite is security. The main elite focus is to gather sufficient 
political power and tangible wealth to gain or maintain their position within the society’s 
hierarchical structure. They can usually achieve this goal by allying with one citizen 
group. Issues o f standing are o f minor importance to governing elite in individualistic 
societies, as they must expend their main efforts on maintaining their access to public 
office. With other elite and the masses less tolerant of corrupt behavior (per Table 2-2), 
governing elite in individualistic societies must take a strategic approach to executing 
their transgressions against the one citizen group, i.e., they must either avoid or 
successfully hide corrupt behaviors that may cause a loss o f support from other elite or 
the one citizen group that is not transgressed against. Without such a strategic approach, 
the corrupt behavior o f individualistic governing elite could generate a wave o f adverse
elite and mass opinion or direct action threatening their access to office. In individualistic 
political cultures, the governing elite are likely to become pariahs (outcasts) if  their 
corrupt behavior is uncovered. Such individualistic corruption is categorized as 
institutional, indicating that it exists clandestinely within isolated sections o f the society’s 
political and economic institutions.
Elite Paragons and Incidental Corruption. In a single-play Political Corruption 
Game, Subgame 4 reveals both citizen groups also have a dominant strategy to always 
acquiesce. In this subgame, it never pays a citizen group to challenge the governing elite, 
since there are no governing elite transgressions. The Subgame 4 solution requires that 
citizens solve their coordination problems so that the governing elite are certain that a 
transgression against one or both groups will result in challenges by both groups. With a 
primary goal o f remaining in office, and knowing they would face a loss o f power for 
their transgressions (corrupt behavior), the optimal strategy for the governing elite is to 
not transgress against either group. Subgame 4 conditions are normally found in societies 
ruled by heteronomy and possessing egalitarian political cultures.
In a heteronomous-ruled and egalitarian society, the principal interest o f the 
governing elite is both tangible (money, land, property, etc.) and intangible (education, 
human rights, etc.) wealth. Egalitarian governing elite worry little about either standing 
or security. Their principal interest is to generate wealth for the good o f the entire 
society. In egalitarian political cultures, both elite and mass opinion are so averse to 
corrupt behavior (per Table 2-2) that any such behavior would threaten the governing 
elite’s access to office. Due to the higher proportion o f commitment rules in egalitarian
cultures, the governing elite come under strong influence to honor their duties to remain 
non-corrupt, or face immediate removal from office fostered by a coalition o f elite and 
mass action. In egalitarian political cultures, the governing elite are most likely to act as 
paragons— model rulers acting in the non-corrupt roles that society expects them to play. 
In a world o f self-interested utility-maximizers, however, there will never be zero 
corruption. Thus, in egalitarian cultures political corruption should only be incidental to 
regular political and economic behavior.
The Figure 2-2 Political Corruption Game single-play subgame analysis reveals 
the four most likely solutions (equilibriums) in the overall iterated game. When faced 
with multiple equilibriums, game theorists turn to focal point analysis to help explain why 
one solution occurs in a specific case rather than another. Focal points identify factors 
exogenous to the game-theoretic model, e.g., factors in the Figure 2-1 external world 
(institutional rules, material realities, etc.), that help explain the particular game solutions. 
Focal points illuminate social expectations (i.e., player perceptions o f other player 
strategies) within the social context in which the strategic game interaction occurs 
(Schelling, 1960, pp. 57, 59, 111-113; Knight, 1995, 102). In other words, the focal point 
analysis assumes that the game equilibriums (solutions) are induced by the surrounding 
institutional structure (Shepsle, 1989, pp. 136-138). The following political corruption 
structural analysis develops the focal point solution concepts that provide additional 
insight in explaining the range o f corruption patterns expected o f governing elite in 
differing states.
Table 2-3 summarizes the components o f the theory of the causes o f political 
corruption developed so far in this chapter. This includes the Figure 2-1 internal world 
(agency) analysis and the external world structural factors dealing with political culture. 
Supporters o f either agency or cultural explanations for political corruption could stop 
their analysis here, but not constructivists. Constructivist derived theories o f social 
behavior must include not only relevant agency and cultural factors, but also other 
political and economic structural factors, including material resource factors. These 
additional structural factors, the focal point analysis still missing from the Political 
Corruption Game, are addressed next in this chapter.
Table 2-3. Summary o f Political Corruption Agency Analysis
Dominant Social Rules Instruction Directive Commitment
Rule’s Purposes Principles, beliefs Specificity, sanctions Create roles
Rule’s Function: What agents: should do. must do. right/duty to do.
Forms o f  Societal Rule Hegemony Hierarchy Heteronomy
Political Cultures C ollectivist Individualistic Egalitarian
Corruption Boundaries White Gray Black
Agent Interests Standing Security Wealth
Agent Status Pirates Pariahs Paragons
Corruption Patterns Systemic Institutional Incidental
A Political Corruption Structural Analysis
Constructivists define structure as stable patterns o f rules, institutions, and their 
unintended consequences. In determining the most important structural factors that cause 
political corruption, the analysis is facilitated by the work o f Johnston (1994) whose 
structural comparative theory o f political corruption includes several stable social rule- 
sets surrounding the political corruption phenomenon. Johnston (1994) argues that both 
societal political corruption patterns and individual political corruption scandals, across
time and for differing political and economic systems, can be explained by analyzing only 
five key social rule-sets. These social rule-sets include the nature o f a society’s: (1) 
boundaries between public office and private interests, (2) elite competition, (3) elite 
accountability, (4) mass participation, and (5) management o f material resources. The 
following structural analysis adds to Johnston’s work by characterizing each o f his 
identified rule-sets by its dominant mix o f social rules.
Boundaries Between Public and Private. A governing elite’s separation o f its public 
duties from its private interests, i.e., the boundaries between public and private, has been 
discussed in some detail in the above agency analysis. The establishment o f such 
boundaries is the central instruction rule governing political corruption. Heidenheimer’s 
(1970) three classifications o f corruption— white (weak), gray (moderate), and black 
(strong) (per Table 2-2)— provide a useful method to characterize the strength o f these 
boundaries within a society. As Table 2-2 displays, those societies with stronger 
boundaries between a governing elite’s public duties and private interests have lower 
incidences o f political corruption.
Evaluating a society’s boundaries (rules) between public and private spheres is not 
necessarily easy. The inability to measure political corruption behavior has always 
hampered corruption scholarship. Heidenhiemer’s work reveals that an initial step in 
measuring political corruption is to determine the types o f behavior, their incidence, and 
their evaluation (white, gray, black). This is often difficult as both the types o f political 
corruption behavior and their incidences are usually hidden to persons outside a society’s 
governing elite. Evaluations o f political corruption must also determine the strength and
formality o f both formal and informal anti-corruption rules. Formal rules are usually 
embedded in a plethora o f constitutional provisions, laws, statutes, regulations, directives, 
standard operating procedures, etc., designed to prevent corrupt behavior by placing 
restrictions on a governing elite. The formal rules are usually issued as directive rules. 
(Specifics o f these formal directive rules are discussed further in the following analyses 
of elite competition, elite accountability, mass participation, and material resources.)
Also o f concern in evaluating a society’s corruption boundaries are the informal 
rules that may strengthen corruption boundaries, but more likely are used to weaken 
formal directive rules. For example, a society may have a number o f formal directive 
rules meant to prohibit governing elite corrupt behavior. However, if  the society’s 
informal rules designate that the sanctions assigned to these directive rules will not be 
enforced (an elite accountability issue), then the formal directive rules provide little 
support to strengthening the boundaries between public and private. Thus, it is important 
to investigate the existence and efficiency o f both formal and informal rules when 
evaluating a society’s boundaries between public and private spheres.
Elite Competition. A basic premise found throughout the political corruption literature, 
the closest thing corruption theory may have to a basic law, is that competition leads to 
fewer opportunities for corrupt behavior (Rose-Ackerman, 1978, p. 148). Within 
Johnston’s (1994) rule-sets, competition is an issue in how governing elite compete for 
political power (discussed in this section) and in how a society’s material resources are 
managed (discussed later). Elite competition encompasses social rules that define elite 
requirements for gaining or retaining their hold on power. These include rules that
concern elite mobility issues, electoral systems, and elite consensus. While seldom issued 
with anti-corruption measures in mind, the rule-sets in these areas often foster unintended 
consequences o f political corruption. Developing balanced elite competition conditions 
is an important factor in reducing political corruption opportunities.
Rules regulating elite mobility concern the opportunities for actual or aspiring 
elite to advance in the society’s social system. A first elite mobility factor is the openness 
of the governing elite to new members. Elite competition is restricted when the 
governing elite is open only to individuals from certain social or economic groups. 
McMullan (1961, pp. 190-191) highlights the problem with a closed governing elite as he 
argues that when one group is put at a disadvantage in joining a governing elite, it 
becomes a source o f corruption. This leads to a second elite mobility factor that finds 
when access to the governing elite is closed, and there are also few other social or 
economic avenues that provide elite mobility opportunities, the probability o f corrupt 
behavior increases as elite competition is further skewed.
Huntington (1968) raised the idea that a structural imbalance in elite competition,
i.e., between political and social/economic opportunities, was a cause o f corruption. 
Huntington offers:
In most forms corruption involves an exchange o f political action for economic 
wealth. The particular forms that will be prevalent in a society depend upon the 
ease o f access to one as against the other. In a society with multiple 
opportunities for the accumulation o f wealth and few positions o f political 
power, the dominant pattern will be the use o f the former to achieve the latter.... 
[However, when] [t]he opportunities for the accumulation o f wealth through 
private activity are limited ....politics becomes the road to wealth, and those 
enterprising ambitions and talents which cannot find what they want in business
may yet do so in politics Corruption...results when the absence o f mobility
opportunities outside politics, combined with weak and inflexible political
institutions, channels energies into politically deviant behavior. (Huntington, 
1968, p. 66)
M orris’s (1991) study o f Mexican political corruption supports Huntington’s 
thesis that corruption results from imbalances between political and social/economic 
opportunities for elite advancement. Among Mexican political and commercial entities, 
Morris found that when the state structure provides the principal elite mobility 
opportunities, the more powerful governing elite are free to extort social resources from 
both the business sector and the citizenry. On the other hand, he also identifies that when 
elite social/economic opportunities are greater, then bribery o f a less powerful governing 
elite by commercial enterprises desiring preferential political decisions is common. 
M orris’s study found Mexican corruption levels at their lowest when there is a balance 
between political and social/economic mobility opportunities. Johnston (1996a) also 
supports Huntington’s thesis as he demonstrates that those states with the least corruption 
exhibit a balance between: (1) political and economic opportunities, and (2) state and 
society.
Governing elite longevity in office is a third elite mobility factor that affects elite 
competition. When a single governing elite monopolizes its hold on state power, the 
opportunities for corruption increase dramatically (Heywood, 1997, p. 15; Della Porta & 
Meny, 1997, p. 172). This is especially true when a corrupt governing elite is able, 
through their directive rule making over a long period in office, to strengthen the 
processes (institutions) by which they extract resources legally from a society. This 
situation was highlighted in the iterated version o f the Political Corruption Game where it 
could be shown that a strategic advantage in extracting resources from a state could
become institutionalized in Subgames 1, 2, and 3 by a governing elite with long-term 
rule-making power (also see Knight, 1992, p. 40).
A society’s electoral system rules also play an important role in what a governing 
elite must do to gain or retain office. In most Caribbean societies, the causes o f political 
corruption are associated closely with their electoral processes. Two important factors 
come into play in analyzing how a society’s electoral processes affect political corruption 
levels. First, the voting process itself is an important factor. Governing elite greatly 
increase their chances o f remaining in office when they alter elite competition factors by 
rigging elections in their favor. Such manipulation o f the voting process coincides with 
increased corruption levels. Second, the processes governing elite use to accumulate 
resources for election campaigning is an important factor influencing political corruption 
levels.
Heywood (1997, p. 14) highlights that in democracies it costs money to run 
election campaigns and maintain electoral support. Weyland (1998) even argues that the 
need for vast resources to conduct wide-scale media campaigns is the primary cause of 
Latin American and Caribbean political corruption. Elite competition improves 
whenever the amount o f resources (money, personnel, time, etc.) the governing elite need 
to participate in the electoral process is both minimized and balanced and the electoral 
process itself is fair and open. Where large amounts o f resources are needed to 
participate in electoral processes, competition quickly becomes limited to only those elite 
candidates with the ability to generate resources. Political corruption increases in
resource-driven elections as governing elite are forced into patronage networks that can 
generate sufficient resources to support candidates.
Political patronage or clientelistic systems are often sighted as a primary cause of 
political corruption (see Rose Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988; Jain, 1998b). In its 
simplest form, a patron-client relationship entails transactions between individuals, 
groups, or combinations of both. The client normally offers a benefit or service to the 
patron, in exchange for which the patron offers some other benefit or service to the client 
(Clapham, 1982). Such transactions establish situations o f reciprocity or obligation 
between the patron and client. Patron-client relationships are both legal and illegal. For 
example, representational clientelism, where citizens (clients) provide votes to a 
governing elite (patrons) they feel will benefit them or their society the most, is a legal 
patron-client transaction found in democracies. Political corruption occurs when the 
governing elite engage in illegal patron-client transactions that benefit the private 
interests o f the governing elite.
Patron-clientelism is a complex social phenomenon. It involves a variety o f 
different behaviors and a number o f different actors. Actors may fill the role o f patrons, 
clients, or agents, persons who assume an intermediary role between the patron and 
clients. For example, in Klitgaard’s (1988) study o f corruption, the patron (principal) is 
assumed to be the state’s mass citizenry; agents, the state’s governing elite; and clients, 
domestic or international actors desiring access to state resources. Actors may also 
assume dual roles. For example, Edie (1991) argues that Jamaica’s governing elite are 
embedded in a system o f dual-clientelism. She develops how the Jamaican governing
elite act as patrons toward members o f their own political parties, but are simultaneously 
mired in a condition o f international dependency where the Jamaican governing elite act 
as clients to international financial concerns (international financial institutions, 
transnational corporations, foreign businesses, international aid organizations, etc.).
All political systems contain some patronage or clientelistic rules. For the 
purposes o f this study, Table 2-2 helps categorize the differences in patron-client systems 
across political cultures. All o f the types o f political corruption behavior listed in Table 
2-2 may involve illegal transactions between patrons and clients. This is especially true 
o f the first five political corruption behaviors in Table 2-2 that are the subject o f much of 
the political corruption literature regarding illegal patron-client relationships. Table 2-2 
reveals that the incidences o f patron-client transactions are the lowest in egalitarian 
political cultures. Egalitarian political cultures usually encompass representational 
clientelism and systems o f political spoils— whereby winning political parties are able to 
appoint senior party loyalists to key government positions. However, even within a 
system o f political spoils, the governing elite in egalitarian political cultures still act for 
the good o f the entire society.
Normally, individualistic political cultures also include representational 
clientelism, however, their political spoils systems are much larger. Winning political 
parties in individualistic political cultures are able to appoint more party loyalists to an 
even greater number o f positions within the government bureaucracy. Table 2-2 reveals 
that patron-client transactions are more frequent in individualistic than in egalitarian 
political cultures. These more frequent patron-client transactions help the governing elite
obtain the vast resources needed to conduct media-intensive electoral campaigns and thus 
keep the self-interested individualistic governing elite in power.
Collectivist political cultures exhibit the most frequent patron-client transactions 
(see Table 2-2). Hegemonic governing elite in collectivist political cultures are able to 
saturate government structures with party or group loyalists. Because social institutions 
are weaker in collectivist political cultures, patron-client relationships may come to 
dominate the daily political and economic transactions in these societies. A review o f the 
Table 2-2 types o f behaviors and incidences provides a good overview o f the probability 
of patron-client relationships in differing political cultures that affect the characteristics of 
a society’s elite competition.
Lack o f consensus among societal groups regarding what social rules should be 
promulgated concerning important societal issues is another important factor in 
evaluating elite competition. Huntington (1968) informs this analysis by offering that the 
absence o f societal agreement, fostered by the existence o f competing value systems and 
cultures, encourages corruption. In a study o f corruption under both authoritarian and 
democratic systems in Chile and the Philippines, M ontinola (1995) demonstrates that 
corruption levels decrease when competition on societal issues is unidimensional—  
meaning members o f the same group vote consistently on all issues. Unidimensionality, 
where one issue can be used to predict a group m ember’s votes on all issues, indicates a 
high level o f intra-elite consensus.
M ontinola (1995) also argues that corruption levels increase when competition on 
societal issues is multidimensional— meaning members o f the same group vote differently
upon a variety o f issues. Multidimensionality indicates a lack of elite consensus, thus 
affecting the ability o f groups to construct coordination mechanisms for collective action. 
The ability o f societal groups to foster both intra-group and inter-group consensus and 
cooperation is an important factor in generating the anti-corruption commitment rules 
discussed in following sections.
Elite competition can be characterized as constricted, oppositional, or corporatist. 
In societies ruled by hegemony and possessing collectivist political cultures, governing 
elite competition is constricted. The group o f governing elite is normally closed with 
limited membership potential for citizens outside governing elite circles. Elite 
competition is limited to that among factions of the governing elite itself. Outside the 
society’s government structure, there are usually few opportunities for citizens to advance 
socially or economically. Political opportunities prevail over social and economic ones. 
Governing elite, whether consisting o f governing families or parties, normally remain in 
power for long periods. Constricted elite competition is also characterized by strong 
intra-group elite cooperation on most issues. With little or no real elite competition, 
directive rules concerning elite competition in collectivist societies focus only on what 
must be done for the elite to maintain control o f the society’s security apparatus, maintain 
ideological control o f the citizenry, and/or maintain political support within the strongest 
factions o f the governing elite.
In states ruled by hierarchy and possessing individualistic political cultures, 
governing elite competition is generally more unfriendly and hostile, i.e., oppositional, 
than that in hegemonic or egalitarian states. Elite mobility is more open as aspiring elite
can more easily advance through party channels. Political parties tend to be voted out of 
office periodically. Oppositional elite competition centers on the political survival of 
governing elite. Resources for electoral campaigns in individualistic societies come 
mainly from private sources. With their hold on political power in hierarchical societies 
less certain than in hegemonic societies, the threat o f governing elite loss o f power 
generates the oppositional elite competition. Elite must fear being voted out o f office for 
two primary reasons. First, loss o f political power eliminates their access to the state 
resources that comes with public office. Second, loss o f political power makes the former 
governing elite vulnerable to charges o f corruption or other crimes from those ascending 
to power.
In societies ruled by heteronomy and possessing egalitarian political cultures, 
governing elite competition is open and balanced, thus lending itself to consensus 
building and not antagonistic competition. Elite competition in an atmosphere of 
consensus building is corporatist in nature (see Katzenstein, 1985). The governing elite 
are open to all societal elements. Seldom does one governing elite faction maintain 
power for extended periods. There is a balance between both elite and mass political, 
economic, and social opportunities. This balance of opportunities creates a situation 
where the governing elite are not threatened by a loss o f power, they can always earn a 
living outside politics, and therefore worry little about elite competition. Corporatist elite 
competition focuses on societal advancement and not political survival as the chief 
concern o f the governing elite. Directive and commitment rules concerning elite 
competition help ensure the balance between state and society and do not artificially
restrict elite competition in any manner. Electoral resources in heteronomous societies 
are either provided by the state, or are regulated such that the competition for private 
resources does not affect the outcome o f elections.
Elite Accountability. O nuf s constructivism offers that directive rules require the 
support o f sanctions if agents decide not to follow the applicable rules. The analysis of 
anti-corruption sanctions speaks directly to elite accountability. A lack o f accountability 
provides increasing opportunities for the elite to act corrupt. In analyzing elite 
accountability there are two dimensions that must be addressed: (1) answerability and,
(2) enforcement (Schedler, 1999, p. 14).
Answerability concerns the obligation for public officials to keep citizens 
informed about their activities and to explain public decisions (Schedler, 1999, p. 14). 
Answerability includes public officials providing information, facts, and data on public 
activities, more commonly referred to as freedom of information. It requires a free media 
(radio, television, newspapers, magazines, etc.). The media are not only the primary 
purveyor o f information to the public, but also act as public monitors (watchdogs) that 
report public activities and initiate discourses on the topics most important to society 
(e.g., political corruption). Answerability also requires public officials to make 
themselves available in public or private forums to provide information, answer citizen 
questions, and explain public decisions.
Enforcement, the second dimension o f elite accountability, concerns the capacity 
o f a state to impose sanctions upon officials who have violated their public duties 
(Schedler, 1999, p. 14). When official behavior is called into question, it must eventually
be investigated and punished if  found in violation o f the rules. Sanctions (punishment) 
resulting from enforcement actions include those contained in the society’s 
administrative, electoral, and criminal justice systems. Administratively, a society must 
have the capacity within its governmental bureaucracy to uncover corrupt behavior (by 
inspections, audits, whistleblowers, etc.) and then the ability to take appropriate 
administrative action. Administrative sanctions may include censures, fines, or removal 
from office. Administrative sanctions highlight the need for openness and transparency 
in government budgeting and contracting. Without administrative openness and 
transparency, corrupt behavior by the governing elite may go uncovered, (see Caiden & 
Caiden, 1977; Caiden, 1978).
Corrupt governing elite may also be held accountable by the society’s electoral 
and criminal justice systems. Electorally, when corruption is found or is a perceived 
problem with the governing elite, citizens must be able to remove suspected officials, i.e., 
throw the crooks out, during the course of regular or special elections. When an official’s 
corrupt behavior violates criminal statutes, the society’s criminal justice system must be 
able to investigate, bring to trial, and punish wrongdoers that are found guilty.
Evaluating elite accountability is a new topic in political research. Adapting the 
work o f O ’Donnell (1999), this study offers that there exist three distinct types o f elite 
accountability— circular, vertical, and horizontal.
Circular accountability is characteristic o f collective political cultures and 
symbolizes informal answerability and enforcement o f societal rules within the 
individual’s respective group. Elite accountability is the preserve o f the small governing
elite in collectivist cultures. Government bureaucracies, elections, and criminal justice 
systems have little or no role in circular elite accountability. For all but the most 
egregious offenses, elite punishment in collectivist political cultures normally entails the 
corrupt official’s removal, often only temporarily, from the group o f governing elite.
Vertical accountability is characteristic o f individualistic cultures and signifies 
that answerability and enforcement measures originate in and travel through a society’s 
vertical bureaucracy. Offenses for which elite are held accountable would be serious and 
would normally be revealed by the governmental bureaucracy. Once elite offenses are 
made known to the public, the process for punishment would follow within the confines 
of the society’s administrative, electoral, or criminal justice systems.
Horizontal accountability is characteristic o f egalitarian cultures and indicates that 
answerability and enforcement originate not only within the governmental bureaucracy, 
but also from groups outside government. In horizontal accountability, the media and 
civil society assume important roles in corruption oversight and have horizontal access to 
all levels o f the government.
Mass Participation. The recognition o f the lack o f mass participation as a causal factor 
in political corruption is an emerging segment o f the anti-corruption literature (see 
Johnston, 1994, 1998). Two social-ruled dimensions pertain to the relationship between 
mass citizen participation and political corruption levels: (1) the promulgation o f 
directive rules that allow citizens to participate in government decision-making processes, 
and (2) the development o f commitment rules that emerge as a result o f the process o f 
mass participation.
Many societies lack directive rules that allow their citizens the right to participate 
in government decision-making. As discussed above as an elite accountability issue, 
societies often restrict both the release o f government information and the m edia’s ability 
to investigate and report. Therefore, citizens often know little about government 
activities, which hampers their ability for real participation in government decision­
making. Some societies place legal restrictions on citizen freedoms concerning public or 
private discussions; assembly and demonstration; formation o f political, labor, or civic 
organizations; and religious worship. For example, in the Caribbean, Freedom House 
offers that 22 o f 25 independent states restrict their citizens’ civil liberties in one way or 
another (Karatnycky, 1999).
Freedom o f civil liberties allows citizens to organize and influence government 
decision-making. Where mass citizen participation is permitted, citizens have the 
opportunity for social empowerment. Social empowerment entails “strengthening civil 
society in order to enhance its political and economic vitality, providing more orderly 
paths o f access and rules o f interaction between state and society, and balancing 
economic and political opportunities” (Johnston, 1998, p. 85). While exact methods of 
social empowerment differ among states, “societies will have in common...the emerging 
strength o f the groups and interests which make up civil society— that is organizations, 
enterprises and informal social networks active in the realm between individuals and 
government” (Johnston, 1998, p. 91). Where civil society is weak, citizens become 
vulnerable to exploitation. Where civil society is strong, citizens are able to build 
coordination mechanisms across groups that are essential to ensuring elite accountability.
An unintended consequence o f the lack o f mass participation or social empowerment is 
greater levels o f political corruption.
The second social-ruled dimension o f mass citizen participation concerns the 
emergence o f societal commitment rules. A strong civil society fosters the development 
o f commitment rules. One method o f developing commitment rules, i.e., the creation of 
roles and establishment o f rights and duties, is to strengthen instruction and directive 
rules. Thus, commitment rule generation becomes an unintended consequence o f the 
strengthening o f instruction and directive rules through mass participation. Before anti­
corruption commitment rules can emerge, a society must first possess sufficient anti­
corruption instruction and directive rules, including those governing the boundaries 
between public office and private interest, elite accountability, elite competition, mass 
citizen participation, and management o f societal material resources (discussed later).
Fostering anti-corruption commitment rules is at the heart o f building self- 
enforcing mechanisms that influence a governing elite to make it their duty (promise) not 
to behave corruptly— a situation where civil society takes this duty as their corresponding 
right. Where strong anti-corruption commitment rules exist, the governing elite know 
that if  they violate their duty to not behave corruptly, civil society will automatically 
challenge the elite’s behavior. The situation becomes self-enforcing as the governing 
elite honor their duties (promises) in the face o f a strong civil society (see Weingast, 
1997). Therefore, the ability o f a state’s civil society to generate anti-corruption 
commitment rules, i.e., strengthen its social empowerment, becomes a key horizontal 
accountability mechanism helping prevent political corruption.
Not all commitment rules have positive effects upon society. Societies have 
different mixes o f instruction, directive, and commitment rules. At times, instead of 
positive commitment rules leading to public goods (e.g., lower levels o f corrupt 
behavior), commitment rules can actually foster public bads. This is the case where the 
roles that commitment rules create result in rights and duties that have negative social 
effects. For example, societies with systemic corruption patterns develop well-defined 
duties and rights (i.e., commitment rules) “to the point that they become actually 
transferable, assignable, inheritable, and saleable” (Cheung, 1996, p. 4). These 
institutionalized duties and rights regarding corrupt behavior result from the building of 
negative commitment rules that are not in the public’s best interest.
Negative commitment rules can develop in situations where a society organizes 
informally in response to the lack o f a formal system to provide public goods. In several 
Caribbean states, where the formal economy is unable to generate employment, or the 
government is unable to provide basic citizen services, societies often take it upon 
themselves to informally organize and foster both employment and basic citizen services. 
The result is the proliferation o f informal economies that pay no taxes toward the public 
good and the fostering o f criminal gangs or paramilitary military forces that provide 
vigilante security services to citizen groups. Accompanying these informal structures are 
rising societal crime and violence levels, upheavals o f family structures (as more family 
members must work outside the home), rising social conflict, and a delegitimization o f 
the government’s authority to rule. An unintended consequence o f these informal 
structures is the generation o f their own negative commitment rules (i.e., rights and duties
that are not in the best interest o f the public). Therefore, when discussing the role o f civil 
society in generating commitment rules, it is important to differentiate between situations 
leading to public goods versus those leading to public bads.
With the social empowerment o f civil society able to produce both positive and 
negative commitment rules, another method is required to conceptualize the idea o f social 
empowerment leading to positive commitment rules. The concept o f social trust fills this 
requirement by representing positive social action associated with building commitment 
rules for the public good. An unintended consequence o f the positive strengthening o f 
civil society while building commitment rules is the growth o f social trust. Social trust 
indicates “the expectation that arises within a community o f regular, honest, and 
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part o f other members of 
that community” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 26). Social trust allows groups to organize to a 
lower level (decentralize) and fosters spontaneous sociability— the ability o f groups to 
work closely together (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 29). In other words, social trust is a shared 
willingness o f both citizens and governing elite to keep commitments.
Social trust is the mechanism that allows citizens to form organizations and 
associations— the foundation to building strong civil societies. Where strong social trust 
exists, citizens spontaneously organize into “dense and complex network[s] o f voluntary 
organizations: churches, professional societies, charitable institutions, private schools, 
universities, hospitals, and ...a very strong private business sector” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 
50). Social trust can itself be seen as a public good, one that makes it possible to
surmount societal collective action problems. The level of a society’s social trust is 
directly correlated to its level o f positive commitment rules.
Recent studies highlight the importance o f building social trust. In a study of 
world political economy, Fukuyama (1995) demonstrates that a state’s economic product 
is directly correlated with its level o f social trust. Fukuyama reveals that states with high 
levels o f social trust are able to build the vital organizational structures between the state 
structure and individual family units that are critical to economic efficiency and growth. 
In a study o f corruption in Nicaragua, Seligson (1999) found interpersonal trust as an 
important variable affecting citizen perceptions o f both corruption levels and the 
legitimacy o f government. He noted “ [individuals who trust each other are able to 
interact in civil society in a more positive fashion....’’(Seligson, 1999, p. 57).
The ability to generate social trust is a function o f a society’s culture (Fukuyama, 
1995, p. 33; Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995, p. 10). The amount o f social trust can vary in 
differing levels o f society, ranging from the trust placed in family units, to that in 
government structures, to that in society as a whole. Recognizing the varying levels at 
which social trust exists, it can be characterized in three categories—paternalistic, 
pluralistic, and cosmopolitan (adapted from Earle & Cvetkovich, 1995). The level of 
social trust makes an excellent proxy variable for measuring mass participation.
Paternalistic social trust is characteristic o f collectivist cultures where trust is 
limited to only members o f an individual’s social group, (i.e., family, tribe, ethnic group, 
etc.). Where paternalistic trust dominates, there usually exists little social trust o f 
individuals in different social groups, in the government structure, or in society as a
whole. Pluralistic social trust is characteristic of individualistic cultures where a minimal 
level o f trust is necessary for differing groups to work together. While self-interested 
behavior is the rule in individualistic cultures, most individuals see it is in their best 
interest to work with others. Where pluralistic social trust exists, there is moderate intra­
group and inter-group trust, and a minimal level o f trust in both government structures 
and society as a whole. Cosmopolitan social trust is characteristic o f egalitarian cultures. 
Cosmopolitan social trust develops from widespread inter-group transactions and 
includes significant inter-personal communication. Where cosmopolitan social trust 
exists, moderate to strong intra-group and inter-group trust proliferates. Additionally, 
there is moderate to strong trust in government structures and in society as a whole. 
Cosmopolitan social trust is the result o f the emergence o f positive societal commitment 
rules.
Material Resource Factors. No constructivist analysis is complete without 
consideration o f how material resources, both routine and extraordinary, impact upon the 
social behavior under investigation. Social rules turn raw materials into material 
resources. Material resource availability plays a major role in agent decision processes. 
Material resource systems help define the opportunities available for a governing elite to 
act corruptly. This section looks first at directive rules pertaining to routine material 
resource systems, or how a society’s economy is structured and how state-owned 
resources are managed.
Beginning with the writings o f Adam Smith (1723-1790 AD), David Ricardo 
(1772-1823 AD), and other liberal nineteenth and twentieth century economists, theorists
argue that to achieve economic efficiency, political interests must be prohibited from 
subverting market forces. The subversion o f market forces is often referred to as rent 
seeking— government elite activity aimed at increasing the payment for a resource over 
what the resource would command in a competitive market or in other use (i.e., through 
regulations, payoffs, bribes, extortion, etc.) (see Krueger, 1974; Tullock, 1989). A non­
interventionist society with open and free markets is hypothesized to reduce the 
opportunities for governmental rent seeking or outright theft o f public resources. Thus, 
an unintended consequence o f an open and free market system is a reduction o f political 
corruption. Building from this logic, there are three routine categories o f material 
resource systems—patrimonial, statist, and market.
Patrimonial material resource systems are dominated by instruction rules and 
normally found in collectivist societies. Patrimonial material resource systems foster 
maximum government control by limiting which classes o f citizens (normally only the 
governing elite) have access to material resources. In these systems the small governing 
elite tightly control the economy and decide, often capriciously, how state-owned 
resources are distributed. Patrimonial material resource systems are usually not 
transparent and provide unlimited opportunities for rent seeking activities. The governing 
elite are given the opportunity to use the national treasury and state-owned resources as if 
they were their own personal property, and decide what, if any, resources may be 
distributed for the public good. To maximize their access to societal resources, 
governments with patrimonial material resource systems maintain strict control over their 
economies, usually including high levels o f protectionism o f foreign trade (high tariffs,
etc.), high personal and corporate taxes, government ownership of major enterprises 
(public utilities, basic foodstuff production, etc.) and infrastructure (ports, airports, 
railroads, etc.), strict wage and price controls, and a variety of regulations (licensing, 
contracting, customs procedures, etc.) that allow maximum rent seeking by government 
officials. One analysis o f corruption in underdeveloped societies found that where 
extensive patrimonialism existed, “the majority of the population are more or less 
permanently excluded” from the benefits o f state resources (Theobold, 1990, p. 91).
Statist material resource systems are dominated by directive rules and found in 
individualistic societies. Statist material resource systems find less government control of 
a state’s economy and state-owned resources. Statist systems utilize a mix o f patrimonial 
and free market mechanisms to manage their economies, while still providing the 
governing elite ample opportunities for rent seeking. Knowing that their opportunities to 
accumulate capital are dependent upon their control o f the state’s resources and economic 
processes, governing elite in statist systems strive to ensure they play key decision­
making roles in economic and state resource management. Statist material resource 
economic management includes some protectionism o f foreign trade, some government 
ownership o f key enterprises and infrastructure, and a special emphasis on regulations 
(licensing, contracting procedures, etc.) that allow substantial rent seeking by government 
officials. In effect, governing elite in statist systems see the state’s economy and state- 
owned resources as their own private business resources and regulate them in a manner 
providing ample opportunity for illicit capital accumulation (see Manzetti & Blake,
1996). Theobald (1990, p. 95) found that even among developed societies, corruption
levels soar when the state becomes so involved in economic management “that in the 
absence o f adequate alternatives the state apparatus becomes the main vehicle of 
economic advancement and capital accumulation” for those in power.
Market material resource systems are dominated by commitment rules and found 
in egalitarian societies. Market material resource systems present the liberal ideal o f free 
and open economies and efficient state-owned resource management. Taking their lead 
from the works o f Smith (1937) and Ricardo (1960), market systems view the only role 
for the state in the economy is to provide public goods that the market is unable to 
provide (monetary systems, public transportation infrastructure, etc.). State ownership of 
enterprises is contemplated only if the enterprise has no competition and state-ownership 
is in the public’s best interest. Market economies enjoy maximum transparency and 
openness. State-owned resource management is also highly efficient and transparent. 
Overall, the market resource system presents the fewest opportunities for rent seeking.
The second dimension o f material resource management concerns the input of 
extraordinary material resources into the Figure 2-1 internal world analysis. 
Extraordinary resources are any large amount of monetary or other resources that are 
provided outside a state’s regular (routine) economic transactions. The sources o f 
extraordinary resources may include: (1) state revenues from the discovery or 
development o f a new industry, i.e., petroleum, mining, tourism, etc.; (2) funds from the 
privatization o f state-owned enterprises; (3) international loans or aid, (4) large bribes to 
officials from foreign businesses seeking government contracts (see Lambsdorff, 1998); 
(5) funds from transnational organized crime activity such as drug trafficking (see
Williams, 1994); or (6) other activities that present the governing elite with a large 
amount o f resources outside the society’s routine economic processes. The availability of 
extraordinary resources alters the Figure 2-1 internal world analysis. The input of 
extraordinary resources into the Figure 2-1 model increases both the opportunities for 
political corruption and the willingness o f government elite to behave corruptly. While 
not characterized within the constructivist theory o f social rules, as done with the other 
social phenomenon investigated above, the effects o f extraordinary material resources 
must always be considered in analyses based upon the Figure 2-1 constructivist analytic 
frame.
Johnston (1986) provides an analysis that highlights the effects o f extraordinary 
resources that are inserted into a governing elite’s cost-benefit analysis. Where the stakes 
o f the corruption are routine (i.e., situations without extraordinary resource inputs), 
existing political corruption patterns tend to become integrative and stable. Integrative 
corruption means that those involved in corrupt transactions have shared interests and the 
corrupt exchanges develop lasting networks. Stability indicates that agents involved in 
the corrupt exchanges remain the same. Political corruption with routine stakes 
maximizes cooperation among those involved in the corrupt exchanges, while not 
unnecessarily antagonizing those outside the exchanges, such that an equilibrium 
develops where there is little outcry to change the corrupt behavior. In situations with 
routine stakes, the rules that influence corrupt behavior remain stable and are extremely 
hard to change.
Where the stakes o f corruption become extraordinary, the resultant political 
corruption tends to be disintegrative and unstable. Disintegrative corruption means that 
those involved in the corrupt transactions have no shared interests, the corrupt exchanges 
are often temporary, and networks of lasting exchanges do not evolve. Unstable 
corruption also entails that agents involved in the corrupt activity change frequently. 
Political corruption with extraordinary stakes results in only temporary cooperation 
among those involved in the corrupt exchanges, while often antagonizing those outside 
the exchanges. In situations with extraordinary stakes, the political and economic rules 
that influence corrupt behavior become unstable.
When extraordinary stakes are present, agents display a greater willingness toward 
corrupt behavior because o f the potential high payoffs. Increasing corrupt behavior 
influences changes in the Figure 2-1 institutional structure. The existence o f 
extraordinary stakes not only increases short term corruption levels, but also tends to 
strengthen the instruction and directive rules that influence long term corruption levels 
(per the feedback loop in Figure 2-1). Additionally, by decreasing governing elite 
legitimacy (i.e., part o f the disintegrative effect), extraordinary stakes lead to the 
destruction o f anti-corruption commitment rules. In states with systemic or institutional 
corruption patterns, extraordinary stakes strengthen the rules causing corruption. In states 
with incidental corruption levels, extraordinary stakes destroy commitment rules and 
move the state toward institutional or systemic corruption levels. Thus, any one o f the 
above six sources o f extraordinary resources, if  not managed within its own set o f strict 
directive rules, can quickly raise a society’s political corruption levels.
Specifying The Theory
Table 2-4 is a synoptic table o f the coordinates o f political corruption. The table 
includes elements from the constructivist theory o f social rules (Table 2-1) and the 
characterizations of the social phenomena addressed in the agency and structural analyses 
presented in this chapter. At the bottom of Table 2-4 is a hypothetical corruption index
modeled on the 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (no corruption) scale used by Transparency
12International (TI) to annually rate state corruption levels.
Table 2-4. Coordinates o f Political Corruption
Dominant Social Rules Instruction Directive Commitment
Rule’s Purposes Principles, beliefs Specificity, sanctions Create roles
Rule’s Function: What agents: should do must do right/duty to do
Forms o f  Societal Rule Hegemony Hierarchy Heteronomy
Political Cultures C ollectivist Individualistic Egalitarian
Elite Competition Constricted Oppositional Corporatist
Elite Accountability Circular Vertical Horizontal
Mass Participation Paternalistic Pluralistic Cosmopolitan
Material Resource Factors Patrimonial Statist Market
Public/Private Boundaries White Gray Black
Agent Interests Standing Security Wealth
Agent Status Pirates Pariahs Paragons
Corruption Patterns System ic Institutional Incidental
Corruption Index:
0 10
Table 2-4 provides the basis for this study’s theory o f the causes o f political 
corruption. The table is probabilistic and not deterministic. By evaluating the 
characteristics o f the Table 2-4 social phenomenon present in a society, a vertical 
interpolation o f those characteristics provides a probable evaluation o f that society’s 
agent status, corruption pattern, and corruption index score. Thus, the table provides a
conceptual method to explain a society’s political corruption pattern and to predict a 
society’s rating on the annual Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.
Few societies will exhibit the exact characteristics o f the social phenomenon 
contained in any one o f Table 2-4’s three right columns. Most societies will exhibit 
characteristics from two or more of the columns. Additionally, in accordance with the 
constructivist tenet that all social phenomena (institutions) are composed o f different 
mixes o f instruction, directive, and commitment rules, some societies will exhibit social 
phenomena characteristics somewhere between adjacent columns. For example, since the 
time o f Alexis de Tocqueville, the U S’s political culture has been evaluated as a 
somewhat balanced mix o f individualistic and egalitarian characteristics (see Ellis, 1993). 
Thus, horizontal interpolation between the Table 2-4 columns of social phenomena 
characteristics is also possible (see Chapters 5 and 6 for examples).
A number o f theoretical propositions may be constructed from Table 2-4.
The three most important propositions include:
Proposition One: Societies with coordinate of political corruption factors (form 
o f societal rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability, mass 
participation, market resource factors, boundaries between public and private) 
that are dominated by instruction rules, or near equal combinations o f 
instruction and directive rules, will likely experience systemic political 
corruption patterns.
Proposition Two: Societies with coordinate o f political corruption factors (form 
o f societal rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability, mass 
participation, market resource factors, boundaries between public and private) 
that are dominated by directive rules, or near equal combinations o f directive 
rules with either instruction or commitment rules, will likely experience 
institutional political corruption patterns.
Proposition Three: Societies with coordinate o f political corruption factors 
(form o f societal rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability,
mass participation, market resource factors, boundaries between public and 
private) that are dominated by commitment rules, or near equal combinations of 
commitment rules and directive rules, will likely experience incidental political 
corruption patterns.
It is important to understand that the above propositions, and others derived from 
the Table 2-4 relationships, remain at the conceptual level. Table 2-4 is the result of this 
chapter’s theoretical analysis that investigates an extremely complex social behavior (i.e., 
political corruption), one that has puzzled social scientists for decades, and reduces it to 
key social concepts that allow an understanding o f the interdisciplinary causes o f political 
corruption. While the work o f Heidenheimer (1970, 1989) and Johnston (1994) were 
critical to the analysis in this chapter, it was O nuf s (1989) constructivism that 
highlighted the causal mechanisms (social rules) that made the development o f Table 2-4 
possible.
The next four chapters provide empirical support to the interdisciplinary theory of 
the causes o f political corruption. Chapter 3 provides a historical overview o f corruption 
during the Caribbean’s colonial period. In keeping with the constructivist tenet that the 
world is constantly being re-constructed (re-constituted) on the rubble o f the past, an 
understanding o f contemporary Caribbean political corruption first requires an 
understanding o f the institutional history o f Caribbean states. Chapter 4 furthers this 
historical understanding by providing a more detailed look at contemporary Caribbean 
institutions and political corruption levels. While these two historical chapters provide 
necessary background, they do not directly advance the Table 2-4 conceptual 
relationships. For this, qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies o f Jamaica and 
Costa Rica are presented in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. This study’s conclusion then
revisits the Table 2-4 coordinates of political corruption in light of the material presented 
in the next four empirical chapters.
Endnotes
1. O nuf s rule-oriented version o f constructivism should not be confused with several 
other competing versions o f constructivism (see Adler, 1997). In the remainder o f this 
study, constructivism refers to the use o f the rule-oriented analytic frame initially 
developed in O nuf (1989).
2. The initial idea for this model of the constructivist analytic frame came from the 
Institutional Analysis & Development (IAD) literature. IAD focuses upon the analysis of 
social behavior that is “bounded” by social institutions. The IAD framework, pioneered 
by Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (1994), combines the use o f rational choice (agency) 
explanations for social behavior with the idea that agent choice is bounded by a 
surrounding institutional structure (i.e., social rules). The IAD framework traces its roots 
to classic political economy, neoclassical micro-economic theory, institutional 
economics, public choice theory, transaction-cost economics, and non-cooperative game 
theory (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 25). The IAD framework is consistent with the new 
institutionalism movement among rational choice theorists that seeks to explain social 
outcomes through analysis o f not only agent preferences and optimizing behavior, but 
also through the strategic context (institutional structure) within which agents must act 
(Shepsle, 1989, pp. 134-135). Originally designed to explain the management (or 
mismanagement) o f common-pool resources, the IAD framework has been used to 
investigate a variety o f political and economic issues where both agency and structure 
play key explanatory roles (Ostrom et al., 1994, p. 26).
3. Completeness implies that the preference order includes all likely outcomes and is 
reflexive, i.e., all outcomes are at least as good as themselves. For example, a preference 
ordering is complete, if  and only if, for all pairs o f outcomes C and D, either C is at least 
as good as D, or D is at least as good as C, or both. Transitivity means that if  one 
outcome (C) is at least as good as a second (D), and the second (D) is at least as good as a 
third (E), then the first (C) must be at least as good as the third (E). (Morrow, 1994, pp. 
17-22).
4. O nuf s (1989) book World o f  Our Making contains a more extensive explanation of 
his constructivist theory o f social rules. The categories shown here are only those needed 
to support this study’s analysis.
5. Much o f the growing constructivist literature refers only to two categories o f rules, 
regulative and constitutive rules. In O n u f s (1989) constructivism, all rules are deemed to
have both regulative and constitutive properties. To Onuf there are only three categories 
o f rules— instruction, directive, commitment— that govern social action.
6. Cultural relativity is an often-cited problem in corruption studies. The cultural 
relativity argument offers that what is seen as corruption in one culture may not be seen 
as corruption in another. Many analysts maintain that the Western concept o f corruption 
cannot be applied to developing states in Asia, Africa, or the Americas. Recently the 
cultural relativity argument has been discredited as more and more developing states 
adopt anti-corruption programs grounded in the normative Western concept o f corruption. 
This is particularly true for the Caribbean where the 1994 Miami Summit o f the Americas 
action plan and the 1996 OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption adopted 
the Western concept of corruption as the desired regional norm. This does not, however, 
eliminate the problem o f societies perceiving corruption quite differently.
7. There have been a variety o f methods used to describe differing types o f political 
cultures. Greif (1994) uses only the collectivist and individualistic typologies. Elazar 
(1966, 1970, 1994) employs the typologies o f individualistic, moralistic, and 
traditionalistic. Ellis (1993) expands the typologies to five: individualistic, egalitarian, 
fatalistic, hierarchical, and hermetic. Heidenheimer (1970) offers four typologies: 
traditional family-kinship systems, traditional patron-client systems, modern boss- 
follower systems, and the civic-culture-based systems. The three typologies used in this 
study are a synthesis o f these previous works on political culture and are in consonance 
with the use o f threes in concepts developed within O nuf s constructivist theory o f social 
rules.
8. The Political Corruption Game is an adaptation o f W eingasf s (1997) Sovereign- 
Constituency Transgression Game.
9. The constructivist concept o f hegemonic rule is based upon a governing elite’s 
ideological control o f society. However, even Gramsci (1971) recognized that sometimes 
a balance between ideological and coercive control may be required. Coercive control, a 
state’s legitimate threat o f or actual use o f force, is a very hierarchical, i.e., directive- 
ruled, concept.
10. The idea o f classifying such governing elite as pirates, pariahs, and paragons 
originates in enterprise theory. See Smith (1980) for an explanation o f enterprise theory.
11. Alatas (1990, p. 5) also refers to this type o f corruption as metastatic, a medical term 
symbolizing that corruption attacks the entire social system such that the infestation is 
total rather than localized and sporadic.
12. The annual Transparency International Corruption Perception Index is a compilation 
of several corruption surveys (a poll o f polls). The surveys include Transparency 
International’s Internet corruption survey, an international Gallup poll, and several
surveys by international business research and consulting groups. The index is prepared 
for Transparency International by a team of researchers led by Dr. Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff at Goettingen University, Germany. Each state’s score on the index relates 
solely to the results drawn from a number o f surveys and reflects the perceptions o f a 
wide variety o f respondents that participated in the surveys. The scores range from 0 
(totally corrupt) to 10 (no corruption) and indicate only the corruption associated with 
foreign business transactions in each state. Additional information on the index’s 
preparation is available at http//:www.transparency.de.
A History of Caribbean Political Corruption: 1492 to 1950
Caribbean history is rife with graft and corruption. Graft and corruption 
permeated the political and economic institutions o f the sixteenth through early twentieth 
century colonial Caribbean. Early twentieth century US interventions in several o f the 
Caribbean’s former Spanish and French colonies fared poorly in arresting this legacy of 
Caribbean corruption, despite US attempts to bring good governance to these politically 
and financially unstable independent states. Reviewing the record o f Caribbean 
colonialism and US interventions is important because contemporary Caribbean political 
and economic institutions took root during this first 450 plus years o f modern Caribbean 
history. This chapter reviews the role o f political corruption in the development of 
Caribbean political and economic institutions from 1492 to 1950. It is a first step in 
understanding how colonialism and US interventions may affect modern day levels o f 
Caribbean political corruption. This chapter focuses closely on the evolution o f the 
concept o f political corruption in the Caribbean, i.e., how governing elite separated their 
public office duties from their private interests.
Corruption Across the Spanish Main
As early as Christopher Columbus's return from his first 1492 encounter with the 
New World, the Spanish crown worried about the abuse o f public office in the 
administration o f its new colonies. Under the existing fifteenth century Roman law, the 
Spanish crown declared itself the sole proprietor o f the territories and populations o f the
New World that Columbus discovered (Borah, 1964, p. 47; Crow, 1992, p. 165). With 
corruption rampant among the aristocracy and merchants o f fifteenth century Spain, the 
crown initially attempted to prevent its colonial representatives from illegally 
appropriating wealth rightfully belonging to the Spanish treasury.
The Spanish crown instituted a colonial revenue system based upon tariffs and 
taxes on colonial trade, including a Royal levy o f one-fifth {el quinto) o f all wealth 
generated from New World mining ventures (gold, silver, precious stones, etc.) (Haring 
1947, pp. 256-292). The establishment o f a feudal tribute on the indigenous Amerindians 
generated additional funds. Recognizing the potential for graft and corruption from the 
enormous wealth expected to flow into the Spanish treasury from the New World, the 
Spanish crown devised a colonial system with several key measures to thwart colonial 
officials from abusing their public office. Many of the these fifteenth and sixteenth 
century Spanish anti-corruption measures remain the core o f contemporary anti­
corruption programs.
To prevent corruption, senior colonial officials dispatched from Spain— including 
viceroys, governors, audiencias (legislative courts), captain-generals, oficiales reales 
(treasury agents)— were subject to numerous financial and social restrictions. First, most 
officials were required to declare their net worth before being appointed to a colonial 
office (Haring, 1947, pp. 280-281). Second, during the term o f their assignments 
(purposely limited to two, three, or five years) senior colonial officials were prohibited 
from personal business involvement in their colonial territory. They were forbidden to 
accumulate property or engage in other business that provided additional income
(McFarlane, 1996, p. 49). As an offset for this income restriction, and as a further 
incentive to avoid corruption, the most senior officials were paid enormous salaries. For 
example, colonial viceroys were paid from $45,000 to $65,000 in gold annually, when 
Spanish soldiers in the same period received only $300 to $600 (Crow, 1992, pp. 165- 
166).1 Third, restrictions were placed on senior colonial officials’ social relations. Senior 
colonial officials were prohibited from: marrying while in office; being godfathers; 
receiving personal gifts; and assisting in private celebrations, except in their official 
capacity (Crow, 1992, p. 166). Finally, upon completion o f their assignment, senior 
Spanish colonial officials were subject to a residencia, an independent judicial review of 
their finances and personal conduct while in office.
As a further anti-corruption measure, the Spanish crown also instituted a system 
of checks and balances among colonial officials. While viceroys, governors, and captain- 
generals performed the executive policy-making and supervisory functions in their 
respective geographic regions, a parallel system o f Spanish courts was instituted to check 
the power o f individual executives. Audiencias, a combination appellate court and quasi­
legislature, were the most senior o f these courts and were collocated with the viceroys 
and governors. Spanish oficiales reales, those who collected and disbursed the crown’s 
revenues, also worked autonomously from other senior colonial officials. As a further 
check on colonial administration, the Spanish crown dispatched a stream o f colonial 
investigators with the high-sounding titles o f pesquisadores (investigators), visitadores 
(visitors), and veedores (seers) (Crow, 1992, p. 167). Unfortunately, for both the crown
and the colonies, the system o f checks and balances and the personal restrictions placed 
on colonial officials were ineffectual at thwarting corruption.
Despite the Spanish crown’s anti-corruption measures, personal venality of 
colonial officials became the ruling standard throughout the Spanish colonies. With 
thousands o f miles separating the colonies from the Spanish crown in Madrid, and a poor 
system o f communications (sailing ship) that did not improve substantially from the 
fifteenth to early nineteenth centuries, Spanish colonial officials experienced wide 
discretion in enacting and enforcing Spanish colonial rules. While there were some 
notably honest and effective Spanish colonial officials, it became more common for 
colonial officials at all levels, often acting in collusion, to engage in the theft o f the 
Spanish crown’s wealth, not to mention the brutal abuse o f the Amerindians and later 
African slave populations.
Notwithstanding the enormous inflow o f gold, silver, Amerindian tributes, tariffs, 
and other tax revenues into the Spanish treasury in the sixteenth century, the Spanish 
crown found itself nearing bankruptcy by the late sixteenth century (Borah, 1964, p. 47; 
Williams, 1970, p. 54). The cost o f Spain’s European military campaigns, the cost o f 
maintaining the New World Empire, and the effects o f widespread colonial corruption, all 
contributed to Spain’s late sixteenth century financial straits. Desperate to find new 
sources o f income from the New World colonies, in 1559 the Spanish crown authorized 
the first sale o f colonial offices. Beginning with notarial offices, the sale o f Spanish 
colonial civil offices eventually expanded and by the eighteenth century almost every
colonial office, with the exception o f viceroys and audiencias, were up for sale by the 
Spanish crown (Borah, 1964, p. 47).
Sale o f offices, especially the sale o f the positions o f oficiales reales, was an 
outright license for Spanish colonial corruption (Haring, 1947, p. 280). Through the sale 
of Spanish colonial offices, the crown recognized its inability to hold colonial officials 
accountable, thus accepting that mid and low-level colonial officials would augment their 
small salaries through fraud and theft o f the crown’s New World resources. To increase 
Spanish crown revenues further, the actual number o f colonial offices quickly expanded 
soon after offices were first placed on sale. By the seventeenth century, the Spanish 
crown had exchanged virtual nonintervention in colonial bureaucratic affairs for the 
recurring revenue generated by the sale o f colonial offices and taxes on the salaries of 
these offices. Moreover, colonial bureaucratic efficiency plummeted and corruption 
accelerated soon after the sale o f offices began (McFarlane, 1996, p. 51).
The report o f a 1735 to 1746 visitadore to South America illustrates the extent of 
Spanish colonial corruption (1749 report summarized in McFarlane, 1996). In their 
travels around the Americas, the two man visitadore found viceroys engaging in 
prohibited trade activities, receiving gifts in return for favors, selling offices for private 
profit, and appointing family and friends to offices so that both the appointee and viceroy 
could profit from them. Audiencia judges were found involved in commercial enterprises 
and using their office to protect and advance their personal ventures. One Panamanian 
audiencia judge was documented openly auctioning his votes on the court to the highest 
bidders. The visitadore accused several corregidores, supervisors o f Amerindian
communities, o f tyranny because o f their abuse o f Amerindian labor for personal profit,
skimming o f Amerindian tribute payments, and forcing of Amerindian communities to
buy unneeded Spanish products at inflated prices. The visitadore also found oficiales
reales involved in fraud and embezzlement o f crown funds. As an explanation for the
causes o f corruption in the Spanish colonies the visitadore offered:
The Indies are abundant, rich and flourishing. As such, they are exposed to 
indolence and luxury. Far removed from the king and his high ministers and 
governed by people who often neglect the public interest for their own, those 
areas are now in a bad state because o f the longevity and deep-rooted character 
o f these ills (quoted in McFarlane, 1996, p. 44).
This visitadore report highlights the rampant corruption existing during the entire 
Spanish colonial period. It shows that despite early Spanish crown efforts to thwart 
colonial corruption, a standard o f separating public office duties from personal self- 
interest never took root in the Spanish controlled regions o f the New World. As the 
nineteenth century independence movements began in the Spanish colonies, the newly 
independent states were saddled with a 300-year tradition o f weak and corrupt 
governmental institutions. The Spanish Creole elite that took control o f the newly 
independent Latin American states were not social revolutionaries (Randall & Mount, 
1998, pp. 18-19)— their primary objective in the colonial wars o f independence was to 
overthrow the hated Spanish colonial administration (Andreski, 1966, p. 178). The only 
radical actions taken by the Creoles were the post-independence abolishment o f slavery 
and the outlawing o f the sale o f public offices. Instead, across the region o f former 
Spanish colonial states, the Creole upper and middle class political and economic elite 
came into constant conflict both among themselves and with a newly emerging military
elite as factions sought the re-establishment o f monopolistic political and economic 
power structures similar to those the upper and middle classes enjoyed under Spanish 
colonial rule. The independence o f Spain’s New World colonies began a two-century 
tradition o f political turmoil, authoritarianism, and caudillo (strongman) politics that 
continued Latin America’s legacy o f rampant political corruption.
Miller (1996) offers three primary reasons why political corruption flourished in 
post-independence Spanish-speaking America. First, the new Latin American states were 
desperately short o f financial resources. With their economies plagued by contraband 
smuggling and otherwise unable to generate sufficient tariff revenues, the new states 
became dependent on short-term financial support from leading domestic businessmen. 
Corruption prospered in the emerging clientelistic environment with domestic 
businessmen trading their financial assistance to authoritarian political officials in 
exchange for monopolies in government contracts and government resource exploitation 
(Miller, 1996, pp. 69-70).
Second, while the norm o f separating public office duties from private interest 
barely existed in Spanish colonial times, there was at least minimal autonomy between 
colonial officials and local business elite. This autonomy completely disappeared after 
independence, as what colonial professional bureaucracy did exist vanished and political 
patronage (the filling o f government positions with personal friends or political 
supporters) replaced the colonial period sale o f offices. Patronage became the lubricant 
for the region’s expanding system o f clientelistic politics.
Third, due to a shortage o f revenues to pay regular and adequate salaries to 
government officials, corruption increased as officials in the newly independent states 
augmented their incomes through their control o f government resources. This was 
especially true for those gaining government office through political patronage— as 
patronage positions often carried no salaries but did provide a license for individuals to 
exploit their access to government resources (Miller, 1996, pp. 69-70). Thus, political 
patronage and clientelistic politics became primary sources o f both personal power and 
personal fortunes in the newly independent states o f Latin America— conditions that have 
continued in the contemporary Spanish-speaking Caribbean..
Corruption in the Colonies of Spain’s European Rivals
A Caribbean imperialist rivalry between Spain and its European antagonists of 
England (Britain after 1707), France, and Holland began soon after Columbus's discovery 
of the New World. In fact, on the return from his first voyage, Columbus was forced to 
evade French pirates lingering off the European coast (Williams, 1970, p. 73). Over the 
course o f the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain’s European competitors used 
three principal tactics in their quest to weaken Spain’s monopolistic hold on the New 
World and to breathe new life into their own commerce. These tactics contributed to the 
violence and instability prevalent in the colonial Caribbean.
First, Spain’s European rivals sent their own fleets or sanctioned privateers to raid 
Spanish shipping. These maritime operations were carried out both in European waters 
and in the Caribbean. The most successful fleet operations in the colonial era were the 
interceptions o f Spain’s entire treasure fleet in 1628 by Dutch Admiral Piet Heyn and
again in 1655 and 1657 by English Admiral Robert Blake (Williams, 1970, pp. 84-85). 
Privateers such as Sir Francis Drake and Sir Henry Morgan, along with many others now 
enshrined in the lore o f privateering and piracy on the Spanish Main, also successfully 
harried the Spanish Caribbean shipping routes.
Second, Spain’s European challengers instituted a system o f contraband 
smuggling throughout the Caribbean as they sought to undermine Spain’s economic 
monopoly in the region. The contraband business in precious metals, gemstones, tropical 
agriculture products, and European manufactured goods included trade not only among 
the Caribbean colonies, but also between the colonies and Europe. Williams (1970, p.
75) offers that the intensity o f this contraband trade, fueled largely by the violent 
privateering and piracy, made the Caribbean situation in many respects a “continuation of 
war by other means” among the European powers.
Third, having established through maritime raids and the contraband trade that 
Spain was unable to adequately defend its Empire, Spain’s European rivals next began to 
infringe on Spain’s territorial monopoly in the Caribbean (Williams, 1970, p. 75). By the 
mid-sixteenth century, it was apparent that the Caribbean islands held little in the way o f 
gold and silver, causing the Spanish conquistadors to migrate in the search for riches from 
the Caribbean to the newly found lands in New Spain (Mexico and Central America) and 
South America. With the exception o f Spanish strongholds in the strategic ports of 
Havana, Santo Domingo, and San Juan, other Spanish Caribbean island possessions 
became sparsely populated and barely defensible. Through a combination o f direct 
military attacks; land raids by privateers, pirates, and buccaneers; and treaty negotiations
surrounding the settlement o f European wars; the English, French, and Dutch began 
acquiring their own Caribbean colonies in the seventeenth century. These eventually 
included the smaller islands o f the Lesser Antilles, the larger islands o f Jamaica and Haiti 
(western half o f Hispaniola), and the mainland areas o f British Honduras (Belize), British 
Guiana (Guyana), Dutch Guiana (Suriname), and French Guiana.
Once Spain’s European competitors gained their own Caribbean possessions, they 
instituted entirely different systems o f empire from Spain’s. While Spain’s main purpose 
of empire was to enlarge the Spanish treasury, the primary objectives o f England and 
France for their Caribbean colonies were as tropical agricultural producers and as 
monopoly markets for their own manufactured goods. The Dutch, on the other hand, 
organized their Caribbean colonies as strategic ports in the Dutch commercial 
mercantilist system, with tropical agriculture as an important but secondary objective. It 
is not surprising that due to differing purposes for their colonies; combined with differing 
European political, economic, and cultural traditions used to organize and govern their 
colonies, that colonial-period political corruption in the English, French, and Dutch 
colonies was systemically different from that found in Spain’s possessions.
Political Corruption in the British West Indies. English colonial objectives and 
governing methods were far different from Spain’s. Where the Spanish crow n’s system 
of feudal tributes, taxes from New World mining and agricultural enterprises, and the 
revenues from the sale o f and taxes on colonial offices constituted Spain’s primary 
revenue sources, the English crown’s main interest was to stimulate English commerce. 
While Spain first instituted plantations to grow tropical agricultural products, the English
perfected the use o f plantation societies where English owners and overseers exploited 
African slave labor. Since the plantations and the commercial trade with the English 
colonies were private ventures, the English crown received only tariff and tax revenues 
from its Caribbean possessions. Although there was some variance among English 
colonies, their government institutions were designed to support the plantation societies 
and consisted o f a governor and a legislative council, both appointed by the English 
crown, and a local assembly, elected from the colony’s freeholders, a small oligarchy of 
white plantation owners and merchants (Parry et al., 1987, pp. 182-183).
The English colonies were governed by acts promulgated in London, constitutions 
developed by local assemblies, and by decree o f the colonial governor. The governor was 
the most powerful figure in the English colonial system as all crown responsibility for 
colonial government rested with him. The instructions to one appointed Jamaican 
governor read:
He was captain-general and vice-admiral o f the fleet; with the legislative 
assembly he was the supreme tribunal in civil matters; he had the final voice in 
the passing o f legislation; he had to preserve good relations with the assembly 
and keep the machines o f government working (Parry et al., 1987, p. 183).
In seventeenth century England, theft o f crown property and mismanagement of 
government resources were already serious problems associated with the English sale of 
public office (see Peck, 1978). There was no professional English civil service. English 
public offices were briskly bought and sold and officials used Royal property as if  it were 
their own (Peck, 1978, p. 221). Many offices were sinecures that offered good pay and 
little work (Peck, 1978, p. 221). Miller (1976, p. 3) highlights, “ [s]eventeenth-century 
Englishmen believed there was nothing immoral or illegal in an official accepting— or
even soliciting— graft and bribes. Corruption [graft], in fact, was the lubricant that 
greased the wheels o f the nation’s administrative machinery.” The lack o f English 
standards separating public office duties from private interest naturally carried over to the 
English colonial administration.
English colonial governors, with only their legislative councils and local 
assemblies as checks, used their extensive powers to reward friends, clients, and 
supporters. There were several areas where the governors concentrated their most 
nefarious self-interested activities (see Miller, 1976, chap. 2). First, English governors 
controlled colonial land grants. Most notable in newer and larger colonies, the governor 
was free to issue new parcels o f land to those in the best position to reward the governor 
either financially or personally. Often this included the governor issuing land to him self 
or other family members. Second, governors controlled locally many o f the rules o f trade 
for importation and exportation in their respective colony. This included the enactment 
of and methods for collecting various tariffs and taxes on business ventures. As with 
land grants, the governors could mold these rules such that their friends, clients, or 
supporters— not to mention their own commercial endeavors— benefited most. Third, 
Caribbean piracy and buccaneering, and the continuing commercial contraband trade, 
required friendly governors that would allow the landing and sale o f stolen and bootleg 
goods. Many English colonial governors grew rich from their support o f this black 
marketeering trade (Miller, 1976, pp. 23-25). Port Royal, Jamaica, located at the mouth 
of the colonial capital harbor in Kingston, was just one o f the pirate and buccaneer havens 
in collusion with the local colonial government. As evidence o f the English acceptability
of this black marketeering, Henry Morgan, one of Port Royal’s most notorious pirates, 
was later knighted and appointed Deputy Governor o f Jamaica.
In the early nineteenth century, the tradition o f British colonial graft and 
mismanagement slowly began to change. Influenced by the ideas o f the Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution, in 1809 a British act was passed prohibiting the sale o f public 
office. This was followed in 1827 by an act making both the offer and acceptance of 
bribes by government officials illegal (Finer, 1952, p. 125). As British sovereignty in the 
early nineteenth century slowly shifted from the monarch to the parliament, a competitive 
and increasingly honest and non-corrupt British government and Home Civil Service 
began to emerge. Thus, the concept o f separating public office duties from private 
interests first grew in British home-government. The same grasp for honest 
administration did not immediately take hold in the British Colonial Service. Instead, 
nineteenth century colonial governors and other officials were appointed not by sale of 
office but through a system o f political patronage that evolved within the Colonial Office.
A watershed in British colonial government occurred with the 1833 abolition of 
Caribbean slavery. Wage labor replaced the forced labor o f African slaves and resulted in 
massive social changes in the Caribbean colonies as the former slaves abandoned the 
plantations. During this period o f rapid social change, the British colonies retained their 
system o f government based on appointed governors, locally elected assemblies, and their 
ancient constitutions. The mass o f former British slaves were still not allowed to vote in 
the nineteenth century Caribbean colonies due to previous suffrage property 
qualifications. However, within several decades o f the abolishment o f slavery, many
industrious mulattos and freed slaves did accumulate sufficient property and wealth to 
become registered voters and some were even elected to local assemblies.
The inclusion o f mulattos and former slaves in colonial assemblies caused two
major areas o f tension in colonial administration. First, the previously powerful white
planter and merchant oligarchies became distressed over their gradual loss o f power, with
many opting to sell their Caribbean holdings and migrate back to Britain. Second, the
political, economic, and social expectations o f the colonial mulattos and former slaves
grew along with their acquisition o f more economic and legislative power. The tensions
relating to such expectations came to a boil in October 1865 in Morant Bay, Jamaica, in a
colonial atmosphere described by Parry et al. (1987):
In Jamaica, as in most o f the West Indian islands at this period, there was almost 
a complete lack o f candidates able and willing to devote themselves to the task 
o f government. Total apathy towards political matters and a supreme 
indifference pervaded the West Indian atmosphere....[revealing] a society 
completely lacking in balance and stability. Violent passions, bitter animosities 
and complete absence o f toleration overwhelmed the island [s]... (Parry et al., 
1987, pp. 188-189).
The aftermath o f the 1865 Morant Bay rebellion set off a series o f events that 
affected both the type o f rule and levels o f corruption found in British Caribbean colonies 
through the end o f World War II. The 1865 rebellion began as a local protest at the 
Morant Bay courthouse over the arrest o f several locals. When the crowd failed to 
disperse as ordered, they were fired upon by Jamaican militia, killing seven protesters.
The protest grew and rioters burned the courthouse and killed several local officials. 
Governor Edward J. Eyre responded with the British military, Jamaican militia, and 
troops o f Maroons, former runaway slaves that had entered into a treaty with the
government. Eyre eventually restored order to the area, costing 450 Jamaican deaths (354 
executed by death penalty), 1,000 burned homes, and an untold number o f floggings and 
other acts o f brutality. The British investigation into the Morant Bay rebellion later 
cleared Eyre o f charges o f brutality and murder (Hart ,1998, pp. 60-87; Knight, 1990, pp. 
281-283; Williams, 1970, pp. 399-402; Parry et al., 1987, pp. 187-190).
The Morant Bay uprising scared both the British Parliament and the colonial 
white oligarchies, convincing them that representative rule incorporating former slaves 
was not workable. As a result, with the exception o f Barbados and Bermuda where 
strong local assemblies and stable social conditions prevailed, the British dissolved other 
existing colonial assemblies and suspended colonial constitutions, implementing Crown 
Colony rule across the region. British colonial rule in the Caribbean from 1865 until 
after World War II was based predominately on the Crown Colony system whereby the 
British colonial governor maintained absolute rule, checked only by British Colonial 
Office directives and the advice o f an appointed local legislative council (Hart, 1998, pp. 
80-87).
The British Caribbean became a neglected backwater o f the British Empire during 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The demand for their tropical 
agricultural exports waxed and waned, generating high unemployment rates that caused 
many inhabitants to migrate to Europe or North America. In Britain, the Home Civil 
Service continued to professionalize and became a model o f honest bureaucracy. While 
the British Colonial Service never professionalized to the extent o f its cousin Home Civil
Service, over the years it did internalize a credo o f efficient administration— gradually 
strengthening its policies separating public office duties from private interests.
As late as the 1930s, appointments to the British Colonial Service were still based
on a political patronage system controlled exclusively by the Colonial Office. Colonial
governors continued to be appointed from the British upper class, those with
distinguished military or other public careers, or those having served long periods with
the Colonial Office. Colonial administrative positions, like those in the Home Civil
Service, became almost the exclusive monopoly o f graduates o f Cambridge and Oxford
universities. By the 1930s, colonial administration had assumed the ethos o f the English
gentleman. Lewis (1968) submits that by the post-World War II independence
movements in the British Caribbean, the British left behind a political legacy that, while
not representative:
On its positive side, it was incorruptible, highly motivated, passionately 
conscious o f duty and conduct. It was determinedly constitutionalist, although 
the Crown Colony system placed severe strains on constitutionalism. It cared 
for civil liberties....It was not even afraid to declare its own faults....(Lewis, 
1968, p. 115).
As the British Caribbean colonies approached the post-W orld War II colonial 
independence movement, there developed a strong British Colonial Service standard of 
the separation o f public office from private interest— making political corruption only a 
minor problem.
Haiti Becomes a Kleptocracy. While the French Caribbean colonies were smaller in 
number than those o f the British, they were vastly more important for France’s overseas 
commerce. In 1789, Saint Domingue (Haiti) alone generated 40 percent o f French
foreign trade as it provided half o f the coffee consumed in Europe and more sugar than all 
the British colonies combined (Randall & Mount, 1998, p. 16). Organizing their colonies 
around the plantation society model, the French ruled their Caribbean colonies through an 
authoritarian and militaristic government more resembling Spain’s than the representative 
system used by England before 1865. French colonial government included a governor, 
intendent, law courts, and military garrison (Geggus, 1989, p. 26). The governor, usually 
of French noble birth or military background, was responsible for the colony’s defense 
and the enforcement o f French imperial commercial regulations. The intendent, the 
second senior French official in the colony, oversaw all other aspects o f colonial 
administration (Thompson, 1997, p. 44).
O f all the European colonial powers, imperial France had the strongest tradition of 
the sale o f public offices. In France, sale o f office was legally equivalent to the buyer’s 
right to other property— including the right to either resell the office or pass it to future 
generations (Swart, 1949, p. 82). As in Spanish and British colonies, graft and theft o f 
French imperial property became widespread in French colonial administration. As the 
French colonies approached the nineteenth century there was no standard o f separating 
public office duties from private interest.
French ideas o f governance and its hold on Caribbean colonies changed with the 
1789 French Revolution. The French Revolution provided the initial spark that ignited 
smoldering racial resentment in France’s most populous Caribbean colony (Randall & 
Mount, 1998, p. 15). Saint Domingue’s 40,000 white and 26,000 free people o f color 
favored the French Revolution’s declarations o f Republican values o f personal liberty,
equality, and security— but in vastly different ways. The white planters and merchants 
saw liberty and equality in terms o f more local autonomy for them from the French court. 
The free people o f color, including many plantation owners, small merchants, and 
professionals, viewed equality to mean their receipt o f rights equal to the whites. Neither 
the whites nor the free people o f color were in favor o f freeing Saint Domingue’s 500,000 
African slaves. When the French government declared the end o f Caribbean slavery in 
1790, with little or no consultation with Saint Domingue’s elite, the announcement 
unleashed a more than decade-long brutal race war in Saint Domingue, interspersed with 
interventions o f French and Spanish troops. In 1804, the state o f Haiti emerged from this 
violent turmoil as a coalition o f the triumphant free people o f color and former slaves 
declared full independence from France.
Wilentz (1989, p. 207) offers “ [s]ince the Revolution o f 1804, groupuscule [small 
group] allegiances, cults o f personality and a reliance on spoils and revenge have 
characterized Haitian politics.” Steeped in continual violence and widespread corruption, 
the nearly two centuries o f Haitian independence have seen the rise o f a perpetual 
kleptocracy. Andreski (1966, pp. 62-69) characterizes a kleptocracy as a form of 
government parasitism— where corruption permeates every level o f government. High- 
level Haitian officials (presidents, ministers, etc.) amassed huge fortunes while in office. 
Mid-level public and military officials also used their access to government resources to 
increase their often-meager salaries. In a kleptocracy, the solicitation o f bribes is also 
epidemic among low-level officials such as customs, immigration, and police officers. In 
Haiti’s post-independence history, the high and mid-level kleptocrats encompassed the
educated mulattos and military officials that made up the state’s political and economic 
elite. The poor masses become the victims o f a kleptocracy. As Andreski (1968, p. 64) 
submits: “ [o]wing to their political power, the wealthy...keep direct taxes low and...shift 
the burden onto the poor by making the state rely on taxes on sale o f articles o f popular 
consumption.” This partly explains why, after nearly 200 years o f independence, Haiti 
remains steeped in poverty, consistently producing the lowest per capita income o f any 
Caribbean state over the last two centuries. In a kleptocracy, such as Haiti, there is no 
standard o f separating public office duties from private interests.
Dutch Commercial Corruption. The Dutch Caribbean colonies, fewest in number and 
smallest in land area o f those o f the European colonial powers, were governed through a 
partnership o f the Dutch crown and the Dutch West India (DWI) Company. The Dutch 
crown sent a commander or governor from Holland to administer each colony. Like the 
English, the Dutch allowed a limited system o f local representation in most o f their 
colonies through a local assembly or council elected from the colony’s white merchants 
and planters. The colonies were ruled by a combination o f laws enacted by the Dutch 
government and those passed locally. Any laws passed in the Dutch colonies were 
subject to the ratification o f both the DWI Company and the Dutch government 
(Thompson, 1997, p. 46). The DWI Company controlled the colonies’ commercial trade. 
While sale o f public office did occur in Holland, it was on a much smaller scale than sales 
in Spain, England, and France (Swart, 1949, p. 85). This did not mean, however, that the 
Dutch colonies were any less involved in graft, just that in the Dutch colonies the graft
usually occurred with DWI Company commercial resources and not those o f the Dutch 
crown.
Prior to the nineteenth century, graft was common in the Dutch India Companies 
(West and East). The men o f the company “were underpaid and exposed to every 
temptation that was offered by a combination o f a weak...organization [colonial 
governments], extraordinary opportunities in trade, and an almost complete absence of 
checks from home....”(Smith, 1971, p. 425). DWI Company officials became rich by 
stealing from the company. As the nineteenth century dawned, however, Dutch 
standards concerning graft and corruption changed similarly to what had occurred in 
Britain. In the nineteenth century, the DWI Company took on a lesser role in colonial 
management and the Dutch colonial service became more professionalized and honest.
By the mid-twentieth century the Dutch had turned over most o f the colonial rule to local 
representatives. As in the British colonies, the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
saw the evolution o f a Dutch Caribbean standard that separated public office duties from 
private interests.
US Caribbean Interventions
The history o f Caribbean graft and corruption would be incomplete without 
surveying the role o f the nineteenth and early twentieth century US interventions in the 
region. During its first century o f independence (1776-1876), the US experienced its own 
wave o f graft and corruption. Having thrown off the yoke o f British colonial corruption, 
the US was born in the late eighteenth century in a wave o f honest intent as promulgated 
by the US Founding Fathers in the Declaration o f Independence and US Constitution.
However, by the early nineteenth century, US electioneering and access to public offices 
became entangled in a system o f political patronage. US graft and corruption reached its 
peak in the 1860s and 1870s, the so-called Gilded Age that was characterized by the 
licentious alliance o f US business and politics (see Johnston, 1982). In the 1890s, the US 
Progressive Movement emerged as a counter to the wealthy and powerful US economic 
elite and the growing social injustices seen resulting from US industrialization. The 
Progressive Movement was intent on making the US political machinery more democratic 
by increasing its efficiency, rationality, and expertise (Gould, 1974, p. 4). An assault on 
graft and corruption was a major plank o f the Progressive Movement platform. It was in 
this Progressive Era atmosphere that the US first intervened in the Caribbean.
The U S’s first Caribbean intervention was the 1898 Spanish-American War. The 
US wresting o f both Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spain ended Spanish Caribbean 
colonialism. The US intent was to grant Cuba its independence soon after the war. 
However, the US distrusted the Cuban elite who were suspected o f being just as prone to 
corruption and misgovernance as their former Spanish rulers— a suspicion proven true 
throughout the twentieth century. Therefore, as a condition o f Cuban independence, the 
infamous 1901 Platt Amendment was enacted by US-Cuban treaty allowing the US the 
right o f intervention in the event Cuban authorities failed to protect life, property, and 
liberty (Randall & Mount, 1998, p. 35). The US later acted on this treaty by intervening 
in Cuba in 1906-1909, 1912, and 1917-1922.
The epitome o f US Progressive Era presidents was Theodore “Teddy” Roosevelt 
(T.R.) (1901-1909). One o f Roosevelt’s first major encounters with Caribbean political
corruption came with the 1903 negotiations with Colombia for the Panama Canal. In 
August 1903, when the Colombian Senate rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty that would 
authorize the US to build the Panama Canal, Roosevelt became distressed with the 
Colombians for two primary reasons. First, Colombian President Jose Marroquin had 
assured the US that the treaty would receive quick ratification after the US had assisted in 
negotiating an end to a bloody Colombian political civil war (1899-1902). Marroquin, in 
Roosevelt’s view, broke Roosevelt’s personal Golden Rule that a m an’s word was his 
bond (Marks, 1979, pp. 91-95).
Second, it appeared to Roosevelt that the main reason for the Colombian rejection
of the Hay-Herran treaty was their attempt to increase the initial monetary indemnity
(from US$10 million to US$20 million) they would receive from the treaty. In
conversations and correspondence after the rejection o f the treaty, Roosevelt, normally
circumspect in his diplomatic discourse, publicly hurled a flurry o f assaults toward the
Colombians, characterizing them as: “backwards people,” “ [at] corrupt and evil
purposes,” “complete governmental incompetence,” “road agents...w ho [tried] to hold-up
a United States official,” “a Bogota lot o f jack rabbits,” “the little wildcat republic,” “a
corrupt pithecoid [ape-like] community,” and “homicidal corruptionists” (Burton, 1968,
p. 125; Chessman, 1969, pp. 99-100; Cooper, 1983, p. 71; and Mowry, 1958, p. 150-151).
One historian summarized US perceptions o f the Colombians as:
The truth was the Americans did not feel that they were dealing with a friendly 
nation. They looked upon the rejection o f the Hay-Herran Treaty by the 
Colombian Senate as what they would call a “hold-up”— a scheme to interfere, 
for the sake o f personal profit [corruption], with a work which was to benefit all 
humanity (Collidge, 1908, p. 277).
History records that Roosevelt resolved the canal crisis by dispatching US naval 
forces to intervene in the November 1903 Panamanian independence rebellion, assuring 
the Panamanian victory by keeping Colombian forces from suppressing the rebellion.
Not surprisingly, only two weeks after the rebellion, the US signed a canal treaty with the 
newly independent Panamanian state. Roosevelt’s resistance to Colombia’s perceived 
corrupt behavior was a major factor in his decision to intervene in 1903 Panama.
The Panama Canal incident was not Roosevelt’s only encounter with Caribbean
political corruption. When he entered the White House in 1901, the Caribbean’s
independent states suffered in a general malaise o f poverty, high unemployment,
economic stagnation, and severe indebtedness. The Caribbean had already established a
long history o f debt defaults characterized by “fraud, chicanery, heavy losses for the
unwary, refunding arrangements, and fresh defaults” (Kneer, 1975, p. xii). Political
corruption was a major contributor to the Caribbean debt problem. By 1902, six
Caribbean states— Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Venezuela— were in default on foreign (mainly European) loans (Kneer, 1975, p. xii).
To hold their European creditors at bay, the Caribbean states conveniently called attention
to the US Monroe Doctrine that proscribed the intervention o f European powers in the
Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt was not about to let the corrupt Caribbean governing
elite hide behind the Monroe Doctrine. Faced with crises where European creditors
threatened armed intervention in 1902 Venezuela and 1904 Dominican Republic,
Roosevelt felt he was forced into declaring in February 1905:
Chronic wrongdoing...may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require 
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the
adherence o f the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United 
States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, 
to the exercise o f an international police power (quoted in Watson, 1976, p.
112).
This Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine provided the justification for his 
intervention for financial supervision in the Dominican Republic in 1905 and for a 
number o f other US interventions in the Caribbean through the 1930s. These included 
the interventions in Cuba cited above, Haiti (1915-1934), Dominican Republic (1916- 
1924, financial supervision 1905-1941), and Nicaragua (1909-1910, 1912-1925, financial 
supervision 1911-1924) (Randall & Mount, 1998, p. 6).
There are many competing explanations for the numerous US interventions in the 
Caribbean during the presidential term o f Teddy Roosevelt, and those o f presidents 
William H. Taft (1909-1913) and Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), which followed in the 
wake o f the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Despite the early twentieth 
century era sometimes being dubbed one o f dollar diplomacy, some historians discount 
that these early twentieth century US presidents acted out o f concerns for US business 
interests (Bemis, 1943; Hill, 1965). In fact, beginning with Roosevelt, the trustbuster, 
these three early twentieth century US presidents were not allied closely with US big 
business. That US business benefited for the interventions is an unintended consequence 
of the US actions. On Roosevelt’s relationship with US business interests, Hill (1965) 
offers:
Roosevelt’s policy does not seem to have been influenced to any marked degree 
by a desire to stimulate the economic penetration o f the Caribbean by American 
business men and American corporations....That Roosevelt was influenced in 
his Caribbean policy by the economic tendencies o f his day is o f course beyond 
question, but no evidence has been found to support the thesis that either his
measures or his actions were determined by, or were the result of, economic 
considerations pressed upon him by American financiers, business men, and 
corporations. (Hill, 1965, pp. 211-212)
Hill (1965, chap. 8) instead argues that Roosevelt’s Caribbean actions were 
opportunistic in nature, but were guided by his devotion to the cause o f US national 
security. Roosevelt’s, and later Taft and W ilson’s, national security concerns in the 
Caribbean focused on building and providing defense for the Panama Canal. For strictly 
geopolitical strategic reasons, the US could not allow a European power to intervene in a 
Caribbean state and attain basing rights that could threaten the canal or its approaches. 
Political corruption in the Caribbean’s independent states contributed to the region’s 
political and financial instability and could have lead to a European intervention. 
Therefore, Caribbean political corruption was a factor leading to the early twentieth 
century US interventions in the region.
Another explanation for President Woodrow W ilson’s proclivity to intervene in 
the Caribbean was his tendency toward missionary diplomacy. Still primarily acting in 
US geopolitical strategic interests to protect the Panama Canal, the stern Presbyterian 
Wilson displayed a special zeal for “saving the [Caribbean] people from bad government, 
tyranny, and economic exploitation....” (Bemis, 1943, p. 185). Wilson aimed to institute 
a “politics o f morality which...would inspire and uplift Caribbean governments in their 
presumed quest for financial respectability and an honest ballot” (Langley, 1980, p. 63). 
Wilson was particularly annoyed at unprincipled Caribbean politicians who “sought 
office for personal gain rather than for public good” (Langley, 1980, p. 63). W ilson’s 
version o f the White M a n ’s Burden thus helped dictate US policy in the Caribbean during
his term that included US interventions in Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and 
Nicaragua.
Despite their initial strong moral overtones, US interventions iri the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Caribbean did little to lower political corruption levels in the 
former Spanish and French colonies. The US standard Caribbean intervention script—  
(1) intervene and establish political and financial stability, (2) organize and train local 
security forces, (3) establish an efficient state bureaucracy, (4) hold local elections, and 
(5) depart declaring political and moral victory— played directly into the hands o f later 
authoritarian rulers that used their powerful US-trained security forces to seize and 
maintain power and extract vast rents from domestic and international actors.
Changing the Caribbean Political Corruption Rules
Determining that US moralism and idealism in the Caribbean were counter­
productive to US foreign policy objectives, in 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
instituted the US Good Neighbor policy that repudiated both the Platt Amendment and 
the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and eventually led to US formal 
acceptance o f the principle o f non-intervention in Caribbean states’ internal affairs. An 
unintended consequence o f the Good Neighbor policy was US acquiescence to Caribbean 
political corruption. One objective behind the US Good Neighbor policy was to keep the 
Caribbean and Latin American states within the US sphere o f influence as war clouds 
formed over Europe and Asia in the 1930s. The US objective was to influence Western 
Hemispheric states to be anti-Nazi, anti-Fascist, or at least neutral in the looming World 
War. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s acquiescence to authoritarian and corrupt Caribbean
governments is clear in his reaction to Dominican Republic leader Rafael Trujillo’s use of 
power to benefit his own private ends. When discussing the Dominican dictator’s 
situation, Roosevelt submitted, “He may be an S.O.B., but he is our S.O.B.” (quoted in 
Williams, 1970, p. 465). The US followed this same our S.O.B. script in the post-World 
War II period when it was no longer Nazism or Fascism but Communism the US feared 
taking hold in the Caribbean. In Roorda’s (1998, p. 1) words “ [t]he Good Neighbor 
policy demonstrated to a generation o f Caribbean dictators that they were free to run their 
countries however they pleased, so long as they maintained common enemies with the 
United States: first the fascists, then the communists.”
Table 3-1 provides the estimated corrupt take by some o f the more notorious 
S.O.B.s the US condoned in both the pre- and post-World War II period.
Table 3-1. Selected Caribbean S.O.B.s
Caribbean State Leader
Years in 
Power
Estimated Take 
(in millions US$)
Cuba Grau 1944-48 174
Cuba Prio 1948-52 20
Cuba Batista 1952-58 300
Dominican Republic Trujillo 1930-61 1,000
Haiti Duvalier(s) 1951-86 700
Panama Noriega 1981-89 772
Nicaragua Somoza(s) 1937-79 600
Venezuela Gomez 1910-35 200
Venezuela Perez Jimenez 1952-85 400
Sources: Klitgaard (1988), Koster & Sanchez (1990), Naylor (1987), Theobold (1990), 
Thompson (1997), Whitehead (1983).
The exact sources o f the Table 3-1 corrupt takes will never be completely known; 
however, a large portion o f each take resulted from bribes paid by foreign investors in
individual Caribbean states. In the early twentieth century, foreign investors “insisted no
company could do business in South America [or the Caribbean] without paying graft”
(Braden, 1971, p. 296). A US ambassador to Cuba, with extensive business and
diplomatic experience throughout Latin America, estimated that the 1930s and 1940s
regional bribery “take was as high as 50 and 60 percent” on contracts and commercial
transactions (Braden, 1971, p. 290). On his experiences in Cuba in the early 1940s, US
Ambassador Spruille Braden wrote:
the Cuban officials had marvelous ingenuity in devising occasions for graft....I 
was appalled by the extent and scale o f the corruption, and the apparent apathy 
o f the public.... Americans were indeed involved in it. They were doing business 
in Cuba, and that had always meant paying bribes and making contributions to 
political parties.... Indeed, Cuban big business was American, and it provided a 
source o f graft and extortion running into many millions yearly....[For example, 
in one case] [t]he American Sugar Refining Co. was obliged to pay $113,000 in 
graft...[in order to recover] the $226,000 the [Cuban] government owed its mill 
at Jaranu. On that distribution I had the figures. Batista took $55,000; Gen. 
Benitez, the Chief o f Police, $25,000; and even a very rich Senator took 
$11,000....The grafters were pitiless, sparing neither the poor, the young, the 
aged, or the ill (Braden, 1971, pp. 290-294).
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s embrace o f the our S.O.B. policy was just a precursor to 
the way the developed world approached the problem of political corruption from the 
1930s through the end o f the Cold War. During the course o f world upheavals in the 
1930s and 1940s, the rules concerning developed state intervention in developing states 
changed dramatically. With the 1945 formation o f the United Nations and the subsequent 
collapse o f colonialism, a new set o f rules emerged pertaining to state sovereignty. These 
new rules were dispensed indiscriminately to both old and newly emerging states, 
including those in the Caribbean. Whereas before World War II a state had to earn its 
sovereignty and right to non-intervention by showing it could maintain internal stability,
follow international norms, and provide public goods; after the war, the status o f 
sovereignty and non-intervention were simply bestowed upon states by the international 
system. This new concept o f sovereignty did not require any particular substantive 
condition in the new state, only the observance and forbearance o f other members o f the 
international community (Jackson, 1990, pp. 1, 11). Many states, including those in the 
Caribbean, used their new independent status o f sovereignty as a shield to keep the 
international community from looking closely at illicit internal behaviors like political 
corruption. Sovereignty issues also became a favored excuse for states that lacked the 
political will or political capacity to comply with otherwise valid international 
requirements. Armed with the new rules o f sovereignty and non-intervention, and 
combined with Cold War superpower protection in their spheres o f influence, corrupt 
rulers, such as those in Table 3-1, felt doubly protected, by sovereignty and superpower 
force, as their corrupt governments depleted national treasuries and diverted state 
resources for their own private use. An unintended consequence o f the post-W orld War 
II rules concerning sovereignty and intervention was their contribution to the non­
accountability o f developing state governments that helped promote political corruption 
in the Caribbean.
Conclusion
From the above evidence, it is clear that the Caribbean colonial and post­
independence periods through the 1940s saw significant political corruption. It is 
impossible to quantify the exact levels o f this Caribbean colonial corruption. However, 
the corruption can be generally characterized. Political corruption permeated the colonial
political and economic institutions o f Spain, England (Britain), France, and the 
Netherlands from the beginning o f the colonial period. After independence, the 
corruption continued unabated in the former colonies o f Spain and French Haiti— perhaps 
even increasing. The former Spanish colonies and Haiti never established societal rules 
separating public office duties from private interests. After a legacy o f early colonial 
political corruption, by the early nineteenth century new societal standards against 
corruption did appear in the former British and Dutch colonies. These changing rules 
were a direct result o f the democratization o f British and Dutch politics, including the 
professionalization o f home and colonial bureaucracies. By the mid-twentieth century, 
political corruption was only a minor problem in the British and Dutch colonies.
The effects o f US nineteenth and early twentieth century interventions on 
Caribbean political corruption levels are more difficult to determine. After US departure 
from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, rules the US implemented 
separating public office from private interests were discarded and the political institutions 
the US left behind were used to establish dictatorships that became steeped in political 
corruption. Ambassador Braden’s above description o f conditions he found in early 
1940s Cuba support this conclusion. Even in taking a counterfactual approach, i.e., 
analyzing the probable political corruption levels in those states if the US had never 
intervened, it is difficult to determine how the US interventions affected later political 
corruption levels. Before the US interventions these states were unstable and violent. If 
the US had not intervened, there is a good chance that instability and violence— along 
with the existing systemic corruption— would have continued as it did in other former
Spanish colonies in the region. One undeniable conclusion from the US interventions, 
however, is that the dictatorships seizing power in these states after the U S’s departure 
strengthened the rules supporting political corruption behavior.
The realpolitik o f Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy institutionalized the US 
acceptance o f corrupt authoritarian Caribbean rulers, a policy that carried over until the 
very end o f the Cold War. The post-World War II changes in the international rules 
concerning sovereignty and intervention in developing states unintentionally strengthened 
the opportunities for developing state governing elite to be corrupt. Again, the lack o f 
post-World War II international reaction to Caribbean political corruption activity 
strengthened the rules supporting the corrupt behavior.
Overall, the discussion in this chapter provides support to contemporary 
Caribbean governing elite arguments that the basis o f present-day Caribbean political 
corruption can be found in their histories o f colonialism and US interventions. Chapter 4, 
which evaluates contemporary Caribbean conditions concerning political corruption in 
more detail, provides further analysis o f the effects o f colonialism and neo-imperialism 
on Caribbean political corruption levels.
Endnotes
1. Crow provides these salary figures in Spanish ducats converted to US dollars. The 
exact conversion rate o f these values to current US dollars is unknown. However, 
assuming the $300 to $600 soldier salaries would be the equivalent o f US$20,000 to 
US$40,000 today, then the Spanish viceroys were paid today’s equivalent o f 
US$3,000,000 to US$4,333,333. W hatever the exact conversion rate, the salaries of 
Spanish colonial viceroys were extremely generous by sixteenth and seventeenth century 
standards.
2. Trinidad and Tobago was already ruled by the Crown Colony system before the 
Morant Bay uprising, providing the British a governing model to follow in the rest o f the 
region after 1865.
Contemporary Caribbean Political Corruption
This chapter surveys Caribbean political and economic development and its 
association with political corruption in the last half o f the twentieth century. It first looks 
at the different paths o f post-war political and economic development that occurred 
across the Caribbean. It then makes a general assessment o f key structural (causal) 
factors associated with contemporary Caribbean political corruption levels. Finally, the 
chapter describes some o f the most prevalent types o f political corruption behavior 
occurring in the Caribbean in the post-war period.
This chapter reviews the political and economic structures— rules, institutions, 
and unintended consequences— affecting contemporary Caribbean political corruption 
that took shape after World War II. The chapter’s agency analysis looks at the Caribbean 
governing elite’s role in post-war structural development. The analysis demonstrates that 
while the post-war Caribbean governing elite had numerous opportunities to establish 
rules to prevent corruption in their governing structures, they instead acted in their own 
personal best interests. This self-interested approach to development resulted in a 
strengthening, rather than a reform, o f pre-war Caribbean structures that supported high 
levels o f political corruption. How the Caribbean governing elite built (constituted) their 
state’s post-war political and economic structures to serve their own private interests is an 
issue seldom highlighted in Caribbean political discourse.
Post-World W ar II Caribbean Structural Development
Contemporary Caribbean political and economic structural conditions are largely 
the result o f post-World War II development. During this period, the majority o f regional 
constitutions were either written or reformed and new economic structures integrating the 
region into the world economy developed. The legacy o f colonialism and US 
interventions in the region played a role in this development, as these factors helped 
define the social rule structure that the Caribbean governing elite inherited in the post-war 
period. Other significant factors in the region’s development were the new post-war 
principles o f sovereignty and non-intervention that allowed domestic governing elite to 
build their state’s institutions with little outside interference. Thus, the essence of 
contemporary Caribbean political and economic structures is largely a product o f 
development trends over the last half o f the twentieth century.
Political Modernization. As with their colonial experiences, the former Spanish,
British, French, and Dutch Caribbean colonies followed quite different post-W orld War II 
political modernization paths. The former Spanish Caribbean colonies experienced a 
string o f authoritarian-dictatorial or authoritarian-democratic regimes (except Costa Rica 
and Puerto Rico). Many o f the authoritarian-dictatorial regimes were installed by military 
coups that frequently cited rampant government corruption as the rational for their 
forcibly taking power. Most o f the former British Caribbean colonies achieved 
independence in the post-war period and built their own unique brands o f liberal- and 
authoritarian-democracies. The former French Caribbean colony o f Haiti suffered under 
the authoritarian-dictatorial rule o f the Duvalier dynasty from 1951 until 1986, when Jean
Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier fled into political exile. Since 1986, Haiti has undergone a 
series o f internal power struggles that include several quasi-democratic starts-and-stops 
and a 1991 to 1994 period o f authoritarian-military rule. In the post-war period, the 
French installed their unique brand o f socialist-democracy in their former Caribbean 
colonies o f French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, and fully incorporated these 
territories into the French state as French Overseas Departments. Also during this period, 
the Dutch allowed their Caribbean colonies increasing self-rule, resulting in the 
independence o f Dutch Guiana (Suriname) and the incorporation o f the semi-autonomous 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba into the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A review o f the 
political development in the former Spanish and British colonies— the largest and most 
numerous independent states in the region— is indicative o f contemporary Caribbean 
political conditions.
Contemporary political institutions in many o f the Caribbean’s former Spanish 
colonies are the result o f a democratization wave that swept Latin America beginning in 
the early 1980s. During the 1960s and 1970s, many o f the former Spanish colonies had 
been ruled, at least at times, by authoritarian-dictatorial regim es.1 During the 1980s, 
many o f these states broke the hold o f their authoritarian-dictatorial leaders and began a 
process o f democratization that transformed them into authoritarian-democratic regimes. 
An authoritarian-democratic regime is a weak representational democracy, often 
described as a facade democracy. In such states, elections, often not free and fair, are 
held to elect top political leaders. After elections, however, there is little public 
participation in political decision-making. Instead, important state decisions are made by
a small group o f political elite in the executive branch. This small group o f political elite 
usually includes the state’s president and his or her closest political and economic 
advisers. Legislatures and judiciaries play secondary, if  any, roles in balancing the power 
o f the strong executives in authoritarian-democratic states. Such states are ruled more by 
power than by law. One analyst characterizes authoritarian-democratic states as where 
“government remains a racket dominated by the powerful and the well-connected”
(Payne, 1994, p. 26). It is these authoritarian-democratic regimes that carried the majority 
of Spanish-speaking Caribbean colonies states through the 1990s and into the twenty-first 
century (see D. Payne, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995).
Understanding how authoritarian-democratic regimes arise in presidential 
governing systems requires a review o f the rules constituting such systems. Drawn from 
the political philosophy o f Montesquieu and Locke, presidential systems are based on the 
principle o f separation o f political power that establishes a structure o f checks-and- 
balances among autonomous executive, legislative, and judicial branches. When the US 
Founding Fathers designed the first presidential system, their main concern was to limit 
the political power held by any one government branch, thus they chose the separation of 
power principle (see Peltason, 1997, pp. 24-28). Former Caribbean Spanish (less Cuba) 
and French colonies, plus Guyana and Suriname, are governed by different forms o f the 
presidential system.
The emergence o f authoritarian-democratic regimes resulted from conscious 
decisions (not unintended consequences) o f Caribbean governing elite who established 
the rules for their presidential systems in the post-war period. The authoritarian-
democratic structures are rooted in the region’s colonial and post-independence traditions 
o f cuadillo (strongman) or oligarchic rule. The continuation o f strongman politics reveals 
that in the post-World War II period that many Caribbean states have not developed elite 
attitudes o f political compromise and tolerance o f opposing political views— societal 
rules considered vital to functioning democracies. Thus, in keeping with their traditions 
of strong central rule, most Caribbean states consciously adopted presidential governing 
systems that concentrate a state’s decision-making power in the hands o f only a few 
senior officials in the executive branch.
Caribbean governing elite facilitated the rise o f authoritarian-democratic regimes 
by building a number o f rules into their post-war constitutions that vary significantly from 
the original US presidential model. For example, most Caribbean presidential systems 
include presidential decree powers that allow Caribbean presidents to bypass their 
legislatures and legislate outright. They also often incorporate strong presidential veto 
powers and the exclusive right o f the executive to initiate legislation in key policy areas, 
further restricting their legislature’s powers, (see Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997, pp. 41- 
52). Additionally, few Caribbean states with presidential systems established 
autonomous judiciaries with legislative review powers. Most judiciaries in Caribbean 
presidential systems are dependent upon their executives, relying upon the executive for 
their funding, appointments, promotions, and disciplinary actions. Such rules that allow 
Caribbean presidents to bypass their legislatures and control their judiciaries negate 
effective checks-and-balances on executive power, and thus foster the emergence of 
authoritarian decision-making processes.
Contemporary Caribbean parliamentary governing systems have also fostered 
their own authoritarian-democratic structures. Contemporary political institutions in the 
former British Caribbean colonies can be traced to the wave o f 1930s social unrest and 
labor riots that occurred across the British West Indies. The unrest sprang from peasant 
and worker frustrations with the British Crown Colony system that perpetuated high 
unemployment, low wages, poor working conditions, and the abject poverty that 
blanketed the region. The British Moyne Commission noted that the unrest was a 
“positive demand for the creation o f new conditions that would render possible a better 
life” (Lewis, 1968, p. 88). The 1937-1938 Moyne Commission West Indian investigative 
report also found that “ [t]he whole West Indies...are practically devoid o f all multifarious 
institutions, official and unofficial, which characterize British life....” (Moyne 
Commission, 1945, pp. 94, 108). The lack o f West Indian social institutions was the 
result o f a British Crown Colony system that focused primarily on maintaining political 
stability in the colonies and gave little attention to economic and social development. A 
combination o f the 1930s unrest, world de-colonization sentiment formalized in the 1945 
United Nations Charter, and British colonial and post-World War II exhaustion, led to a 
British decision to dismantle the West Indian Crown Colony system and begin a process 
leading to independence for most o f the West Indian colonies.
During the 1940s, the British Caribbean colonies were given universal suffrage 
and increasingly more responsibility in self-rule, until the British eventually approved 
their constitutions and granted them independence. In 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago were the first British Caribbean colonies to gain full independence. Other British
Caribbean colonies obtained their independence over the next three decades, with the 
exception o f the six colonies that remain British Overseas Territories (see Table 1-1).
The political institutions that evolved in the former British Caribbean colonies all imitate 
the British Westminster parliamentary system (see A. Payne, 1993; Emmanuel, 1993).
The political parties competing for power in these Westminster-cloned systems generally 
trace their roots to the 1930s and 1940s West Indian labor unions. The adoption o f the 
British Westminster structures by these newly independent small states raises a number of 
problems.
Westminster parliamentary systems are based on the principle o f loyal opposition. 
The parliamentary ruling party or ruling coalition, the party or coalition with the majority 
of parliamentary members, selects a government consisting o f the prime minister and 
cabinet ministers. The government is responsible for the development o f a government 
program that must receive parliamentary approval. The non-ruling party or coalition 
forms an opposition that is responsible for ensuring all viewpoints on important 
government programs are thoroughly debated both within parliament and publicly (i.e., in 
the media, public forums, etc.). Once a government program has run the gauntlet o f 
public and parliamentary debates and is passed by the parliament, both the ruling 
party/coalition and the opposition are bound to lend its implementation full support. 
Governing systems based on the principle o f loyal opposition assume that a high level of 
tolerance for opposing views and an attitude o f compromise and cooperation exist 
between the ruling party/coalition and the opposition. If at any time the parliament losses 
confidence in the government, the parliament can call for a vote o f no confidence,
requiring that a new government from the parliamentary majority be formed or that 
national elections be called. Power is checked in parliamentary systems through the 
influence o f an informed citizenry on the members o f parliament, parliament’s oversight 
of government activities, parliament’s ability to replace the setting government, and the 
opposition’s readiness (with a designated shadow cabinet) to assume the reigns o f 
government if  the citizenry votes them into the majority (see Birch, 1990, pp. 130-132).
For the smaller former British Caribbean colonies, the W estminster system 
provides an ideal structure for the emergence o f authoritarian-democratic regimes. The 
corruption o f the Westminster system in small states is an unintended consequence o f the 
Westminster political rules. In states with a small number o f parliamentary members, 
prime ministers and cabinet ministers often perform a dual function o f executive and 
legislature. In fact, in some states the prime minister and cabinet actually constitute the 
majority o f votes in the parliament itself—thus allowing them to set parliamentary 
agendas, control parliamentary and public debate, and pass any legislation agreed to 
within their small group. The Westminster system was never intended to allow such 
accordance between the executive and legislature (see Birch, 1990, chap. 12). With 
judiciaries in Caribbean Westminster states usually subordinated to the executive, there 
are virtually no checks on the executive’s power. The political decision-making power in 
small Westminster states thus unintentionally can become authoritarian-democratic—  
residing in the prime minister, cabinet, and a few trusted advisers. One longtime observer 
of British Caribbean politics refers to the W estminster system as one leading to elected 
dictatorships (D ’Costa, 1998, p. 145). In effect, these corrupted W estminster systems
recreate the power structures o f the pre-Crown Colony British colonies by installing a 
powerful prime minister and cabinet, similar to the pre-1865 colonial governors and local 
assemblies found in most British colonies.
Two other major problems arise in attempting to adapt the British Westminster 
structure to small states. First, the parliaments in small Westminster states are usually too 
small to offer an effective opposition to the ruling government (see Lijphart, 1993, pp. 
328-332). The result is little formal public debate o f government programs. The lack of 
a loyal opposition negates the central principle around which W estminster systems are 
built. Second, the Westminster first-past-the-post rules designate that the parliamentary 
candidate from each constituency receiving a simple majority o f the popular vote 
represents that constituency in parliament. An unintended consequence o f this rule is that 
parliamentary party member proportions seldom match the percentage o f electoral party 
support as occurs in states with proportional representation. For example, it is not 
uncommon for an opposition party or coalition with 30 or 40 percent o f the popular vote 
to receive only 10 or 20 percent o f the parliamentary seats (see Emmanuel, 1994). This 
first-past-the-post problem further degrades the representational effectiveness o f the 
Westminster system in small states.
Authoritarian-democratic systems dominate the governing structures o f 
independent states across the Caribbean. Despite its quasi-democratic starts-and stops, 
Haiti remains an authoritarian-democratic system. Among independent former Spanish 
colonies, only Costa Rica’s governing system is not authoritarian-democratic. Why Costa 
Rica escaped authoritarian-democratic structures is explained in Chapter 6. Among
independent former British Caribbean colonies, only a few states (The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Dominica) escaped the rise o f an authoritarian-democratic system. Barbados, 
for example, avoided the corruption o f the Westminster system through a strong societal 
sense o f consensus and public participation in politics— conditions lacking in many o f the 
other former British colonies.
Caribbean Basin authoritarian-democratic systems foster corrupt behavior by 
restricting elite competition, limiting elite accountability, and negating mass participation 
(see discussions in Chapter 2). One o f the most insidious o f these effects is the restriction 
on elite competition that fosters animosity among elite factions. Officials other than the 
president or prime minister and their immediate advisers are effectively locked out o f 
wielding real political power in authoritarian-democratic systems. Legislatures become 
jealous o f the power held by their strong executives. Judiciaries feel compelled to 
support their executives at any cost. Out-of-power parties fight viciously to regain power. 
Citizens, seeing this internal political power imbalance and the malicious inter-party 
struggles, become cynical and place less legitimacy in governmental institutions. With 
political animosity rising in the state, it becomes more difficult to foster societal 
cooperation on contentious issues. The result, as Huntington (1968, p. 64) highlights, is 
that public agreement on important state issues is replaced by political corruption.
Economic Modernization. While Caribbean post-W orld War II political modernization 
was primarily the result o f internal governing elite-controlled rule making in each state, 
economic modernization was driven by both external (international) and internal 
(domestic) causal factors. The immediate post-war decades were a time o f general
Caribbean economic boom. The standards o f living in most o f the region vastly
improved, as there were strong international demands for the Caribbean’s agricultural,
mineral, and petroleum products. During the 1960s, many Caribbean states averaged
commendable gross domestic product growth o f 4 to 5 percent (Ramsaran, 1995, pp. 112-
113). Largely influenced by the United Nations-backed import-substitution economic
development model, Caribbean states took actions to expand their export sectors while
restricting their imports to encourage and protect nascent domestic industries. With the
acquiescence o f Canada, the US, Britain, and other traditional European trading partners
that desired to keep the Caribbean states as part o f the anti-Soviet bloc, the Caribbean
states developed statist economic structures that:
encouraged governments to assume a very active role, not only as redistributors 
but as instigators o f development through the provision o f incentives and 
investment. The modem welfare state took root in this period. Governments 
saw their role not only as providing the regulatory framework but also as being 
involved in the production o f goods and services and influencing private 
decisions through interventions in critical areas o f the economy. Exchange 
rates, prices, interest rates, credit rationing, and exchange and trade controls 
became the major tools of economic management (Ramsaran, 1995, pp. 112- 
114).
Dominquez (1993) labels the general economic structures that arose in the 
Caribbean during the post-war period as a Statist Bargain. He credits the Statist Bargain 
as the primary reason that democracy seemed to flourish in much o f the Caribbean after 
World War II. The Statist Bargain entails Caribbean governing elite, in alliance with key 
business interests, building protectionist walls around their economies (see Dominguez, 
1993, pp. 13-22). With protection against competing imports, and ample government 
subsidies for their operations, the Caribbean business sectors reaped large profits, while
not having to be particularly efficient or work too hard to be competitive. In exchange for 
the protection of their business interests, Caribbean business elite allied with the 
governing elite and filled their political coffers with resources to finance large political 
patronage machines. The Caribbean governing elite thus found themselves with ample 
resources to build citizen electoral support through dispensing jobs, instituting basic 
education and health programs, offering other government services, and even paying cash 
to some citizen supporters.
From the 1960s to 1980s, Caribbean states were able to maintain their Statist 
Bargain regimes under the benevolent watch o f Canada, the US, and Europe, their 
primary trading partners whose consumers shouldered much o f the cost o f the Caribbean 
protectionism. Programs like the 1986 Caribbean and Canada Trade Agreement 
(CARIBCAN), the 1983 US Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and the four Lome 
Conventions since 1975, institutionalized the respective Canadian, US, and European 
acceptance o f Caribbean protectionist regimes. During the Cold War, the Canadians, 
Europeans, and US justified their support o f Caribbean protectionism as a means to keep 
the region within the fold o f the Western anti-Soviet alliance.
Despite the robustness o f the Caribbean Statist Bargain, international oil shocks 
in the 1970s and early 1980s caused a severe downturn in Caribbean economic prosperity. 
To offset the costs o f the increased price o f oil, to maintain social welfare programs 
instituted during the 1950s and 1960s, and for economic infrastructure and military 
hardware purchases, Caribbean states borrowed heavily in the international financial 
market in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With international banks flush in Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Country (OPEC) funds, there were plenty o f international entities
ready and willing to provide loans to Caribbean states. In 1982, however, the world debt
crisis put a halt to the widespread deficit financing o f Caribbean state budgets as
international lenders became much more discriminating. By the late 1980s, it also
became obvious that much o f the Caribbean international borrowing had gone to enrich
the governing elite’s personal bank accounts and not for more egalitarian purposes (see
Naylor, 1987; Beaty & Gwynne, 1993). Beaty and Gwynne (1993) allege:
the wealthy and corrupt in Latin America [including the Caribbean] managed to 
steal virtually every dollar lent to their countries by Western banks, creating the 
debt crisis o f the 1980s [and later]...and others skimmed billions from their 
national treasuries and hid them in Swiss and Caymanian accounts free from 
snooping regulators....” (Beaty & Gwynne, 1993, p. xxv).
The post-Cold War world presents the Caribbean governing elite with a new set of 
rules that effect their economic modernization. Developed state foreign aid has largely 
disappeared as the Caribbean is no longer o f strategic importance in a W estern-Soviet 
struggle over spheres o f influence. International financial institutions (IFIs), i.e., World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US Agency for International 
Development, etc., are demanding transparency, accountability, and improved financial 
management before tendering financial assistance. As a result o f the 1980s world debt 
crisis, many commercial banks even require Caribbean states obtain IMF certification 
before making loans. Developed states are demanding that Caribbean states open their 
economies, thus undermining the Statist Bargain that was based largely on local 
protectionist schemes. Developed states are also pushing for corruption and good
governance reforms. All o f these new international pressures arose simultaneously with 
trends o f decreasing regional economic growth and increasing unemployment.
Caribbean governing elite find themselves in a quandary— caught between 
conflicting international and domestic demands for political and economic reform. With 
economic prospects still dim, many states are forced to maneuver the minefield o f the 
debt crisis by calling for IFI support. IFI insistence on reforms toward liberal (free) trade 
policies, increased state revenues (taxes), and decreased state budgetary outlays, 
undermine the populist political and statist economic structures that kept the Caribbean 
governing elite in power in the post-World War II period. The demand for international 
and domestic reforms has increased societal tensions across the Caribbean. One 
consequence o f these tensions can be seen in Venezuela where in 1998 the mass citizenry 
rejected the two traditional political parties and voted in President Hugo Chavez, an ex­
army officer who organized a new third-party and ran on a strong political reform and 
anti-corruption platform. Chavez’s election has made most Caribbean governing elite 
uncomfortable. Caribbean governing elite are afraid that Venezuela-like third parties 
might force them from power as social welfare programs continue to diminish and 
economic growth founders. Amid this resultant political and economic turmoil, 
Caribbean political corruption continues to flourish.
Contemporary Caribbean Institutions
Contemporary Caribbean political and economic institutions vary widely across 
the region. Table 4-1 provides a set o f comparative Caribbean political and economic 
indicators. The table includes the 1999 status o f selected indicators o f Caribbean
corruption patterns, political rights, civil liberties, press freedom, income levels, trade 
structures, and involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering activities. While 
the Table 4-1 comparative indicators do not adequately measure the institutional factors 
that cause political corruption developed in Chapter 2, they do provide insight into the 
contemporary political and economic institutions existing in Caribbean states and
'j
territories. Included in the below discussion o f the Table 4-1 indicators is qualitative 
information related to contemporary Caribbean institutions associated with political 
corruption. The Caribbean states and territories in Table 4-1 are grouped by the 
evaluation o f their corruption patterns, discussed last in this section.
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Political Structures. Table 4-1 provides Freedom House ratings o f each state or 
territory’s political rights and civil liberties. These Freedom House ratings are composite 
indexes that indicate whether basic political rights and civil liberties are present in a state. 
The political rights index includes factors relating to freedom and fairness o f elections, 
existence o f basic elite competition, and levels o f self-determination for both individuals 
and social groups. The civil liberties index includes factors relating to freedoms of 
expression, press, assembly, religion, and fairness o f criminal justice systems. While 
these Freedom House indexes do not correspond exactly with the Table 2-4 concepts of 
form or rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability, or mass 
participation, they do reveal that, on a macro-level, states with the highest (worst) 
political rights and civil liberties index scores (3 or greater) correspond to states with the 
most political corruption (systemic).
Chapter 2 develops how the freedom and fairness o f electoral systems are factors 
in evaluating the nature o f both elite competition and elite accountability in states. In 
general, any state in Table 4-1 with a political rights rating o f 3 or greater has problems 
with their elections’ freedom and fairness. States in the bottom half o f Table 4-1 tend to 
have elections tainted by charges o f fraud and corruption. The Organization o f American 
States (OAS) and Emory University's Carter Center have developed a regular industry 
around monitoring regional elections. Despite this international oversight, governing 
elite continue to have considerable influence over the electoral process in their respective 
states. Governing elite usually control voter registry, voting procedures, and vote 
counts— all areas open for abuse in the non-transparent conditions existing in many
regional states. For example, in the 1999 national elections in Antigua and Barbuda, the
ruling Antiguan Labor Party (ALP) took drastic measures to ensure their electoral victory.
A document secreted from the office o f Prime Minister Lester Bird titled “Winning the
election is all that matters” stated:
All voters who owe utility bills “for even minimum arrears”...should be 
disconnected “on a large scale.” Then they could be reconnected on the 
understanding they would vote for the ALP. Members of the party 
...[should]...“find out in each constituency the registered voters in arrears in 
meeting their mortgage obligations and offer to assist, but obtain an agreement 
that they will vote for the ALP candidate.” “Rumors must be circulated in every 
government ministry that their jobs are only secure if  they vote ALP. Serious 
consideration must be given to the giving away of cash money to potential 
voters before the day o f election. I would suggest $1,500 to $5,000.... (quoted in 
Howe, 1999, p. 23).
The ALP won this election, one the OAS and Carter Center did not observe. Why 
did Antiguan citizens not simply take the money and, knowing the widespread ALP 
political corruption, vote for the opposition? One journalist offers, “The ballot in Antigua 
is not as secret as it should be. The Electoral Commission has been transformed into an 
ALP vehicle. Two party activists were planted at each polling booth checking how 
citizens voted” (Howe, 1999, p. 23). While such extreme measures to fix elections do not 
occur in every Caribbean state, as Table 4-1 implies, governing elite in many states, 
especially those with authoritarian-democratic regimes, are able to use similar tactics to 
ensure their reelections.
The financing of elections is another important factor in assessing the freedom 
and fairness o f Caribbean elections. Geddes (1991, 1994) provides a compelling analysis 
of the financing structures in contemporary Caribbean electoral processes. Using simple 
game-theoretic models (agency models), Geddes (1991) investigates the relationships
between electoral resources required to win elections and the political will o f governing 
elite to institute electoral reform in South and Central American presidential systems.
She concludes that resources obtained from political patronage networks are the single 
most important factor underlying the power structures in these states. Therefore, 
governing elite are not likely to reform patronage structures that might undermine their 
main source o f power.
Political patronage includes both legal and illegal behaviors (see Chapter 2 
discussion of patron-client systems). Representational patronage is generally legal and 
includes promises or provision o f state resources (jobs, education and health programs, 
etc.) in exchange for electoral support. Illegal patronage, on the other hand, concerns 
resources provided by individuals or special interest groups (in expectation o f special 
political favors) that politicians use for their own private gains— including their use to 
build electoral support. Illegal patronage is a behavior that is antithetical to the Western 
concept o f good governance.
Geddes (1994, p. 42) describes the South and Central American patronage reform
initiatives as a politic ian ’s dilemma. Her studies reveal that even though politicians may
truly want to offer reform for illegal patronage, they face the dilemma that they cannot
afford the cost o f reform due to the loss o f electoral resources that would threaten their
hold on political power. She submits:
In order to maintain their electoral machines, politicians need to be able to “pay” 
their local party leaders, ward heelers, precinct workers, and campaign 
contributors with jobs, contracts, licenses, and other favors. What kinds o f 
payments are common or even possible depends on political traditions, legal 
constraints, and the amount o f state intervention in the economy among other
things. Where state intervention has customarily been high, politicians depend 
heavily on the distribution o f state largess to cement party loyalties (Geddes, 
1994, pp. 40-41).
In a study o f Westminster parliamentary systems in the Eastern Caribbean, Peters
(1992) also found patronage as a major electoral factor. In analyzing Eastern Caribbean
leader incentives, Peters observed that “[t]he overriding objective seems to be centered on
remaining in power” (Peters, 1992, p. 85). Peters describes how, immediately upon
election, Eastern Caribbean politicians begin to campaign for the next election through a
system o f dispensing legal and illegal patronage and crusades o f victimization that target
both opposition politicians and supporters o f the opposition party (Peters, 1992, pp. 178-
181). Along with their primary goal o f political survival, Peters found that Caribbean
political elite behavior is also motivated by a strong wealth incentive. Peters offers “[t]he
majority o f politicians in the Caribbean rely on their position as elected officials for their
sole source o f income” (Peters, 1992, p. 41). He observes that because the transition back
to a non-governmental role is so difficult for Caribbean politicians not reelected;
lower income nonprofessional individuals elected to [Caribbean] government 
will do anything necessary to remain in power as long as possible. During that 
period, they spend their entire term in office campaigning for the next term and 
try to amass as much capital [legally and illegally] as they can in order to 
guarantee their economic survival after they lose power. (Peters, 1992, p. 41)
Based on Geddes’ (1991, 1994) and Peters’ (1992) analyses, the reliance on illegal 
political patronage to fuel Caribbean elections is a characteristic o f both presidential and 
parliamentary governing systems in the region.
Even if  Caribbean elections were fair and free, there is no guarantee that 
electorates will hold corrupt governing elite accountable by voting them out o f office.
For example, McCann and Dominguez (1998) found that despite widespread knowledge 
o f the Mexican ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) corruption, over the 
course of several elections from 1986 to 1995, the electorate repeatedly voted the PRI 
back into power. Two principal factors explain these PRI victories. First, the PRI 
generated voter support through their existing extensive patronage networks. Second, 
with the expectation that election fraud would return the PRI to power anyway, those 
voters most likely to vote for the opposition failed to come to the polls (McCann & 
Dominguez, 1998, pp. 498-499).
One elite competition factor not captured in Table 4-1 is the nature o f elite 
mobility. Chapter 2 discusses how limitations on elite mobility affect the nature o f elite 
competition. Limitations on elite mobility may take a number o f forms. First, dictatorial 
states limit elite mobility by creating longevity in office for dictators, their handpicked 
successors, and their most trusted advisors. Cuba is the current best Caribbean example 
of a dictatorial state with limited elite mobility. President Fidel Castro has held power in 
Cuba for over 40 years and has designated his brother, Defense M inister Raul Castro, as 
his immediate successor. Real political power in Cuba is managed not within the Cuban 
government structure, but within the Politburo o f the Cuban Communist Party, chaired by 
Fidel Castro and made up o f his most trusted advisors. All decisions about changes 
within the Cuban governing elite (government or party) are made either by the Politburo 
or by Castro himself. Haiti under the Duvaliers (1951 -1986), the Dominican Republic 
under Trujillo (1930-1961), and Nicaragua under the Somozas (1937-1979) are past
examples o f Caribbean states where elite mobility was restricted by dictatorial rule and 
accompanied by high political corruption levels.
Second, states with Westminster parliamentary systems often maintain the same 
individuals (or their offspring/spouses) as party presidents, and thus as candidates for 
prime minister, for long periods. The Bird family o f Antigua and Barbuda (1950s to 
present), the Jagans o f Guyana (a presidential system) (1960s to 1990s), the Manleys of 
Jamaica (1940s to 1990s), Edward Seaga o f Jamaica (1970s to present), John Compton of 
St. Lucia (1960s to 1990s), and James Mitchell o f St. Vincent and the Grenadines (19708- 
present), are only a few examples o f individuals or families holding the top political 
positions in their state or political parties for long periods (see Griffith, 1993, pp. 24-25). 
In many cases these individuals or families led the independence movements in the 
former British colonies and held political power until they became unable to serve due 
usually to health reasons.
Finally, states with dominate political parties precipitate restrictions on elite 
competition by excluding other parties from power. The Mexican PRI and Antiguan ALP 
are the two most glaring recent Caribbean examples o f political parties that have 
excluded their opposition from access to their state’s governing structures. The Mexican 
PRI maintained political control from 1929 to 2000. Antigua’s ALP took power initially 
in that state’s 1950s independence movement and has maintained control since Antigua’s 
1981 independence from Britain (see Henry, 1991). Although both the PRI and ALP saw 
the rise o f competing political parties, they continued to maintain control over their
respective governments and make all decisions about changes to the governing elite 
within closed party circles.
Table 4-1 includes Freedom House’s rating o f state press freedoms. As the table 
demonstrates, there are problems with press freedom in many Caribbean states. Some 
Caribbean states go to great lengths to control the press (see Sussman, 1999). In many 
states, the press is restricted outright through state-ownership or ownership by interests in 
alliance with the government. Some states employ systems o f media and journalist 
licensing, special media taxes, and the withdrawal o f government advertising as methods 
o f controlling information. Some Caribbean media outlets and journalists have found 
their licenses revoked on short notice for reports deemed harmful to governments. Most 
Caribbean states also have strict defamation, slander, and libel laws— many dating to the 
authoritarian military rule in parts o f the region prior to the 1980s. Throughout the 
region, the press finds itself the target o f harassment and violence. Radio and television 
stations and newspaper offices frequently become the targets o f arsonists or bombers. 
Almost 200 journalists were killed across the Americas during the 1990s and scores o f 
others injured in violent attacks. The majority o f these journalists were killed in Central 
America, Mexico, and Colombia. In an atmosphere o f constant media harassment, it is 
not surprising that self-censorship is a major problem with press freedom in the 
Caribbean.
Problems o f press freedom also extend to issues o f freedom o f information. Few 
states in the Caribbean have freedom o f information laws. On the contrary, Caribbean 
states often make efforts to restrict information from their media and citizens. M ost of
the former British colonies, as part o f their independence process, adopted legislation 
similar to the British Official Secrets Act (see Thurlow, 1995). Such legislation prohibits 
the release o f any information not sanctioned by the government. In this case the 
government is defined as only the prime minister and cabinet ministers. Caribbean 
officials justify holding information release at such high levels as a means to ensure the 
executive remains responsible for the actions o f their subordinate civil service. In reality, 
the restricted release o f information is more to keep the sitting government from being 
embarrassed by government mismanagement and officials’ illicit behaviors, especially in 
the period just before elections. While not as formal as Official Secrets Acts, the former 
Spanish colonies and Haiti also possess similar policies or structures restricting the 
release o f government information.
An area not indicated in Table 4-1 is the enforcement aspect o f elite 
accountability. The lack o f accountability in many states due to electoral problems is 
discussed above. However, there also remain significant problems in administrative and 
criminal justice structures. Administrative mismanagement is rampant throughout the 
Caribbean (Jones, 1992, 1995). Similar to the lack o f regional freedom o f information, 
Caribbean government budget preparations, contracting, and accounting are often 
completed with little government or public oversight (Wesberry (interview), 1999).
There is widespread Caribbean tax evasion. Civil services in the region are often bloated 
and far from professional, often the result o f pressure on governing elite to provide 
patronage benefits (employment) to loyal party supporters. Recently, a large percentage 
o f Caribbean homegrown technically trained experts have immigrated to developed
states, further contributing to conditions o f maladministration (Jones, 1992, p. 39). A 
major focus o f intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations working in the 
Caribbean has been to improve administrative management, professionalize civil 
services, and provide incentives for technical experts to remain in the region. In such 
conditions o f administrative mismanagement, there is little chance o f administrative 
enforcement actions holding a governing elite accountable.
In most Caribbean states, criminal justice systems lack the basic principles present 
in developed states (Salas & Rico, 1993, p. 48). Governing elite are seldom held 
accountable in criminal justice systems that lack efficiency and openness. Courts in the 
region find themselves overburdened with cases due to the “upsurge in criminal activity 
and the growing litigiousness o f the region’s citizenry” (Ryan, 1998, p. 50). Moreover, as 
discussed previously, judicial systems lack independence as they are often dependent 
upon executive branches that control not only their budgets, but also the selection, 
promotion, and discipline o f judges. W ithout a political base o f their own outside the 
executive, criminal justice systems are unlikely to hold a governing elite accountable.
Another elite accountability factor that cannot be overlooked in the Caribbean is 
the granting o f asylum to corrupt ousted elite. Caribbean governing elite know that if 
they are caught in corrupt acts, they can usually receive political asylum under the 
sovereignty umbrella o f other regional states. Costa Rica is a favorite asylum haven o f 
corrupt elite. Beginning in the 1970s, Costa Rica became an asylum for a number of 
fleeing elite as they followed the lead o f President Jose Figueres, Sr., who philosophized 
“a dollar robbed or a dollar bought, is still a dollar” (Araya et al., 1982, p. 19). In 1986,
Haiti’s ousted President Jean-Claude Duvalier was granted asylum in France after 
plundering millions from the Haitian treasury. The US has also been the exile home of 
corrupt dictators such as Batista o f Cuba and the Somozas o f Nicaragua. The ability o f a 
corrupt governing elite to obtain political asylum is a key contributor to the conditions of 
weak elite accountability in the Caribbean.
Using Table 4-1 ’s press freedom ratings as a proxy indicator for the level o f elite 
accountability, it is evident that states with the worst ratings (30 or greater) correspond to 
the states with the highest levels (systemic) o f political corruption.
A final political structural factor to consider is the nature o f a state’s mass 
participation. Table 4-1 has no direct indicators o f mass participation but does provide 
several proxy indicators. First, a state or territory’s level o f civil liberties is an indication 
of the ability o f citizens to organize and participate in government. Second, Fukuyama 
(1995) argues that the level o f social trust in a state is correlated to its level o f income 
(GDP per capita in Table 4-1). Chapter 2 developed how social trust is a good 
measurement o f a society’s level o f mass participation. Finally, the level o f black market 
activity in a state is an indicator o f both the size o f its informal economy and how much 
citizens trust in formal political and economic institutions. Overall, it is evident form 
Table 4-1 that states with higher political corruption levels (systemic) have, on average, 
lower civil liberties scores, lower averages o f personal incomes, and higher levels o f 
black market activity.
Economic Structures. Contemporary Caribbean economic structures are just as varied 
as the political structures discussed above. Table 4-1 displays the wide variance in
regional income levels (GDP per capita). The table also provides indicators for the levels 
o f government intervention in the economy, external trade protection, and black market 
activities. In consonance with the Statist Bargain discussion above, most Caribbean 
states continue a high level o f external trade protection. In keeping with international 
pressures for neoliberal economic reforms, Caribbean government intervention in their 
economies is generally lower than their external trade protection. Table 4-1 also reveals 
that those states with the lowest incomes also have the highest levels o f black market 
activity— indicating that citizens are being forced into the informal economy to survive. 
Overall, Table 4-1 indicates that Caribbean states generally retain their statist economic 
structures— which Chapter 2 reveals contribute to political corruption levels.
Political Corruption Patterns. There is no single comprehensive measure o f Caribbean 
political corruption levels. The Transparency International (TI) annual Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) provides the best measure o f political corruption in several 
Caribbean states. Table 4-1 includes the 1999 Caribbean TI CPI ratings in the corruption 
pattern column. The TI CPI scores are calculated by combining the scores o f several 
international and domestic surveys. The CPI scores are a composite measure o f the 
political and bureaucratic-administrative corruption levels as perceived by a state’s mass 
citizenry and both domestic and international businesspersons.4 While some may dispute 
the exact TI CPI scores o f individual states, TI considers the CPI an excellent indicator of 
a state’s level o f corruption when compared with other states (Transparency International, 
1999a).
The Table 4-1 TI CPI scores paint a rather bleak picture o f Caribbean political 
corruption in comparison with other world regions. Even Costa Rica (5.1), the Caribbean 
state rated the least corrupt in the TI CPI, is below the 5.5 index threshold TI offers as the 
benchmark for a state that is systemically corrupt.5 In 1999, Costa Rica ranked number 
32 of the 99 states scored in the TI CPI. Point-wise, Costa Rica was well behind the 
world’s least corrupt states o f Denmark (10.0), Finland (9.8), New Zealand (9.4), and 
Sweden (9.4). The entire Caribbean is also well behind the contemporary CPI scores of 
its former colonizers— Spain (6.6), United Kingdom (8.6), France (6.6), Netherlands 
(9.0)— and the US (7.5). The Table 4-1 TI CPI scores place all Caribbean states rated, 
except Costa Rica, in the bottom-half o f states worldwide. Honduras (1.8) and Panama 
(1.7) both place among the top 10 most corrupt states in the world. Table 4-1 reveals the 
substantial problem with contemporary Caribbean political corruption.
Several Caribbean states and territories are not included in the 1999 TI CPI. In 
Table 4-1, the other Caribbean states and territories’ corruption patterns are subjectively 
rated as incidental, institutional, or systemic using the conceptual definitions o f these 
terms developed in Chapter 2. These subjective ratings were developed either using other 
survey data or from a content analysis o f Caribbean literature.6
Using a single 1995 Business International (BI) survey, three o f the missing 
Caribbean states can be placed comparatively with those rated by Transparency 
International in Table 4-1 (see Mauro, 1995). The 1995 BI survey places both the 
Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago as less corrupt than Jamaica., but more 
corrupt than states with TI CPI scores similar to Costa Rica. The 1995 BI survey also
rates Haiti as more corrupt than Panama. Some would argue, however, that it is not Haiti,
but the Eastern Caribbean island state of Antigua and Barbuda that leads the region in
political corruption. One author offers:
Under V. C. Bird [Vere Sr., Prime Minister 1981-1994], Antigua has become 
not only a sanctuary but a spawning ground for crooks and scoundrels, a place 
where, for the right price, one can buy everything from a diplomatic passport to 
a government minister, an island where all o f one’s schemes, no matter how 
illegitimate, can find official sanction. No other Caribbean nation, not even 
Haiti under the Duvaliers, has been plundered and mismanaged for so long in so 
public a fashion by a single family and with such devastating results. Members 
of the Bird family have long believed that because of V.C. Bird’s early years 
[leader o f the Antigua labor and independence movements], they have almost a 
divine right to rule A ntigua.. ..Antigua may be the last country in the Caribbean 
in which a head o f state employs totalitarian tactics to ensure that a political 
dynasty is established and that one o f his sons succeeds him in office. (Coram, 
1993, p. 5)
Aruba, a state whose governing elite are believed closely associated with 
international organized crime, also rates near the bottom of Caribbean corrupt states along 
with Honduras, Panama, Haiti, and Antigua and Barbuda. Aruba’s corruption problems 
are discussed in more detail in a later section.
Based on a content analysis o f Caribbean literature, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, the Bahamas, and Dominica rate just above Costa Rica (5.1) in the Table 4-1 
corruption patterns. Barbados, with the strongest regional liberal-democracy, experiences 
little political corruption. The Bahamas (after the 1992 ouster o f Prime M inister Lyndon 
Pindling) and the British Overseas Territories o f Bermuda and the Cayman Islands also 
exhibit strong democratic institutions. Dominica’s reputation for probity relates to the 
15-year (1980-1995) term o f Prime M inister Dame Eugenia Charles who was considered 
a “model o f both domestic virtue and geopolitical pragmatism ” (Maingot, 1994c, p. 10)
and ensured her government was not corrupt.7 Other Caribbean states and territories were 
rated in the Table 4-1 corruption patterns column based upon the content analysis o f 
Caribbean literature.
The actual levels o f past Caribbean political corruption will never be precisely 
known. At best, we can understand the corruption levels through the results o f the 
content analyses. However, even then only some corruption behavior surfaces in the 
public domain. The following section looks at much of the anecdotal evidence 
concerning Caribbean political corruption and improves our understanding o f state and 
territorial corruption levels measured subjectively in table 4-1.
Caribbean Political Corruption Behaviors
Caribbean political corruption encompasses a myriad o f diverse governing elite 
behaviors (see Table 2-2). Political corruption behavior may entail outright theft o f state 
resources or bribery, fraud, and graft associated with routine domestic or international 
business transactions. It may also encompass, as is being seen more frequently in the 
Caribbean, the misuse o f extraordinary material resources resulting from governing elite 
assistance to international organized crime activities (drug-trafficking, arms smuggling, 
money laundering, etc.). The complex and often interconnected behaviors surrounding 
Caribbean political corruption make it a particularly dogged problem.
Theft of State Resources. The outright theft o f state resources by a governing elite was 
common under pre-1990s authoritarian-dictatorial Caribbean rule. Along with bribes 
paid by foreign businesses, theft o f state resources was another major source o f the take
listed in Table 3-1 for various Caribbean rulers. Scott (1972) refers to regimes with wide-
scale theft o f state resources as being predatory (similar to Table 2-4’s pirate evaluation
of agent status). For example, regarding Haitian dictator Francois Duvalier’s (1957-
1971) rule, Scott offers:
Government is virtually the only source o f wealth in Haiti. Given the 
uninstitutionalized, coercive basis o f the regime and the absence o f any limits—  
either legal or traditional— predatory corruption was virtually unchecked. The 
annual budget, composed mostly o f customs and excise taxes, was the dictator’s 
personal purse to dispose o f as he saw fit. Loyal retainers and family members 
were given personal gifts, the Tonton Macoute [Duvalier’s secret police force] 
was rewarded for it missions o f intimidation and death, personal fortunes were 
created, and so forth (Scott, 1972, p. 85).
Most cases o f governing elite theft o f state resources never surface due to the lack 
of investigative journalism and the ineffectual administrative and criminal justice systems 
throughout the Caribbean. However, when cases do surface, they are often surrounded by 
political overtones (Maingot, 1994a, p. 64). Such political victimization was the case in 
the 1993 Venezuelan Congressional impeachment and later conviction o f President 
Carlos Andres Perez for misusing a secret US$17 million Venezuelan government fund to 
pay for campaign debts and a lavish 1989 inauguration. More commonly, the theft o f 
state resources is part o f a complex scheme involving multiple persons and including 
connections to domestic and/or international businesses. Venezuela, Mexico, and 
Colombia provide examples o f the complexity surrounding predatory Caribbean political 
corruption.
Venezuela is an example o f a complex predatory system o f political corruption. 
During the first three decades after World War II, Venezuelan political corruption was 
supported by the political rents acquired from manipulation o f the state’s massive oil
industry. However, the 1980s world debt crisis, along with 1980s sagging oil revenues,
decreased the Venezuelan state resources available for rent extraction and forced the
governing elite to find other methods to support their predatory ways. In 1983, the
Venezuelan government decided to abandon fixed convertibility on foreign exchange and
adopt a differential exchange system. The decision was justified publicly as a means to
reduce capital flight, cut imports, restrain inflation, reactivate the economy, and protect
jobs and wages (Beroes, 1990, cited in Little & Herrera, 1996, pp. 269-270). But in
actuality, it became a license for the governing elite to steal government revenues and
resulted in the Venezuelan state’s direct loss o f U S$11 billion in hard currency during the
mid-1980s. With the Venezuelan government unable to adequately regulate their new
differential exchange rate system, a massive system o f fraud and misappropriation o f
assets began that included most o f the state’s import sector, numerous state and foreign
businesses, the political parties, senior government officials, and even the Venezuelan
Central Bank (Little & Herrera, 1996, p 270). Later known as the Recadi scandal, the
massive political corruption surrounding the differential exchange rate system:
was an instrument used by public officials, businessmen, and politicians to 
traffic in influence, grant and receive privileges and economic advantages, 
evade laws, and enrich themselves, individually and as groups to the detriment 
o f the national interest... (Beroes, 1990, quoted in Little & Herrera, 1996, pp. 
269-270).
Only one importer (a Chinese national) in the Recadi case was ever tried and convicted of 
fraud for the massive loss o f Venezuelan state revenues (Little & Herrera, 1996, p. 270). 
The Recadi case is an excellent example o f the lack o f governing elite accountability in 
authoritarian-democratic systems.
Mexico presents a second example of an entrenched governing elite that fashioned
a complex predatory system to extract political rents through the exploitation o f state
resources. From 1929 to 2000, M exico’s ruling PRI asserted almost unchallenged control
over Mexican politics and the economy. The PRI combined the use o f the stick and the
carrot, coercive and allocative political corruption, to perpetuate the 71 -year continuous
control o f Mexican politics (Knight, 1996, pp. 227-231). Described as fostering an
authoritarian-corporatist (form o f authoritarian-democratic) governing regime (Morris,
1991, p. 24), the PRI cultivated tremendous corruption throughout the Mexican
governmental system.
Countless cases o f bribery, extortion, fraud, kickbacks, nepotism, and 
unexplained wealth routinely attend the upper echelons o f the [Mexican] 
government....The early 1980s unleashed a rash o f public investigations and 
scandals centering on such once-powerful figures as the head o f the huge state 
owned oil monopoly PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum), leaders o f national trade 
unions, state governors, and even former presidents. Besides bringing lucrative 
employment opportunities for many members o f his family, for instance, it has 
been estimated that President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-82) skimmed from $1 
to $3 billion [US$]. General estimates o f the sums pilfered in the major cases 
exposed in the early 1980s approach $20 billion [US$], enough, according to 
one report, to have paid the interest on the huge Mexican debt for 1983, 1984, 
and the first five months o f 1985. (Morris, 1991, pp. xvi-xvii)
With such entrenched Mexican political corruption, it was not surprising that 
when in 1996 over US$120 million o f unexplained funds were found in the accounts o f 
Raul Salinas, brother and political confidant o f former Mexican President Carlos Salinas 
(1988-1994), that the revelation barely raised eyebrows in Mexico (Bamrud, 1996, pp. 
38-39). Mexican citizens take political corruption for granted, viewing the US$120 
million in Salinas’s accounts as mere petty cash and knowing that these sums are no
doubt dwarfed by amounts in other still hidden Salinas accounts (Bamrud, 1996, pp. 38- 
39).
Colombia provides a third example o f complex predatory political corruption
spawned by an authoritarian-democratic system. In 1958, Colombia’s two largest
political parties entered into a formal elite pact (the National Front) agreeing that the
parties would share political power. The National Front ended political conflict over the
spoils from Colombia’s enormously profitable coffee business and the future income
from emerging mining and petroleum industries. Although presented as a solution to
Colombia’s massive political violence o f the 1950s, and as a Colombian return to civilian
rule after the 1953 to 1957 period o f military rule, the National Front was effectively a
governing elite agreement to end political competition over the control o f state resources,
allowing monopolistic control to alternate between the two principal political parties. On
the political corruption the National Front engendered, one writer comments:
In every country o f the world there is patronage, but in Colombia this practice 
has been taken to the extreme on account o f the Frente Nacional [National 
Front]. It has reached a stage in which policy consists o f distributing the fruits 
o f power, appointments, licenses, contracts, scholarships. This has degraded 
political life in Colombia. Indeed, there is no debate on programmes and ideas. 
This means the relationship between the government and the congress has been 
reduced to deciding what to give to whom. (Cepeda, 1998, p. 78)
The Colombian National Front officially ended in 1978, however, some o f its 
unintended consequences were the continuation o f a legacy o f a predatory governing elite, 
widespread patronage, entrenched systemic corruption, and extreme political violence. In 
1991, a Bogota editorial declared that the corruption “problem is so huge that no one 
knows what to do about it” (Semana, 1991). The same editorial cited that in early-1991,
29 parliamentarians, 48 judges and magistrates, 65 directors o f public municipal 
corporations [city managers], 68 directors o f decentralized institutes [parastatals], 72 
military officials, 88 national police officials, and 1,261 customs officials, were under 
investigation for corruption by the Colombian attorney general (Semana , 1991). In a 
Colombia already saturated with political corruption, it is little wonder that drug-related 
corruption (discussed below) took such rapid and firm root in the 1980s and 1990s.
The above three examples— Venezuela, Mexico, and Colombia— include the 
three largest and most populous Caribbean states with the largest regional economies. 
These three states, all ruled by versions o f authoritarian-democratic regimes, are among 
the Caribbean’s most corrupt (see Table 4-1)— providing an indication o f the types o f 
corrupt behavior occurring in authoritarian-democratic regimes across the region.
Foreign Business Bribery. One objective o f the Western Hemispheric heads o f state and 
government at the 1994 Miami Summit o f the Americas was to cast blame for their 
domestic corruption problems on foreign businesses bribing government officials across 
the region (Feinberg, 1997, pp. 90-91). In 1994, only the US possessed a law, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), prohibiting its national businesses from bribing foreign 
officials. Since 1994, the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the OAS have all addressed the need to criminalize 
foreign business bribery. Several OECD and OAS members have now passed laws 
similar to the US FCPA. However, these international and domestic actions have not 
stopped the bribery o f government officials by foreign businesses.
In 1999, based on a survey o f senior domestic business and financial officials in 
14 emerging market states, TI published its first Bribe Payers Index (BPI) (Transparency 
International, 1999a). Similar to the TI CPI, the BPI rates a state’s businesses’ propensity 
to bribe foreign officials in negotiating government contracts along a scale o f 10 (no 
bribery) to 0 (very high level o f bribery). Several prominent Caribbean investors, 
including China (3.1), Italy (3.7), Japan (5.1), France (5.2) and Spain (5.3), show 
moderate to high propensities to bribe foreign government officials. The Caribbean’s 
main investors, including Canada (8.1), Netherlands (7.4), United Kingdom (7.2), and the 
US (6.2 despite the FCPA), exhibit lower propensities to bribe foreign officials. While 
the exact level o f foreign business bribery occurring in Caribbean states will never be 
known, it is a significant factor in Caribbean political corruption behavior.
Like most political corruption behaviors, the details o f foreign businesses bribing 
Caribbean government officials seldom reach public attention. But some do. Just prior 
to the 1977 US FCPA enactment, it was revealed that United Brands, a US fruit company, 
had paid the president o f Honduras US$2.5 million to reduce a proposed tax upon banana 
exports. The resultant scandal ended with the Honduran president being overthrown in a 
military coup and the Chairman o f United Brands committing suicide (Maingot, 1994a, p. 
60).
In 1986, Vere Bird, Jr., an Antiguan cabinet minister and the son o f Antigua and 
Barbuda’s Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr., was involved in a foreign business bribery 
case— one with a new wrinkle. Vere, Jr., Minister o f Aviation, notified the Antiguan 
parliament that he had arranged for a French consulting firm to handle all arrangements
for resurfacing the deteriorated runways at Antigua’s Vere Bird, Sr., International Airport. 
It was later found that Vere, Jr., embezzled US$4 million out o f the U S$11 million 
allotted by the Antiguan government for the resurfacing contract. The investigation of 
this scandal revealed that the principal stockholder in the French consulting firm was 
Vere, Jr. Thus, Vere, Jr., the foreign businessman, effectively bribed himself, the 
Antiguan Minister o f Aviation, in order to siphon money from the airport contract. Even 
though the official inquiry into this scandal recommended Vere, Jr., be dismissed from 
public office, Vere, Sr., chose not to remove his eldest son from government (Coram, 
1993, pp. 132-139). There are no doubt thousands o f bribery transactions annually in the 
Caribbean involving foreign businesses and government officials— some as direct as the 
above United Brands example and others buried in the complexity o f international 
contracting and finance as displayed in the above Antiguan airport scandal.
A further example o f the corrupting influence o f foreign businesses, and the 
welcoming o f such behavior by Caribbean governments, surrounds the case o f  Robert 
Vesco, a fugitive US financier. Vesco fled the US in 1972 after stealing over US$200 
million from a European mutual fund. Vesco was able to buy him self temporary 
protection in Costa Rica through a combination o f local investments in support o f 
influential politicians (bribes) and his provision o f international financial advice to Costa 
Rican President Jose Figueres, Sr. (Sunol, 1974). In 1978, a new Costa Rican president, 
facing increasing US pressure for V esco’s extradition, terminated V esco’s Costa Rican 
asylum. Vesco then took his investments and advice to the Bahamas and later Antigua, 
until they also pulled out his welcome mat. Finally, in the 1980s, Vesco relocated to
Cuba where he lived until 1996 when Fidel Castro’s government charged him with fraud 
and awarded him a 13-year sentence in a Cuban prison (Eaton, 1999). In the cases of 
Costa Rica, the Bahamas, and Antigua, Vesco was welcomed with open arms as long as 
he paid-off the right government officials and as long as US pressure for his extradition 
was controllable. In Cuba, while Vesco’s investments and international financial 
expertise were initially appreciated, he was given asylum as an annoyance to the US. 
However, Vesco’s later trial and conviction shows that even Fidel Castro’s government 
has limits for tolerating foreign business corruption.
Cuba provides a unique case to examine political corruption cultivated by foreign 
businesses. Since 1959, Cuba has been ruled by a Communist Party elite that maintains 
its hold on power through a combination o f communist ideology and control o f the state’s 
security apparatus. Until the early 1990s, Cuba was closed to foreign investment. As 
Cuba began to loosen control of its state-owned economy in the 1990s and allow outside 
foreign investors, especially from Spanish tourist hotel conglomerates, a raft o f political 
corruption scandals came to light (Tamayo, 1999). The Cuban scandals reveal an 
entrenched Communist Party political elite grasping to retain its hold on power while at 
the same time personally benefiting from the expansion o f foreign investments in the 
Cuban tourist, mining, and agricultural industries. One author cites “ [corruption is so 
pervasive in Cuba that few are arrested for stealing from the state. If the government was 
serious about cracking down on corruption. It would have to put the whole island behind 
bars ...” (Oppenheimer, 1992, p. 417). It is clear from the foreign businesses taking part
in the TI surveys (Cuba is rated 3.5 on the TI CPI) that political corruption has taken a 
strong hold on Cuba’s socialist-run state.
Drug-Related Corruption. Bursting onto the Caribbean scene in the 1970s, political 
corruption associated with the international drug trade has had a deleterious effect upon 
the region (see Lee, 1985). Drug corruption first began in the drug producing state of 
Colombia and then spread like wildfire along the Caribbean routes used by the 
Colombian drug cartels to transport their illegal products to markets in North America 
and Europe. Political corruption is also a major factor in fostering the ancillary drug trade 
activities o f arms smuggling and money laundering. While drugs (marijuana, cocaine, 
heroin, amphetamines) may be the product in demand, political corruption provides the 
fuel that keeps the production, transportation, marketing, and financial components o f the 
illicit business running smooth.
Thoumi (1995) argues that low risk to drug traffickers led to Colom bia’s 
comparative advantage in becoming the production and control center o f the Latin 
American drug trade. Factors contributing to this low risk condition include: (1) a 
weakened state with guerrillas fighting the armed forces for control o f large geographic 
areas, (2) high levels o f societal violence traditionally used to settle conflicts, (3) an 
established contraband [black market] trade, (4) a unique Colombian brand o f capitalism 
fostering expectations o f high short-term profits, and (5) geographically isolated areas 
that allowed the traffickers to initially bribe only a few local officials to ensure protection 
(Thoumi, 1995, pp. 172-176). Following the Colombian drug cartels’ efforts to maintain
this low risk advantage provides a road map to the drug-related political corruption that 
spread throughout Colombia and the Caribbean beginning in the late 1970s.
In the early to mid-1970s, when marijuana was Colombia’s main drug export, the 
above low risk factors were sufficient to ensure the drug trade prospered. As the 
Colombian drug trade grew, especially its expansion in the late 1970s into the more 
profitable cocaine exports, the traffickers could no longer just bribe local officials, but 
also had to bribe those on the national level to ensure their continued low risk advantage. 
“In 1978, for instance, [Colombian] President Alfonso Lopez Michelson was told by top 
US drug enforcement officials that some thirty high-level officials, including two cabinet 
ministers and five federal judges, had been corrupted by the drug traffickers”
(Nadelmann, 1993, p. 279). Lopez Michelson took no action on this report, confirming 
that the traffickers retained their low risk advantage.
As Colombian cocaine, amphetamines, and later heroin, flooded the North 
American and European markets in the 1980s and 1990s, “the traffickers grew even more 
powerful, investing in the legitimate economy, buying protection from all branches and 
levels o f government, and bribing, intimidating, and killing those who challenged them” 
(Nadelmann, 1993, p. 279). By the mid-1990s, drug corruption had reached the very top 
of the Colombian political structure. In 1996, President Ernesto Samper was charged 
with financing his election campaign with US$6 million donated by the Cali Drug Cartel. 
Samper’s later absolution on all charges by the corruption-tainted Colombian Chamber of 
Deputies revealed the continued low risk advantage held by the Colombian drug 
traffickers.
Outside Colombia, Caribbean drug-related corruption can be correlated with the 
Colombian trafficker’s access to low risk drug transportation routes. In the early to mid- 
1970s, the Colombian marijuana crop was largely delivered by aircraft or boat direct from 
the Colombian Guajira region to North America with little need for support in other 
Caribbean states. This changed in the late 1970s to mid-1980s when cocaine became the 
primary Colombian drug export and the preferred (low risk) method o f transport was by 
boat or small aircraft to the Bahamas where the drugs were loaded into small fast boats 
(40-60 knots capable) for the final run into South Florida. This is the era when the 
Medellin Cartel, specifically Carlos Lehder, bribed the Bahamian government o f Prime 
Minister Lyndon Pindling to obtain virtual unrestricted use o f Bahamian air space and 
territory (see Gugliotta & Leen, 1989). Pindling, later investigated for his dealings with 
Lehder, was never charged with illegal acts despite having no explanation for US$2.5- 
US$3.5 million o f deposits in his personal accounts. A Bahamian commission o f inquiry, 
however, did lead to a string o f indictments against Pindling’s political and personal 
colleagues for drug-related corruption (Wilson, 1992).
By the late 1980s, when US and Bahamian law enforcement had shutdown much 
of the fast boat drug traffic into South Florida and Lehder resided in a US federal prison, 
the traffickers needed new low risk transportation routes. Here, the Colombian Cartels 
diversified. The emerging Colombian Cali Cartel and the more established Medellin 
Cartel began shipments around and through the Central American isthmus to Mexico 
where the drugs were later smuggled across the US-Mexican border. The Medellin and 
Colombian North Coast cartels also established transportation networks through the
Eastern Caribbean with the objective o f moving the drugs into Puerto Rico (and then onto 
the US) or to Western Europe. This diversification lead to the spread o f drug corruption 
across the Central American peninsula, into Mexico, and throughout the Eastern 
Caribbean.
Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega is the most infamous o f the Central 
American leaders embroiled in drug-related corruption. As early as the 1970s, Noriega, 
then head o f Panamanian military intelligence, was suspected o f drug trafficking 
involvement. In the 1980s, after Noriega rose to head the Panamanian military (after 
General Omar Torrijos’ mysterious death in a plane crash), new evidence emerged that 
this former CIA asset had become deeply involved in the drug trade. One report 
estimates Noriega pocketed more than US$350 million in the 1980s for allowing 
Peruvian and Colombian traffickers the unrestricted use o f Panama as a drug 
transshipment point, money laundering site, and protective safe-haven (Koster & Sanchez 
1990, p. 298). With US collusion, Noriega was part o f a 1980s scheme where arms were 
flown into Costa Rica destined for the Nicaraguan Contras and then drugs flown back to 
the US for the drug cartels in the same airplanes (Scott & Marshall, 1991). In 1988, 
Noriega was indicted on drug-trafficking charges in a US federal court. In 1989, a US 
military invasion o f Panama ousted Noriega who was later arrested, tried, and convicted 
of drug-trafficking charges.
Mexico, with its own marijuana and heroin production dating back to the 1960s,
also possesses a complex history o f drug-related corruption. In 1970s and 1980s Mexico:
federal, state, and local police alternately competed and cooperated with one 
another and with assorted prosecutors, judges, military units, political officials,
and agents o f the security services in extracting bribes from drug traffickers, 
actively participating in drug trafficking operations, and cracking down on drug 
trafficking. Even though top-level officials, in Mexico City reportedly exercised 
substantial influence over career, policy, and operational decisions with 
implications for drug enforcement and drug-related corruption, substantial 
power was exercised more or less independently by regional commanders and 
political bosses (Nadelmann, 1993, p. 277).
The Mexican drug-related corruption reached the very top o f the Mexican 
government in the late 1980s and 1990s. At least part o f the US$120 million in 
unexplained funds found in the foreign bank accounts o f Raul Salinas in 1996 were 
payoffs from Mexican drug-traffickers to President Carlos Salinas for his involvement in 
the drug trade. In 1997, the Mexican drug czar, General Jose de Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, 
the person responsible for overseeing all o f M exico’s anti-drug programs, was arrested on 
charges o f drug trafficking, bribery, and illicit enrichment. Gutierrez’s arrest resulted 
from his close association with at least one o f M exico’s own major drug cartels. In 1999, 
the head o f the US Drug Enforcement Administration testified, “Corruption in Mexican 
law enforcement was the worst he has seen in his 39-year law enforcement career. 
Continuing reports o f corruption and the rapidly growing power and influence o f the 
major organized criminal groups in Mexico cause us great concern....” {Miami Herald  
1999, p. 10A).
The virus o f drug-related corruption also emerged as the Colombian cartels 
moved their drug transportation routes to the Eastern Caribbean in the late 1980s. In 
1988, St. Lucia’s Police Commissioner, Cuthbert Phillips, was dismissed due to 
allegations o f drug-related corruption and inefficiency in the Royal St. Lucia Police Force 
(Griffith, 1997, p. 160). In 1992, Trinidad and Tobago’s assistant police commissioner
publicly alleged that a drug-trafficking cartel was operating within the police force 
(Griffith, 1997, p. 162). The subsequent investigation o f this allegation found evidence 
o f close relationships between drug-traffickers and all levels o f the Trinidadian police, 
including the police commissioner.
In November 1994, a prison riot broke out in St. Kitts over the release o f two 
drug-murder suspects. In October 1994, Vincent Morris, the son o f the St. Kitts-Nevis 
Deputy Prime Minister, and his fiancee were found murdered in the trunk o f a burned-out 
car. Two weeks later, the police superintendent investigating these murders was gunned 
down and killed on his way to work. In November, Deputy Prime Minister M orris’s two 
other sons, suspects in all three murders, were arrested with 121 pounds o f cocaine. At 
arraignment, the two Morris brothers were immediately granted bail, no doubt due to their 
father’s powerful political connections. The release o f the two murder and drug- 
trafficking suspects caused a violent public protest and prison riot in St. Kitts. The prison 
riot destroyed the St. Kitts-Nevis’s central prison and allowed over 150 prisoners to 
escape. The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security Force, based in Barbados, was called 
on to help the St. Kitts police restore order and recapture the escaped prisoners. The 
following summer, Deputy Prime Minister M orris’s People’s Action Movement party 
was voted out o f power (Griffith, 1997, pp. 169-170). This St. Kitts example 
demonstrates the severe effects drug-related corruption can have on the political stability 
of small Eastern Caribbean states.
Seeing the vulnerability o f the small Caribbean states to drug-related corruption, 
the ultimate fear o f US policy-makers was “that one day traffickers might take full control
of a country by putting a majority o f elected officials, including the president [or prime 
minister] directly on the payroll” (US Dept, o f State, 1997, p. 6). Under Noriega, Panama 
came close to being a corrupted narco-state in the late 1980s. However, the one state to 
actually achieve this notoriety was the Caribbean island o f Aruba. One writer argues that 
Aruba became “[t]he world’s first independent mafia state in 1993” (Sterling, 1994, p.
21). She reports how in the late 1980s, the Cuntrera brothers Sicilian mafia family 
bought “everything o f importance on the island: hotels, casinos, tourism, building land, 
construction, banks, police, customs, the justice minister, the prime minister, and the 
governing and opposition parties” (Sterling, 1994, p. 21). In 1987, the Cuntrera brothers 
allied with the Colombian drug cartels and offered Aruba as a safe haven for mafia/cartel 
vacations, money-laundering, and as a transshipment point both for drugs headed to 
North America and Southern Europe and for commercial contraband goods illegally 
smuggled along the Caribbean coasts o f South America and Panama. The global drug 
and commercial merchandise that the combined Sicilian mafia and Colombian cartels 
peddle is estimated at US$300 billion annually (Sterling, 1994, p. 22).
In 1992, Venezuela, under US and Italian pressure, captured the Cuntrera brothers 
and deported them to Italy. However, the structure o f A ruba’s narco-state was left behind 
to serve as the “headquarters o f the first international joint venture [mafia and cartel] in 
organized crime” (Sterling, 1994, p. 22). Aruba presents political corruption in its purest 
form— the principal fuel that sustains an entire state. But in the Aruban case, a classic 
anecdotal example for corruption revisionists, the political corruption helped ignite 
booming tourist, international banking, and commercial maritime and air shipping
industries, improving the island's standard o f living as it boosted the Aruban per capita 
gross national product to US$16,640, the highest in the Caribbean after Bermuda (PAHO, 
1999).
Arms Smuggling Corruption. Drugs themselves are not the only commodity that drug- 
related corruption supports in the Caribbean. Drug-related arms smuggling is also a 
serious regional problem. A drug-related arms smuggling case became the most 
notorious incident o f political corruption in Antigua, another state many believe is close 
to a full-fledged narco-state.
In the 1989 arms smuggling scandal, Vere C. Bird, Jr., still an Antiguan minister 
despite the 1985 airport scandal, facilitated an illegal transshipment o f 10 tons o f Israeli 
arms to members o f the Colombian Medellin drug-cartel (see Blom-Cooper, 1990; 
Thorndike, 1991; Coram, 1993). The arms were invoiced from Israel to the Antigua and 
Barbuda Defense Force, but upon their arrival in Antigua were immediately redirected to 
Colombia. Colombian security forces found a large cache o f the arms during a December 
1989 assault that killed Medellin Cartel henchman Jose Rodriguez Gacha. Colombia’s 
investigation found that some o f the guns from this shipment had also been used in the 
1989 assassination o f Colombian presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan (Maingot, 
1994c, p. 155).
A Colombian diplomatic protest to Antigua over the arms discovery lead to an 
official inquiry o f the incident by British jurist Louis Blom-Cooper, who uncovered 
collusion between Vere, Jr., and several Israeli arms merchants. He recommended that, 
for his role in this scandal, Vere, Jr., should never again hold public office. Additionally,
Blom-Cooper recommended that Lieutenant Colonel Clyde S. Walker, head o f the 
Antigua-Barbuda Defense Force, be dismissed from the service and also never hold 
public office again. Prime Minister Vere Bird, Sr., reluctantly removed Vere, Jr., and 
Walker from government service, however, by the late 1990s both had returned to 
prominent positions as special advisors to the new Antiguan Prime Minister Lester Bird, 
Vere, Jr.’s, younger brother.
Another Caribbean arms smuggling case illustrates the complex international 
connections associated with this drug-related activity. In January 1989, US$8 million in 
arms were found in a shipping container in the port o f Kingston, Jamaica. The arms were 
o f West German manufacture and were bound for an unknown guerrilla group in 
Colombia. Colombian guerrilla groups are known for providing protection to drug 
growing and processing areas. The arms were shipped from Portugal on a Panamanian 
registered freighter. A Panamanian company that had previously been linked to illegal 
arms shipments, cocaine smuggling, and drug-related money laundering owned the 
freighter. The joint Jamaican, British, US, and Colombian investigation o f this incident 
deemed it “an international network o f traffickers and terrorists” (Maingot, 1994c, p.
152).
Money Laundering Corruption. A second drug-related criminal endeavor closely 
associated with political corruption is money laundering. “Money laundering generally 
involves a series o f multiple [financial] transactions used to disguise the source of 
financial assets so that those assets may be used without compromising the criminals who 
are seeking to use the funds. Through money laundering, the criminal tries to transform
the monetary proceeds derived from illicit activities into funds with an apparently legal 
source” (US Dept, o f State, 1999b). The world drug-trade is estimated to generate 
US$500 billion in illegal cash transactions annually (Payne, 1996). There is an enormous 
demand by drug traffickers to turn this illegal cash into financial instruments that appear 
clean. There is also a huge demand by Caribbean governing elite to both clean the 
proceeds from their corrupt behavior and to move their ill-gotten assets to offshore 
financial centers inaccessible to state auditors or investigators. The ability o f a state’s 
governing elite to extract political rents from their support o f money laundering or other 
questionable financial activities, whether drug-related or from other illegal behaviors, has 
become a lucrative source o f Caribbean political corruption.
Money laundering is a profitable business across the Caribbean. While some 
money laundering schemes are uncovered by domestic and international investigations, 
the majority goes undiscovered and unprosecuted. The largest international financial 
scandal ever, a US$20 billion fraud that lead to the 1991 collapse o f the Bank o f Credit 
and Commerce International (BCCI), involved BCCI branches in 62 states, with the 
BCCI branch in the Cayman Islands a principal player (see Truell & Gurwin, 1992). 
Investigations o f the BCCI scandal found Manuel Noriega and the Colombian Medellin 
Cartel as BCCI clients. BCCI, not a bank in the conventional sense o f the word, was an 
international financial entity involved in money laundering, drug trafficking, political 
bribes, untraceable cash transactions, weapons trafficking, and the financing o f terrorists 
worldwide. Senior officials in the US government knew o f BCCI’s illicit activities 
beginning in the early 1980s, however, US officials found it convenient to keep BCCI
open to facilitate its own clandestine intelligence operations, including the Iran-Contra 
arms smuggling. The scariest part about the BCCI scandal is that the bank’s officials 
were following most international financial rules— rules that have changed little since 
BCCI’s 1991 collapse (Beaty & Gwynne, 1993).
A governing elite’s ability to engage in money laundering is determined by two
principal factors. First, to be a money laundering threat requires a state to have a well-
developed international financial sector. For example, Nicaragua, although rated in Table
4-1 as a systemically corrupt Caribbean states, presents a low money laundering threat
because o f its poorly developed international financial sector. Second, the attitude o f the
governing elite toward money laundering and other questionable financial business
(Internet gambling, economic citizenship, etc.) helps determine a state’s corrupt behavior.
The Caribbean has become famous for its governing elite’s promotion o f Offshore
Financial Centers (OFC) that facilitates money laundering and other financial crimes.
The US Department o f State describes OFCs:
An OFC is a jurisdiction where an intentional effort has been made to attract 
foreign business by deliberate government policies such as the enactment o f tax 
and other fiscal incentives, "business friendly" regulatory/supervisory regimes 
and secrecy enforced by law. It is the O FC s legal framework that makes it 
unique. Common to most developing and mature OFCs is a legal framework 
that to varying degrees facilitates the maintenance o f secrecy, the minimization 
or mitigation o f tax and supervisory burdens, and freedom from common 
regulatory constraints, such as exchange controls and disclosure requirements. 
When viewed as a financial services concept, an OFC is any jurisdiction that 
enables banks, trust companies, company incorporators, other financial 
intermediaries and financial advisors resident in that jurisdiction to provide 
products and services to non-residents in their home countries. In many cases 
the same services are not available to their own residents. These jurisdictions are 
often sovereign states but not necessarily so. They may be a free zone within a 
city.... They may also be political subdivisions within a sovereign state.... The 
relationship between offshore and onshore jurisdictions is complex, but for the
most part offshore financial centers tailor their products and services to residents 
o f other jurisdictions. Through a practice known as nicheing, OFCs regularly 
modify their legislation, developing new financial vehicles and services to 
attract business from their target markets (US Dept, o f State, 1999b).
Table 4-1 lists those Caribbean states where the governing elite have sponsored 
OFCs and the money laundering threat level each state presents based on the analysis of 
the US Department of State. The Table 4-1 money laundering threat ratings must be 
qualified. Some states, even though possessing strong OFCs and being a high threat for 
money laundering activity, still do not condone illegal behavior outright. For example, 
the Cayman Islands are in compliance with nearly every international convention against 
money laundering, but remain an OFC with a high threat for money laundering due to the 
estimated US$5-US$10 billion dollars that get lost in the US$ hundreds o f billions the 
island’s financial sector processes each year. When evidence o f money laundering does 
surface, Cayman officials gladly cooperate with international investigators in uncovering 
its sources (US Dept, o f State, 1999b).
Barbados presents another unique international banking case. Although an OFC 
of moderate threat for money laundering activities, Barbados’s OFC is known for its open 
and transparent offshore financial services. Barbados’s OFC regulations insist financial 
entities know the identity o f their clients and were written to attract clients who want 
disclosure (Maingot, 1995, p. 18). Several o f the other Caribbean OFCs; Antigua and 
Barbuda, Aruba, and Panama; are largely in the international finance business for both the 
legal and illicit gains it brings their respective governing elite. The willingness o f 
governing elite in these states to support OFCs correlates closely with the high levels o f 
political corruption in these states.
Conclusion
This chapter reveals the diversity in contemporary Caribbean political and 
economic institutions and their general association with regional political corruption 
levels. The chapter highlights that Caribbean states with authoritarian-democratic 
political systems suffer the region’s worst political corruption problems. The rise of 
authoritarian-democratic systems was both a conscious effort and unintended 
consequence o f Caribbean political development paths. In contemporary Caribbean 
presidential systems, the governing elite drew upon their states’ histories o f colonial and 
early post-independence strongman and oligarchic rule to build (constitute) governing 
systems that placed political decision-making power in the hands o f a small political elite. 
In contemporary Caribbean Westminster parliamentary systems, governing elite took 
advantage o f the inappropriateness o f the Westminster system for small states lacking 
strong societal values o f tolerance and civic cooperation, and also built governing systems 
centered on only a few powerful decision-makers. In both the presidential and 
Westminster parliamentary cases, the governing elite played the lead role in manipulating 
their state’s political and economic development for their own self-interests— and not 
necessarily the best interests o f their larger citizenry.
While this chapter neither tests nor advances this study’s theory o f the causes o f 
political corruption, it does demonstrate that certain Caribbean indicators— political 
rights, civil liberties, press freedom, and economic structures— are associated with high 
political corruption levels (as Table 2-4 predicts). It also reveals anecdotal evidence o f 
the most prevalent types o f political corruption behaviors that have become public
knowledge in the region. Next, Chapters 5 and 6 advance this study’s theory through 
closer investigations of the agency issues, institutional structures, and political corruption 
behavior in Jamaica and Costa Rica, respectively.
Endnotes
1. States with authoritarian-dictatorial governments during all or some portions o f the 
period from 1960 to 1980 included El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela, and Cuba.
2. Table 4-1 cannot be used to establish statistical correlations o f the causes o f Caribbean 
political corruption. The concepts (variables) hypothesized in Table 2-4 to cause political 
corruption are neither operationalized nor adequately measured in Table 4-1. At best, 
Table 4-1 can be used to establish general trends in the relationships between the 
indicators shown and corresponding levels o f political corruption.
3. This finding is statistically significant when computed for all world states rate by 
Transparency International in their annual Corruption Perception Index.
4. The methodology for the 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception 
Index can be found in Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, The Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index 1999-Framework Document October 1999, available at 
http:Wwww.transparency.de.
5. The Transparency International definition o f systemically corrupt states is the 
equivalent o f states designated institutionally or systemically corrupt as developed in 
Chapter 2 o f this study.
6. The content analysis was developed using Griffith (1993, 1997), Nadelmann (1993), 
Maingot (1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1995), Collier (1998); reviews o f the periodicals 
Caribbean Insight (1995-1999) and Central American Report (1996-1999); and database 
searches o f Info-LatinoAmerica (1988-2000). The ratings correspond to the TI CPI as 
follows: Incidental (6.7 to 10), Institutional (3.4 to 6.6), and Systemic (0 to 3.3).
7. With Prime M inister Charles’s retirement in 1995, political corruption in Dominica is 
beginning to resemble that in other small Eastern Caribbean states (St. Lucia, etc.). 
Dominica has become a regional leader in offering economic citizenship to the nationals 
o f other states and is working toward becoming a major offshore financial center.
Jamaica: Westminster Corrupted
Jamaica possesses some o f the Caribbean’s most breathtaking vistas. The third 
largest Caribbean island after Cuba and Hispaniola, Jamaica boasts steep wooded 
mountains, green fertile lowland fields, and white sandy beaches, all surrounded by the 
deep blue Caribbean Sea. A closer look behind this natural beauty, however, reveals a 
Jamaica with one o f the Caribbean’s most entrenched authoritarian-democratic governing 
systems. Since its 1962 independence from the British, Jamaica’s governing elite have 
manipulated their Westminster parliamentary structures to place government decision­
making in the hands o f a small group o f powerful political elite. The competition to 
attain Jamaican political power has degenerated into open, and often violent, warfare 
between the state’s two principal political parties. Not surprisingly, the Jamaican 
governing elite’s exploitation o f political power has spawned serious problems with 
political corruption.
Transparency International (TI) assigns Jamaica a 1999 rating o f 3.8 on their scale
ranging from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (no corruption) (see Table 4-1). Placing this
Jamaican TI rating on the corruption index in Table 2-4 (the coordinates o f political
corruption) leads to the following hypothesis that is tested in this disciplined-
configurative case study o f Jamaica:
Hypothesis: Jam aica’s coordinates o f political corruption causal factors (form 
o f societal rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability, mass 
participation, market resource factors, boundaries between public and private) 
are dominated by instruction rules, or near equal combinations o f instruction
and directive rules, resulting in political corruption patterns between systemic 
and institutional.
This chapter investigates the above hypothesis using the framework o f this study’s 
theory o f the causes o f political corruption. It first provides a historical survey o f 
institutional development in Jamaica. Second, it assesses the nature o f contemporary 
Jamaican political corruption patterns, including determining the boundaries Jamaicans 
have established between their public duties and private interests. Third, it investigates 
contemporary structural factors that cause Jamaican political corruption. Finally, the 
chapter summarizes the interdisciplinary causes o f Jamaican political corruption. This 
chapter demonstrates that the main cause o f political corruption in Jamaica is a self- 
interested governing elite who have manipulated their state’s political and economic 
development to serve their own personal interests.
Historical Setting
Jamaica takes its name from its original inhabitants, the Arawak Indians, who 
called the island Xaymaca— the land o f wood and water. Columbus arrived in Jamaica in 
1494. The Spanish first settled the island in 1509 and took quick advantage o f Jamaica’s 
natural harbors to use the island as a supply base for Spanish expeditions exploring the 
Caribbean, Mexico, Central America, and South America. The island’s original Arawak 
inhabitants were subjugated and eventually died out in Spanish attempts to establish 
plantation (encomienda) based agriculture. African slaves were then imported to replace 
the decimated Indian work force. Lacking precious metal deposits, the Spanish gave 
Jamaica little priority among its New World colonies, resulting in the growth o f neither
large nor well-fortified Spanish settlements. Capturing Jamaica in 1655, in the face o f 
little Spanish resistance, was an easy task for the British forces under the command o f 
Vice Admiral William Penn (Hillman & D ’Agostino, 1992, pp. 30-32).
Soon after Penn’s victory, the British fortified Jamaica and expanded its 
plantation-based economy. During the eighteenth century, Jamaica’s strong agricultural- 
export sector and its role as a regional market for the slave trade made it the crown jewel 
of Britain’s Caribbean colonies. Jamaica’s version o f slave-based plantation agriculture 
was particularly onerous, one reliant on terror as the principal means to keep slaves in 
line. While some plantation owners lived in Jamaica, many o f Jamaica’s plantations were 
absentee landlord operations, i.e., owned by entrepreneurs living in Britain and run by 
local overseers who brutalized the African slaves. Between 1690 and 1820, 800,000 
African slaves were imported by the British to work Jamaica’s prosperous plantations 
producing rum and sugar for European markets. Despite the large number o f slaves 
imported by 1820, only 340,000 slaves then populated the island (Trager, 1994).
The lower than expected number o f slaves in 1820 was due not only to Jam aica’s 
role as a slave market for other British Caribbean and North American colonies, but also 
due to a combination o f other factors (Hillman & D ’Agostino, 1992, p. 33). First, the 
number o f male African slaves imported far outnumbered the females (Trager, 1994). 
Second, at least one-third o f all slaves died soon after their arrival in Jamaica, many from 
suicide (Trager, 1994). Third, as a result o f primitive health and medical conditions, only 
half o f the babies born to Jamaican slave mothers survived. Finally, Jamaican slavery, 
like that in other Caribbean colonies, promoted humiliations, mutilations, and killings as
common methods for slave discipline. For example, British authorities and plantation 
owners reacted to an 1831 slave rebellion led by Samuel Sharp, one where no whites were 
killed, by flogging and hanging hundreds o f slaves who joined in Sharp’s refusal to work 
without adequate compensation (Trager, 1994; Randall & Mount, 1998, pp. 21-22).
The end o f slavery brought significant changes to Jamaica. The British ended the 
slave trade in the British Empire in 1807 and abolished slavery in Jamaica in 1834. All 
former Jamaican slaves were finally declared free in 1838. Under the system o f wage 
labor that took slavery’s place, Jamaican sugar production fell from a high o f 70,000 tons 
in 1821 to only 20,000-25,000 tons annually by the early 1840s (Trager, 1994). Many o f 
the former slaves preferred to live on subsistence agriculture rather than return to arduous 
plantation work for the meager wages their former brutal masters offered. After the 
1830s, both the production o f and European demand for Jamaican tropical agricultural 
products declined. Jamaica, once one o f Britain’s most prized overseas colonies, became 
a forgotten backwater o f the British Empire until just before the outbreak o f World War II 
(see Lewis, 1968, chap. 7; Hillman & D ’Agostino, 1992, pp. 33-35).
During its three centuries o f British colonial rule, Jamaica epitomized what
Knight (1990, p. 76) defines as an exploitation society— conditions where a minority of
Europeans dominated a majority o f non-Europeans in a socioeconomic complex designed
to produce export commodities for the European market. In an exploitation society, the
Europeans never ceased to behave like transients and continued to base their society and
politics on those o f the metropolis (Knight, 1990, p. 75). Additionally:
exploitation societies lacked a common, unifying, institutional basis beyond the 
plantations and other economic enterprises. They were innovative only for self­
preservation. Not only were such societies divided, they tended to be 
divisive....The elites lacked cohesion and self-confidence. However long the 
elite remained physically in situ , they were psychologically transients, with 
myopic confusion o f social order and productive efficiency. The most enduring 
and sometimes the most interesting features o f such societies were created by 
the lower orders, who were often told what they could not do but rarely told 
what they ought to do. (Knight, 1990, p. 86)
Jamaica’s three centuries as a British exploitation colony resulted in an ever- 
increasing level o f societal frustration and political apathy among the masses. After a 
short period o f British military rule (1655 to 1661), a semi-representational colonial 
governing system was installed in Jamaica (Hillman & D ’Agostino, 1992, p. 32). A 
governor and ruling council (upper legislative house) were appointed by the British king. 
A local assembly, elected from the white plantocracy (rich planters) and mercantile 
interests, made up a lower legislative house. This colonial governing structure changed 
little between 1661 and 1865 when societal frustrations flared in the Morant Bay rebellion 
(see Chapter 3).
After the 1834 abolition o f Jamaican slavery, the white plantocracy and 
mercantilists continued to rule as they had since 1661— in the moneyed elite’s best 
interests while giving little attention to the needs o f the black masses. Just before the 
1865 rebellion in Morant Bay, mulatto and black entrepreneurs began to gain political 
power as they attained the requisite financial resources to qualify as both voters and 
candidates for the Jamaican local assembly. The possibility o f sharing power with the 
successful mulattos and blacks was unnerving to Jamaica’s white elite. The white elite 
concluded from the Morant Bay rebellion that a government that included former slaves 
was unworkable. Thus, in the name o f self-preservation (as could expected in an
exploitation society), Jamaica’s white plantocracy and mercantilists overwhelmingly 
supported the abolition o f Jamaica’s locally elected assembly and the institution o f British 
Crown Colony rule. To Jamaica’s white elite, non-representative British rule was a better 
choice than a shared local government with the successful mulattos and black ex-slaves 
(see Lewis, 1968, chap. 6; Hillman & D ’Agostino, 1992, pp. 33-35; Randall & Mount, 
1998, pp. 47-48).
The British Crown Colony system in Jamaica allowed no local representation 
beyond an unofficial council from the moneyed plantocracy and mercantilists that acted 
as informal advisers to the British appointed governor. With local political activities 
discouraged, the Crown Colony system focused on establishing bureaucratic efficiency, 
maintaining societal order, and providing basic government services (education, health, 
water, roads, etc.). In British liberal-democratic tradition, the Crown Colony system left 
Jamaica’s economic development to market forces (i.e., the plantocracy and 
mercantilists). As the 1945 Moyne Commission investigation in the West Indies 
confirmed, the Crown Colony system gave little attention to building the political, 
economic, and social institutions found in modern states (Moyne Commission, 1945).
Jamaican societal frustrations continued to simmer under British Crown Colony 
rule well into the twentieth century. These frustrations peaked in 1937 and 1938 as 
evidenced by a series of labor riots that signaled the beginning o f Jam aica’s quest for self- 
government. The 1930s worldwide economic depression and a growing sense o f 
Jamaican nationalism helped spark the Jamaican independence movement. The 1930s 
depression caused a serious slump in foreign demand for Jam aica’s tropical agricultural
products— making a bad internal economic situation even worse. During this same 
period, the Jamaican masses were moved by calls from Marcus Garvey and others toward 
a new sense o f Jamaican racial pride and nationalism. Frustrations over Jam aica’s 
economic and political malaise, continuing widespread poverty, worker grievances 
against management, the lack o f political or economic institutions as avenues for 
expressing their frustrations (e.g., no labor unions), and a rising sense o f nationalism, all 
combined to ignite a series o f protests and riots in the late 1930s (see Lewis, 1969, chap.
7).
Two charismatic leaders who eventually lead Jamaica to its 1962 independence 
emerged from the 1930s unrest. First, Alexander Bustamante, the 1938 founder o f the 
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU) and the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) (in 
1942), captured the attention o f the Jamaican working masses, especially the rural poor, 
and became their hero in the fight against British colonialism. Second, Bustamante’s 
cousin, Norman Manley, a Rhodes scholar and Jamaican barrister, who in 1938 founded 
the People’s National Party (PNP) that later allied with the new National W orkers’ Union 
(NWU), became the darling o f the Jamaican middle class and intelligentsia as the new 
spokesman for Garvey’s earlier appeals for Jamaican nationalism and political 
independence (see Lewis, 1968, chap. 7). The competition that arose between 
Bustamante’s JLP/BITU and M anley’s PNP/NW U carried Jamaica through its transition 
to independence and remains the basis for present day Jamaican politics.
British colonial and post-W orld War II fatigue, and the strong decolonization 
sentiment in the newly formed United Nations, influenced Britain to start its Caribbean
colonies on a road to independence. The British granted Jamaica universal suffrage in 
1944, along with a new constitution that allowed Jamaicans to regain the initial trappings 
o f representative government for the first time since 1865. Over the next 18 years,
Britain implemented further incremental steps in Jamaican self-government until full 
independence was granted in 1962 (see Munroe, 1969). The pre-independence period 
was facilitated by a period o f Jamaican economic growth that lasted from the 1940s until 
the late 1960s. This economic expansion was precipitated by the development o f the 
bauxite-alumina and tourist industries and a strong world demand for Jamaica’s 
traditional tropical agricultural products (sugar, coffee, bananas, etc.). Between 1950 and 
1968, the Jamaican economy grew at the average annual rate o f 6.7 percent (Worrell, 987, 
p. 3).
Jamaican colonial experience with political corruption was typical o f other British 
Caribbean colonies. The seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries saw widespread 
corruption surrounding Jamaica’s role as a pirate and smuggling haven (Marx, 1992). In 
the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, especially after the abolishment o f slavery, 
corruption ensued from the elite’s (colonial officials, plantocracy and mercantilists) self- 
interested quest for wealth and power at the expense o f the black masses. However, by 
the mid-twentieth century, the professionalized British Colonial Office had reduced 
corruption to only a minor problem (Lewis, 1968, p .l 15). Jamaica began its first years as 
a sovereign state with a Jamaican-born civil service that inherited strong values of 
honesty and probity from its former British colonizers (Munroe, 1994, pp. 189-191;
Mills, 1997, p. 24; Cargill (interview), 1999). The two principal political leaders,
Bustamante and Manley, had reputations o f strong British democratic values— especially 
the need for consensus politics— and were considered upstanding politicians with the 
interests o f the Jamaican people as their central concerns (Cargill (interview), 1999). The 
rule o f law was strong in the early days o f Jamaican state formation, as revealed in the 
pre-independence 1950s where several elected Jamaican parliament members were 
prosecuted and jailed for corruption (Chang, 1999).
By the 1970s, the pre-independence and early post-independence Jamaican 
conditions o f honest and non-corrupt government changed. After barely 10 years of 
independence, the Jamaican civil service became largely politicized, with most o f the 
formerly incorruptible Jamaican-born civil servants retired or replaced (see Mills, 1997, 
pp. 13-20); Bustamante and Manley had both stepped-down from national leadership; and 
the rule o f law, especially surrounding the Jamaican governing elite’s accountability, was 
severely weakened. A Jamaican journalist describes the emergence o f the corrupt 
Jamaican state:
Since independence in 1962, Jamaica has undergone a most far-reaching change 
in its attitude toward corruption in government. It has moved from having 
isolated cases to acceptance o f corruption as the norm. In the mid-1970s, 
Jam aica’s two major political parties [JLP and PNP] became fully aware o f the 
deficiency in accountability that existed in our democratic framework. This 
realization flowed out o f the 1976 State o f Emergency, which led to the 
institutionalization o f what I call “Politocracy”— the corruption o f power and 
government institutions for political ends. In that year, the relatively efficient 
bureaucracy left behind by the British became totally fragmented. The 
legislature, judiciary and administration became victims o f corruption by 
politics. (Buck, 1989, p. 21)
Two key events helped solidify the rules surrounding the lack o f Jamaican elite 
accountability and the rancorous JLP-PNP political competition that arose in the 1970s.
First, in a 1972 act o f political revenge, a newly installed PNP government commissioned 
an inquiry into the handling o f government contracts and work permits during the 
previous JLP government (1962-1972). The Da Costa Commission o f Inquiry found 
widespread disregard for proper government financial planning, including extreme 
mismanagement and political influence surrounding the award o f government contracts, 
approval o f work permits, and sale o f state-owned land during the JLP’s reign (Da Costa, 
1973). While the Da Costa Commission’s final report detailed the illegal behavior o f 
several JLP officials, its final recommendations called for no legal actions against any 
individual. The report only encouraged the ruling PNP to strengthen government 
contracting procedures. No action was ever taken on the Da Costa report, indicating the 
PNP lacked the political will to either prosecute JLP officials or limit the system o f 
political influence over government resource management that had become a lucrative 
source o f funds for both the ruling party and individual government officials. The ruling 
PNP saw no need to change the rules o f the political game under which they were then 
benefiting.
Second, in 1976 the PNP government declared a nationwide State o f Emergency. 
After their 1972 election, and in the face o f strong JLP opposition, the PNP set about 
dismantling Jamaica’s open market economy and installing a socialist economy based on 
government ownership of key modes o f production and increased government planning 
and regulation o f the entire economy. The JLP-PNP policy disagreements eventually 
turned violent with factions from both parties engaging in open armed warfare in the 
poorer neighborhoods o f Kingston. The resulting crisis reached a peak on June 19, 1976,
when PNP Prime Minister Michael Manley, son of PNP founder Norman Manley,
declared a constitutional-based State o f Emergency that suspended many civil and human
rights. Manley justified his declaration as a means to stop the rising tide o f politically
engendered gang violence and to restore public stability (Gunst, 1995, p. 18). However,
the PNP’s actions went beyond restoring public safety and included the imprisoning o f
numerous JLP officials and supporters. In the introduction to a book about the State o f
Emergency, Stone (1989) describes the mid-1970s Jamaican political context:
Democracy in Jamaica was in a crisis in the 1970s as the two major political 
parties, the Jamaica Labor Party and the People’s National Party, confronted 
each other from sharply opposed ideological positions. [The PNP was social- 
democratic, the JLP more liberal-conservative.] Political violence intensified to 
unprecedented levels and the contest for power assumed a winner-take-all 
situation that shattered the very foundation o f the inter-party consensus, which 
had been built up during the 1950s and 1960s. For the first time in the history 
o f party competition in the country, the governing PNP took it upon itself to use 
the full power o f a State o f Emergency to paralyze the campaign efforts o f the 
opposition by locking up the key members o f its leadership and by publicly 
accusing the party o f consorting with enemy forces and o f plotting subversion 
(Stone, 1989, p. i).
Manley lifted the State o f Emergency on June 4, 1977, after the PNP won the 
1976 national elections. The PNP’s control over the Jamaican media allowed them to 
mount a propaganda campaign that convinced most voters there was truth to the PNP 
allegations against the JLP, and therefore, the State o f Emergency was justified. Over 
600 JLP officials and supporters were detained or jailed during the one-year State of 
Emergency. Later it was revealed that there was little basis for the PNP accusations, but 
not one PNP official, or member o f the Jamaican police or defense force, who 
enthusiastically enforced the PN P’s emergency orders, was ever held accountable for the 
misuse o f political power that occurred during the State o f Emergency (Charles, 1989).
The only accountability the PNP experienced was its later loss to the JLP in the 1980 
national elections. The 1976-1977 State o f Emergency, especially the lack o f 
accountability for its PNP leaders, helped solidify the rules for the acrimonious and often 
violent JLP-PNP political competition that still haunts Jamaican politics.
After the widespread expansion o f the Jamaican economy in the 1950s and 1960s, 
it began to contract significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. The 1972 to 1980 ruling PNP 
socialist programs saw the state take a leading role in economic planning, including state 
ownership o f many sectors o f the economy. This restructuring o f the economy occurred 
during the period o f the 1970s world oil crisis and general recession. Jamaica was 
particularly hard hit by the world oil crisis, as it possesses no petroleum or coal resources 
and is totally reliant on imports for its energy needs. Additionally, Jam aica’s move 
toward a socialist economy angered the US, leading the US to undermine Jam aica’s 
receipt o f vital investment capital from international financial institutions (IFIs) (World 
Bank, IMF, etc.).
When the JLP recaptured the government in 1980, it commenced a reversal o f the 
PNP socialist economic programs. While maintaining a firm hold on Jamaican economic 
planning to maximize rent seeking, the JLP began to privatize state economic holdings 
and shift to a more open market economy. JLP Prime Minister Edward Seaga became a 
favorite o f US President Reagan as the US reversed its 1970s stance and insured Seaga’s 
government received preferential treatment from the IFIs. Despite the JLP’s efforts at 
revitalizing the Jamaican economy, GDP growth remained weak, reaching only a peak o f 
4.2 percent in the 1980 to 1988 period o f JLP government (Gayle, 1996, p. B397). After
the PNP regained power in 1989, GDP peaked at close to 7 percent growth and then 
plummeted dramatically, leveling off at around 1 percent growth from 1991 to 1996 and 
dropping to negative growth from 1997 through 1999 (Political Risk Services, 1998b; 
World Fact Book, 1999).
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the political war between the JLP and PNP 
continued. Hundreds o f politically motivated murders occurred each year, with the 
numbers peaking in election years (see Headley, 1996). In 1997, when the PNP won an 
unprecedented third consecutive election over the JLP, the political violence seemed to 
recede for the first time in the three decade JLP-PNP political war. This chapter now 
turns to assessing contemporary political corruption levels and institutions that developed 
over these last three decades o f Jamaican political and economic turmoil.
Assessing Contemporary Jamaican Political Corruption
TI’s 1998 and 1999 corruption perception index (CPI) scale ratings o f Jamaica at 
3.8 (on a scale o f 0 to 10) drew mixed reactions in Jamaica. Those in Jam aica’s ruling 
PNP government took the low ratings as personal affronts, immediately questioning the 
competency o f TI to publish such ratings while simultaneously heralding recent PNP- 
initiated anti-corruption measures (Campbell, 1998). Those in the opposition JLP and 
new third party, the New Democratic Movement (NDM), saw the ratings as a means to 
discredit the ruling PNP and offered that the TI ratings were too high, i.e., that the 
Jamaican PNP governing elite were even more corrupt than TI offered (Campbell, 1998). 
Trevor MacMillan, a former Jamaican police commissioner and head o f the Jamaican TI 
chapter, justified the Jamaican ratings when he stated, “I think it reflects what most
people in Jamaica believe. The fact is there is a major corruption problem in Jamaica” 
(Campbell, 1998).
In a 1999 poll o f Jamaican citizens, 49 percent thought corruption was the greatest 
threat to Jamaican democracy. In the same poll, seventy-seven percent felt that there was 
more corruption in Jamaica now than there was 10 years ago (Chang, 1999; Daily 
Gleaner, 1999). A 1995 survey o f Jamaican citizens found that 64 percent thought most 
or all Jamaican politicians were corrupt (Rodrigues, 1996, p. 110). Thus, the consensus, 
both inside and outside Jamaica, is that political corruption presents a significant 
problem.
Table 5-1, developed from a content analysis, characterizes the current incidence 
and evaluation o f Jamaica’s political corruption problem s.1 Table 5-1’s results correlate 
closely with the 1999 TI 3.8 CPI rating o f Jamaica. The content analysis o f Jamaican 
political corruption reveals a governing elite that regularly abuses its power to benefit 
themselves, their friends, and their supporters. The single greatest source o f Jamaican 
political corruption is associated with the Table 5-1 behaviors related to political 
influence peddling— where the governing elite use their positions to intervene in 
government contracting and the delivery o f government services with the expectation of 
private gain. Jamaican jurist Barnett (1999) summarizes the political corruption 
problems as:
The partisan type o f corruption, which manifests itself in the award o f contracts 
and the employment o f persons on the basis o f their political affiliations to the 
governing party, are generally accepted as part o f the political system. Financial 
contributions and the political support o f political parties often come from 
persons who expect most favored treatment in the distribution o f the scarce 
benefits dispensed by the government. In many areas o f public administration it
is well known that gifts to public officials are the only means o f obtaining 
expedition in the handling o f the citizen’s application to government 
departments. An even more unsavory corollary is that failure to pay may result 
in retardation o f the processing o f one’s matter. (Barnett, 1999, pp. 10-11)
Table 5-1. The Incidence and Evaluation o f
Jamaican Political Corruption Behavior
Types of Political Conruption Behavior
1. Governing elite deviate from the rules for 
the benefit of friends or supporters.
2. Large gifts, or other benefits, accepted by 
governing elite for private gain.
3. Unregulated campaign contributions 
solicited and accepted by governing elite.
4. Nepotism or political cronyism in govern­
ment appointments and contract awarding.
5. Governing elite profit from state decisions 
through sideline occupations or kickbacks.
6. Citizens compensate governing elite for 
advancing administrative due process.
7. Governing elite tolerate or cooperate with 
organized crime for private gain.
8. Governing elite ignore convincing proof of 
political corruption.
9. Governing elite misuse state resources 
(land, property, etc.) for private gain.
10. Governing elite misuse state treasury for 
)rivate gain.
Key: SOP = Standard Operating Procedure; FI = Frequent Incidence;
01 = Occasional Incidence; 0 0  = Rare Incidence, Without Regular Pattern.
W = White Corruption Boundaries, G = Gray Corruption Boundaries;
B = Black Corruption Boundaries.
Source: Content Analysis (see Endnote 1).
Table 5-1 reveals that Jamaican political corruption is not only pervasive, but also 
widely accepted by the Jamaican elite and masses (predominantly white boundaries).
This corrupt behavior persists in present day Jamaica in spite o f a number o f anti­
corruption laws and regulations— rules the Jamaican governing elite regularly violate
Incidence Evaluation
SOP W
SOP W
SOP W
SOP W
SOP W
SOP W
FI G
SOP G
SOP G
with impunity (Cargill (interview), 1999). For example, to prevent conflicts o f interest, 
the 1962 Jamaican Constitution prohibits members of parliament from owning or having 
financial interests in businesses that obtain government contracts— unless a parliamentary 
waiver is granted (Aub & Aub, 1994). Despite this prohibition, at least one-third (20) of 
Jamaica’s elected parliamentarians are associated with business interests holding 
government contracts— all having received parliamentary waivers (Aub & Aub 
(interviews), 1999a, 1999b; Cargill (interview), 1999).
The centerpiece of Jamaican anti-corruption statutes, the Corruption Prevention 
Act o f 1931, dates to the British colonial period. Although the Corruption Prevention Act 
encompasses a plethora o f activities considered corrupt, and applies to all public servants 
except Parliament, there have been no prosecutions o f senior public servants under the act 
in Jamaica’s almost four decades o f independence.
Jamaican parliamentarians fall under the anti-corruption provisions o f the 1973 
Parliamentary Integrity o f Members Act. This act establishes a commission to investigate 
the assets, liabilities, and income o f members o f parliament, those both elected to the 
Jamaican House o f Representatives and appointed to the Jamaican Senate. Again, like 
the Corruption Prevention Act, the requirements o f the Integrity o f Members Act are 
regularly ignored, including parliamentarian’s failure to submit annual declarations o f 
assets to the Integrity Commission (Cargill (interview), 1999). There are also a number 
o f Jamaican anti-corruption statutes surrounding the misuse o f public finds, electoral 
fraud, illegal government contracting, and government financial irregularities (see 
Barnett, 1999). However, like other anti-corruption measures, the governing elite also
regularly ignores these. In surveying the problem o f Jamaican elite accountability, Stone 
(1980, p. 101) confirms “the official rules o f the game are violated with impunity by 
political bosses....” This allows the Jamaican governing elite to act as near predators 
(pirates in accordance with Table 2-4) as they are free to enrich themselves and fill ruling 
party coffers in the execution o f their public duties.
Explaining Jamaican Political Corruption
There are several competing explanations for Jamaica’s political corruption 
problems. Most take structural approaches. Barnett (1999) takes the structural approach 
when he blames corruption on various deficiencies with the Jamaican criminal justice 
system that present the governing elite no risk o f prosecution. Others explain Jamaica’s 
corruption problems as a result o f the governing elite’s manipulation o f the Westminster 
parliamentary system for their own private interests (see Jacobs, 1978; Mills, 1997; 
Munroe, 1999b). Stone (1980) and Edie (1991) further the structural arguments by 
relating Jam aica’s political corruption problems to the strong clientelistic system that 
developed after 1962.
This chapter reveals that while all o f the above explanations for Jamaica’s 
political corruption problems have merit, the overall causes for the problems are more 
complex. Taking advantage o f the weaknesses o f the Westminster system in small states, 
Jamaica’s governing elite have constructed an authoritarian-democratic governing 
structure. Predictably, this governing structure is accompanied by restrictions on 
institutions concerning elite competition, elite accountability, and mass participation.
This authoritarian-democratic structure, combined with a self-interested governing elite
that built and perpetuate this structure, led to Jamaica’s severe political corruption 
problems.
Form of Rule. Jamaica’s form o f rule is a mix o f hegemonic and hierarchical conditions 
(see Chapter 2). It is partly hegemonic because o f the paternalistic relations that exist 
between the governing elite and mass citizenry. At the same time, it is also partly 
hierarchical because o f the threats o f or actual use o f coercion that are used by the 
governing elite to maintain political control and public stability (coercion is a directive- 
ruled condition). The nature o f this partly hegemonic, partly hierarchic, form o f rule are 
evident in the below description o f Jamaica’s formal and informal ruling structures.
During Jam aica’s 1944 to 1962 transition to independence, the rising governing 
class seemed oblivious to the inappropriateness o f the W estminster system as a Jamaican 
democratic model (Munroe, 1969, p. 302). The core of the Jamaican W estminster system 
is a 60 member House o f Representatives elected from individual geographic 
constituencies. The political party (or coalition) with the majority o f the 60 elected 
Members o f Parliament (MPs) forms the Jamaican government and becomes the ruling 
party/coalition. The ruling party selects one elected MP as the Prime M inister (PM) or 
head o f government. Since independence, the PM has always been the president o f the 
ruling party. The PM and Opposition Leader, the MP who heads the non-ruling party or 
coalition, recommend the 21 persons to be appointed to the Jamaican Senate (13 by the 
ruling party or coalition, 8 by the opposition) by the largely ceremonial Governor 
General. The PM also selects approximately 30 o f the ruling party or coalition MPs or
Senators as cabinet or state ministers, constituting the senior decision-makers in the 
executive branch o f government.
The Jamaican Westminster system places extraordinary power in the hands of the 
PM (see Munroe, 1999b, p. 52). The source o f this political power is the PM ’s control o f 
ministerial appointments, as the Jamaican government ministers, checked only by the 
PM, possess the dominant say in how state resources are managed and distributed in their 
respective areas o f responsibility. The vast majority o f Jamaican public policies, 
including all budget decisions, originate within the ministries. As is traditional in 
Westminster parliamentary systems, the process o f government policy formulation is 
closed, with the final decisions o f the ministers presented as a consensus o f the entire 
government (PM and ministers). This principle o f collective responsibility for the 
government’s programs is typical of Westminster governments. Thus, the Jamaican 
public, and even MPs that are not ministers, are not privy to the ministerial debates 
leading to final policy formulation. The PM, if  he/she sees fit, can rule dictatorially over 
the entire public policy process as each minister serves only at the continuing pleasure o f 
the PM. This forces a strong unidimensionality on Jamaican governmental policy­
making— at least as presented to observers outside the ruling circle o f ministers.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the W estminster key governing principle o f loyal 
opposition often does not work in small states such as Jamaica. The principle o f loyal 
opposition calls for the opposition MPs to oppose draft government policy and thereby 
ensure a complete and adequate public debate o f all policy issues (Birch, 1990, pp. ISO- 
132). The opposition MPs are joined in the opposition process by the backbenchers of
the ruling party. Backbenchers are MPs o f the ruling party or coalition that do not hold 
ministerial appointments. Backbenchers in Westminster states are free to support either 
the government or opposition, but it is partly their responsibility to ensure all policy 
matters are thoroughly debated. However, in states with a small number o f MPs, like 
Jamaica, the process whereby loyal opposition to government policy occurs can quickly 
break down.
The undermining o f the loyal opposition principle is best illustrated by looking at 
Jamaica’s current parliamentary structure o f 51 PNP MPs and 9 JLP MPs. Almost 30 of 
Jamaica’s current PNP MPs are ministers, and constitute a group that not only runs the 
executive branch o f government, but also holds a near majority vote in the legislature. 
Approximately 20 PNP MPs remain as backbenchers. Because these PNP backbenchers 
have realistic chances o f someday becoming government ministers themselves, they 
always support draft public policy presented by the cabinet (Cargill (interview), 1999). 
This can be contrasted to Great Britain, where the vast majority o f backbenchers will 
never become ministers and are free to challenge their own party’s government policy and 
thus assist the opposition. Jamaican backbenchers always back their party’s government 
policies as they have no desire to upset the PM or other senior party leaders and damage 
their future chances for ministerial appointments.
Even with only 9 MPs, the opposition JLP can, and does, oppose government 
policy. Although the JLP is heard in Parliament and their opposition does foster media 
coverage o f key policy debates, in reality the overwhelming majority the PNP holds in 
parliamentary votes ensures that governmental policy as presented by the PM and
ministers always prevails. In the past, the Jamaican Parliament has seen more evenly 
balanced numbers of MPs between the PNP and JLP. Nevertheless, because o f strict 
Jamaican party discipline the ruling party always prevails in government policy votes 
(Cargill (interview), 1999).
Under the Westminster principle o f loyal opposition, once a parliamentary vote is 
taken, all sides are suppose to accept the results and lend their full support to the policy’s 
implementation. This is not the case in Jamaica where what is best for Jamaica and its 
citizens is subordinate to both MP self-interests and what is good for their respective 
parties. Long after Jamaican legislation is approved, the opposition continues to assail 
and undermine government programs. This results in a highly fractured parliamentary 
atmosphere. However, no matter how rancorous parliamentary debate may become over 
a government policy, there is virtually no chance— because of the strict party discipline—  
that the opposition can muster a majority o f MPs for a parliamentary vote o f no 
confidence that would replace the government or require new national elections. With no 
effective legislative check on the strong executive, and no judicial review o f acts passed 
by the legislature, the PM, who controls the entire Jamaican public policy process, holds 
enormous personal political power. In Jamaica, these W estminster manipulations led to 
the rise o f an authoritarian-democratic system.
Political Culture. Jamaican authoritarian-democratic rule is supported by a political 
culture with a mix o f collectivist and individualistic characteristics. Its collectivist 
component is anchored in citizen loyalties to the two traditional political parties (JLP and 
PNP). Its individualistic component deals with both how the political parties are
informally organized and how coercion and violence are used to maintain the structures 
within and between parties.
When acting as the ruling party, both the JLP and PNP have manipulated the 
disbursal o f  state resources to gain electoral advantage. Over time, Jamaica evolved into 
a strong clientelistic political system relying on extreme political patronage (see Stone, 
1980; Edie, 1991). Locally christened a tribalistic governing system, the Jamaican 
system is unique in the Caribbean for the rancor and political violence it spawns between 
JLP and PNP party loyalists (National Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). To 
understand the influence tribalism exerts over Jamaican politics, requires an examination 
of the inner-workings o f Jamaica’s political parties, the collectivist groups that help shape 
Jamaica’s political culture.
The leader o f a Jamaican political party is the chief o f his/her political tribe. The 
party leader’s power emanates from his/her control over party appointments, including 
not only his/her influence over those who fill high party offices but also over which party 
members will run for Parliament from which constituencies, and which MPs will become
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ministers for the ruling party. Therefore, as with other W estminster systems in small 
states, the careers o f aspiring politicians are substantially in the hands o f their party 
leader. The strength o f the party leader is shown in the case o f Edward Seaga, JLP leader 
since 1974. Seaga was first elected a JLP MP in 1962. He was the Jamaican PM from 
1980 to 1989. In 1989, 1993, and 1997, the JLP, headed by Seaga, lost decisively in 
national elections to the PNP. Today, Seaga remains the JLP leader and the Opposition 
Leader in the Jamaican House o f Representatives. In what democratic state would a party
leader that led his/her party to three consecutive crushing defeats still be in power? 
Probably nowhere.
Under the Jamaican political party leaders, MPs become the vanguards for 
distributing political patronage, i.e., the dispensing o f state resources to loyal political 
supporters. Constituencies with an MP elected from the ruling party receive much greater 
levels o f state resources (schools, health clinics, parks, youth programs, etc.) than those 
with opposition MPs. Additionally, within individual constituencies, voters who support 
the ruling party receive more individual state resources (state contracts, jobs, housing, 
scholarships, personal loans, etc.) than supporters o f the opposition party (National 
Committee on Political Tribalism, 1997). The system o f representative political 
patronage, where the ruling party provides state resources in exchange for electoral 
support, underpins the entire Jamaican political system.
Which ruling party is in power makes a significant difference in the quality o f life 
of individual Jamaican citizens. Individuals supporting the ruling party expect to share in 
state largess, while these same benefits are denied supporters o f the opposition party. As 
MPs have little time, especially MPs in ministerial positions, to manage the distribution 
o f state resources to their party’s constituents, the MPs rely on informal systems o f 
political dons in each constituency to direct the distribution o f political patronage.
Notwithstanding both party and governmental (state and local) bureaucracies, the 
real power structure o f the Jamaican political tribes follows the patronage resource 
distribution flow from the party leader (paternal tribal chief), to the senior party officials 
(MPs), to the political dons, to party supporters. This structure is diagrammed in Figure
5-1. Extreme citizen loyalty to individual parties and political dons generates the bitter 
competition for limited state resources between the JLP and PNP tribes. This has resulted 
in a system o f violent garrison politics. Ten o f the sixty Jamaican electoral 
constituencies are designated garrisons, areas so highly controlled by one party’s loyalists 
(9 PNP controlled, 1 JLP controlled) that just entering one as a member o f  the opposite 
party can get a person killed.
Figure 5-1. The Structure o f Jamaican Clientelistic Power
Organized around the two major political parties, Jamaica has two distinct party- 
political structures similar to Figure 5-1, one for the JLP and one for the PNP. Those 
lower in the party-political structures always look to those higher for resources and 
solutions to problems, while persons at all levels o f the Figure 5-1 structure tend to act
either in the best interests o f their respective party or in their own self-interests. Between 
JLP and PNP party structures there are relatively few transactions. Those between-party 
transactions that do occur are usually acrimonious and often include threats or acts o f 
coercion and violence. Thus, in Jamaica there are actually two separate political 
societies, one JLP and one PNP, with a mix o f collectivist and individualistic 
characteristics.
Elite Competition. Jamaica’s collectivist-individualistic political culture is associated 
with a mixed constricted-oppositional elite competition. The Figure 5-1 clientelistic 
system constricts competition within political parties, while exacerbating it between the 
parties. When surveying the nature o f Jamaica’s elite competition with regard to 
openness o f party structures, longevity in office, and electoral processes, its mixed 
constricted-oppositional nature is apparent.
Access to Jamaican political party leadership positions is severely restricted. As 
seen in the above example o f the JLP’s Edward Seaga, party leadership positions often 
remain in the hands o f the same person for decades. This is because politics provides one 
of the only routes for social and economic advancement among Jam aica’s middle class 
professionals. Jamaica’s economy, discussed further below, is weak and presents only 
limited opportunities for new entrepreneurs. Jamaica’s main economic enterprises 
remain in the hands o f an extremely small and well-entrenched upper class. Therefore, 
for educated, middle class, professional Jamaicans to advance socially and economically, 
they have two principal options. First, they can immigrate to the Canada, Great Britain, 
or the US— which has resulted in a massive brain drain from the island over the past 30
years. Second, they can gain access to state resources through a career in politics (either 
within the party or government). Politics thus becomes a full-time profession for those 
choosing the second option— resulting in the severely restricted access to senior party 
positions.
Longevity in office for the entire Jamaican governing elite, and not just for 
individual party officials, is a hidden factor that also constricts Jamaican elite 
competition. Since Jamaica’s 1962 independence, the JLP and PNP have alternated as 
the ruling party, each serving a series o f two consecutive terms to then be replaced as 
ruling party by the other. (This rotation was broken when the PNP won a third 
consecutive term in 1997.) Since 1980, despite differences in party campaign platforms, 
there have been only minor differences in the policy implementation o f the two parties.
By the 1980s, when the PN P’s experiment in socializing the Jamaican economy was 
recognized as a failure, the policy differences between the JLP and PNP became matters 
o f degree and not substance (see Payne, 1993). With the PNP originally offering a social- 
democratic ideology, and the JLP more liberal-conservative beliefs, both converged into 
populist parties by the late 1980s (see Stone, 1992). Both parties now offer similar 
populist social welfare programs (aimed at their political supporters), while also 
implementing similar economic policies as they wrestle with international pressures on 
Jamaica’s weak and dependent economy.
Throughout the post-independence period, as seen in the PNP inaction over the 
1973 Da Costa Commission inquiry, both parties worked to strengthen Jam aica’s 
clientelistic system (Figure 5-1), i.e., fortify the rules o f how ruling parties could extract
political rents and dispense them for political patronage purposes. Thus, since the early 
1980s, it has mattered little which political party was in office, as both parties’ economic 
and social policies and their support to the clientelistic structure have remained stable.
Also contributing to a mixed constricted-oppositional elite competition is the 
Jamaican electoral process, one fraught with widespread irregularities. Manipulation of 
voter lists, irregularities at polling stations, and fraudulent vote counts are just a few of 
the seemingly constant problems prohibiting free and fair elections in Jamaica. Political 
parties are behind the electoral failures and the parties share equally in their occurrence. 
Ruling parties look for every advantage in the timing o f calling national elections, 
obstructing voter registrations in opposition garrisons and constituencies, manipulating 
final voter lists, and even making sure voter lists never arrive at some polling stations. 
Even more troubling is the control political dons maintain over polling locations. 
Constituency political dons are known to interfere in elections by orchestrating threats to 
polling station officials, threats to voters to keep them from voting, and ballot box 
stuffing to ensure their candidates win (Electoral Advisory Committee, 1994).
In the 1997 Jamaican national elections, a nongovernmental organization, Citizens 
Action For Free and Fair Elections (CAFFE), emerged to provide independent oversight 
of elections. However, even with 2,000 CAFFE volunteer election observers deployed 
across the island, plus the observation o f teams from the US-based Carter Center, many 
of the past electoral irregularities continued. As a result, CAFFE would not declare the 
1997 elections free and fair. It only reported that there were major improvements in
electoral freedom and fairness and that the will o f the Jamaican people (to retain the PNP 
as ruling party) was expressed (CAFFE, 1998, p. 7).
How Jamaican political campaigns are funded also constricts elite competition. 
There are no public funds allocated for national political campaigns. There are also no 
limitations on where or how parties or candidates can receive campaign funding (Golding 
(interview), 1999). The funds come from two primary sources. First, upper class 
economic elite and the few existing interest groups (trade unions, etc.) contribute both to 
political parties and individual candidates in the hopes o f gaining influence over 
governmental policies and access to state-owned resources from the ruling party (i.e., 
through the elite interest group influence channels in Figure 5-1). Elite interest groups 
are the primary funding sources for the opposition party.
Second, the ruling party has access, through its ability to conduct political 
influence peddling, to significant funds obtained from the manipulation o f state 
contracting and state-owned resource management. As seen earlier, governing elite 
behaviors surrounding the manipulation o f the awarding and financing o f state contracts 
is the single most frequent source o f political corruption in Jamaica. The funds received 
from these illicit acts are then made available to the ruling party and its candidates for 
national campaigns. These funds are converted to votes through campaign advertising, 
candidate stumping, and dispersal o f funds to voters as either benefits (housing, etc.) or 
direct cash payments (Golding (interview), 1999). The prevalence o f a votes-for-cash 
atmosphere is seen in how MPs are expected to freely disburse moderate sums (US$20 to
US$200) o f cash to individual political supporters whenever they visit their 
constituencies (Chuck (interview), 1999; Golding (interview), 1999).
Elite Accountability. The lack o f elite accountability is a serious problem contributing 
to Jamaican political corruption. Despite a string of post-independence corruption 
scandals, not one Jamaican senior public official has been prosecuted for a corruption 
offense since 1962. Jamaica’s circular (intra-elite) system o f elite accountability 
experiences problems with both answerability and enforcement (see Chapter 2).
Jamaican elite answerability problems start with the fact that the state has no 
freedom o f information regulations. Jamaica closely follows the Westminster 
parliamentary system’s “cult o f secrecy and confidentiality in government” (Mills, 1997, 
p. 34). Like most other Westminster systems, Jamaica uses a combination o f the 
constitutional collective responsibility doctrine and an Official Secrets Act to control 
government information. Under the collective responsibility doctrine, all government 
officials (ministers and civil servants) take an oath that keeps government policy-making 
processes closed and non-transparent (Aub & Aub, 1994). A Jamaican government 
agency can only release information to the public cleared by the minister responsible for 
that agency. The separate Official Secrets Acts, as originally adopted in Great Britain, 
was meant to foster governmental consensus in W estminster governments, ensure 
ministers were held responsible for the bureaucracies in their respective agencies, and 
prevent information vital to national security from being erroneously released (Thurlow, 
1995). Jamaica, as other small Caribbean W estminster systems, uses their Official 
Secrets Act well beyond the limits intended by the British. In Jamaica, the Official
Secrets Act becomes a tool o f authoritarian-democratic rule as it shields the government 
from releasing even the most basic state information.4
The case o f Jamaica’s Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINS AC) provides 
a good example o f how government secrecy laws are abused. A mid to late 1990s decline 
in the Jamaican banking sector and a number o f business bankruptcies caused the loss of 
investor and business confidence in the Jamaican financial sector. In answer to this 
problem, the PNP government commissioned FINS AC to use state funds to either take 
over or subsidize private banks and businesses to avert total financial system chaos. 
Approximately US$2.5 billion in state funds were used in the late 1990s to compensate 
for the mismanagement in the Jamaican banking and business sectors. To put this 
amount in perspective, it is almost half o f Jamaica’s annual Gross Domestic Product 
(US$5.8 billion, 1997), double one year’s government budget expenditures (US$1.6 
billion, 1997), and two-thirds the size o f Jamaica’s total foreign debt (US$3.2 billion,
1997) (Political Risk Services, 1998b). The FINSAC bailouts were not only for bankers, 
a source o f traditional PNP support, but also for PNP supportive businesses and 
numerous high level PNP party and government officials.
In 1999, on learning o f the large amounts o f FINSAC liabilities, there was a media 
outcry for transparency and accountability as to exactly which bankers, businesses, and 
politicians were being dispersed what amounts o f state funds. One 1999 poll revealed 
that 80 percent o f Jamaican citizens thought the names o f politicians receiving FINSAC 
bailouts should be made public {Jamaica Observer, 1999b). FINSAC’s reply to the 
media argued that it was a financial institution similar to a bank and therefore came under
strict Jamaican banking secrecy laws— thus avoiding any transparency or accountability 
for its use o f state funds. The PNP government supported this FINS AC stance (one the 
media also assailed)— no doubt because it would be politically embarrassing if  the list o f 
PNP officials and supporters saved by FINSAC was published.5
A positive note for Jamaican answerability is the state’s recent embrace o f media 
freedom. Prior to the 1990s, the Jamaican Broadcast Corporation (JBC) (television only) 
was owned by the state and subject to ruling party politicization— as seen in its abuse by 
the PNP during the 1976-1977 State o f Emergency (Bennett, 1994). In the 1990s, as part 
o f continuing efforts to open the Jamaican economy, the ruling PNP privatized the JBC. 
Jamaican newspapers and radios have historically been privately owned and regularly 
report on government policy issues and criticize government behavior. Foreign television 
and radio broadcasts are also readily available in Jamaica by satellite or short wave and 
are not regulated. Overall, Freedom House gives Jamaica a score o f 11 (scale 0-100, 0 
being most free) on press freedom, ranking it as one o f the freest states in the entire world 
(Sussman, 1999). Despite this veneer o f press freedom, there is significant self­
censorship in the Jamaican media (Cargill (interview), 1999).
Jamaica has strict libel and defamation laws (see Barnett, 1977, pp. 408-409). 
Whenever media reports include anything the least bit controversial about an individual 
in the governing elite, the media outlet is immediately slapped with a libel lawsuit, 
whether the allegations are true or not. Within the Jamaican criminal justice system, once 
the libel lawsuit is filed, no further media reporting on the person (by any media source) 
is allowed until the lawsuit runs its course (which can take years) (Aub, 2000). This
effectively eliminates serious attempts at investigative reporting in Jamaica. The media’s 
lack o f courage to challenge libel lawsuits limits its role to sniping at the margins o f 
governmental problems. Thus, the media never becomes a serious threat to the governing 
elite in governmental policy matters or elite misbehavior such as political corruption 
(Cargill (interview), 1999).
Another problem relating to Jamaican answerability is that MPs are not readily 
available to their constituents to explain government policy. To address this problem, a 
1991 report (The Stone Report) recommended “[t]he establishment o f regular non­
partisan public meetings between MPs and constituents to allow MPs to give public 
account o f their stewardship and to keep voters informed in constituency plans and 
developments” (Stone Committee, 1991, p. 3). A few MPs do hold public meetings in 
their constituencies and frequently meet with constituents. Other MPs only make 
themselves available in their Kingston offices to constituents from their own party. Still 
other MPs never set foot in their constituencies until just before national elections and 
allow political dons to dispense the bulk o f their patronage resources. The 1991 Stone 
Committee reported that overall “the allocation o f the M P’s time to constituency 
representational work falls far short o f what is needed to adequately serve the needs of 
constituencies” (Stone Committee, 1991, p. 15).
Enforcement is also a major problem for Jamaican elite accountability. On paper, 
Jamaica has a robust administrative system with an Ombudsman, an Auditor-General, 
and a Contractor-General who are tasked to uncover government waste and fraud 
associated with political corruption. As seen with other Jamaican regulations and laws,
there is no accountability o f the governing elite, even when administrative investigations
reveal strong evidence o f political corruption. A 1999 report (Orane Report) highlighted
the “lack o f accountability throughout the public sector including the top echelons o f the
public sector and the political directorate. Much of the waste and inefficiency occur
because there is no culture o f economy and/or efficiency” (Orane, 1999). This same
inefficiency and lack o f accountability surrounds government action on the reports o f
Jam aica’s Ombudsmen, Auditor-General, and Contractor-General. For example, the
Contractor-General submits an annual report to Parliament detailing his/her findings into
the administration o f government contracts. Often these reports disclose discrepancies in
individual contracts. However, no follow-up investigations are ever commissioned. In
1998, the outgoing Contractor-General, frustrated at the continued lack o f parliamentary
follow-up on his reports, included in his annual report:
The great disappointment has been that after seven years [as Contractor- 
General] it has not been possible to persuade Parliament to which I report to 
undertake an examination o f the Annual Reports which are made in accordance 
with the Contractor-General Act. This means no one has been asked to account 
for actions criticised in the Reports.... If there is no change in how the Annual 
Reports are handled then the money spent for the operation o f the office will 
continue to be regarded as not being likely to lead to significant improvement in 
the sector. (Contractor-General, 1998, p. 2).
A review o f several years o f Auditor-General and Contractor-General reports 
reveals numerous allegations o f improper contracting and questionable disposal o f state- 
owned property. Even more telling o f the lack o f elite accountability portrayed in these 
reports are the refusal o f government agencies to provide the necessary documents or 
cooperation that the auditors need to complete their inquiries. For example, the ministries 
o f National Security and Justice, Education, Health, and Public Utilities and Transport
were all several years in arrears in providing documents to the Auditor-General, even 
after many formal requests for the documents (Auditor-General, 1997, 1998). Likewise, 
the Contractor-General repeatedly reported that the government’s Urban Development 
Corporation continually disregarded Jamaican contracting regulations (Contractor- 
General, 1997, 1998). The lack o f parliamentary attention and follow-up to these 
administrative reports clearly reveals the flagrant disregard Jamaica’s governing elite 
have for any form o f administrative accountability.
In general, Jamaican politicians cannot be voted out of office as an elite 
enforcement tool. The only real choice Jamaican voters have is to elect the prime 
minister, as they know the head o f the ruling party will become prime minister. Jamaican 
voters have no say in who (only which party) represents their constituency, as the party 
selects MP candidates. There is unarguably deep citizen dissatisfaction with the lack o f 
public input to Jamaican politics. In a 1995 poll, 64.5 percent o f respondents reported the 
Jamaican political system did not work well and needed changes (Rodrigues, 1996, p.
75). In the 1997 national elections, only 66 percent o f those registered voted (33 percent 
o f all those eligible)— the lowest voting percentages in any contested Jamaican election 
since 1962 (CAFFE, 1998).
In the Jamaican tribalist system, the primary governmental performance criteria 
that influences the largely illiterate and poverty stricken masses is which political party 
can deliver the most patronage benefits. This helps explain why, even though the 
mismanaged Jamaican economy has been severely retracting for most o f the 1990s, the 
PNP maintains voter support. The PNP has a highly developed patronage delivery system
including control o f the 9 PNP garrisons. Since its 1989 defeat, the JLP has fractured 
internally and does not appear capable of outperforming the PNP’s patronage distribution. 
The inability to deliver patronage benefits also explains why Jamaica’s emerging third 
political party, the National Democratic Movement (NDM), has been unable to break the 
JLP and PNP hold on parliamentary seats.
Disgruntled Jamaican middle class professionals and intelligentsia that are calling 
for an array o f constitutional, justice, and corruption reforms primarily support the new 
NDM. The NDM lost decisively to the JLP and PNP in the 1997 elections because it has 
no history o f patronage distribution to the masses. Even the NDM party leader, Bruce 
Golding, a former popular JLP MP who had won his constituency over a number o f years, 
lost to a new JLP candidate largely because o f the JLP’s history (i.e., Golding’s) for 
delivering patronage to the constituency’s citizens. While the NDM  continues to gain 
support in Jamaica, until the patronage-supported Jamaican political culture changes, the 
JLP and PNP will continue to capture mass citizen support and maintain power with little 
accountability.
The final area o f elite accountability enforcement to consider is the Jamaican 
criminal justice system. As in many developing states with limited resources and 
authoritarian-democratic governments, the Jamaican criminal justice system has serious 
problems with case backlogs, witness intimidation, jury tampering, prison overcrowding, 
and worst o f all, increasing politicization in favor o f the governing elite (JIS, 1994;
Chuck (interview), 1999). On the bright side, most Jamaican judges have reputations for 
honesty and are considered one o f the most trusted elements in the Jamaican government
system (Cargill (interview), 1999). However, Jamaican judges are becoming more 
politicized, meaning they are being increasingly influenced by the governing elite (Aub & 
Aub (interviews), 1999a, 1999b). A general reputation for honesty also applies to the 
office o f the Jamaican Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP prosecutes all 
cases for the Jamaican state. The DPP is also the source for most judicial appointments. 
Unfortunately for Jamaican citizens, while the judges and prosecutors are not generally 
corrupt, the same is not true o f the Jamaican police.
The Jamaican police force (Constabulary Force) is reportedly the most corrupt and 
least trusted state institution in all Jamaica (Chuck (interview), 1999; Cargill (interview), 
1999). The Jamaican police are so highly politicized that, in effect, they become the 
enforcement arm o f the ruling party as was seen in the 1976-1977 State o f Emergency 
(Harriott, 1997). The police are extremely violent— with approximately one-quarter o f all 
Jamaicans killed by gunshot each year being victims o f police shootings (Chevigny, 1995, 
p. 212).6 Through the Minister o f National Security and Justice, the ruling party directs 
the police to do its bidding, ranging from the control o f anti-government protesters to the 
targeting o f opposition party members. The police receive their corrupt largess from a 
combination o f ruling party patronage, their alliance with powerful drug dons (discussed 
later), and extortion o f the mass citizenry.
As in most developing states, the Jamaican police are organized and outfitted to 
control the masses, but not to investigate or control the governing elite. The DPP has no 
investigative arm o f its own and relies on the police for all investigative support. Police 
investigations that implicate ruling party officials are stonewalled or conveniently lost.
Additionally, the police have neither the trained personnel nor technical abilities to 
conduct complex political corruption investigations. Barnett (1999) argues that the lack 
o f a professional criminal investigation capability is a primary reason for Jamaica’s 
corruption problems.
Despite the corrupt behavior o f the Jamaican police, they remain protected by the 
governing elite. For example, in 1991 the PNP government commissioned a group o f 
senior British police officials to review the work o f the Jamaican police. The resultant 
Hirst Report was so critical o f the Jamaican police that the Ministry o f National Security 
and Justice never released it publicly (Chevigny, 1995, p. 204). Jamaican governing elite 
have little fear o f being held accountable by the Jamaican criminal justice system, as 
charges o f political corruption, even if  made by someone outside the police or 
government, will never be investigated and presented to the DPP for action.
Elite accountability in Jamaica is strongly circular, i.e., there is no accountability 
o f the governing elite outside o f their own circles. This can be seen in the 1989 Shell Oil 
scandal. Shell Oil, whose Jamaican operations chief, Howard Hamilton, was a member 
of the PNP National Executive Committee, sought to begin the import o f unleaded 
gasoline. In gaining approval for the imports, PNP Minister o f Finance, Percival J. 
Patterson, waived all import duties on the gasoline for Shell. In January 1992, when 
Patterson’s actions in relation to Shell’s gasoline imports were made public, the political 
and media outcry resulted in Patterson’s resignation as Deputy Prime Minister, although 
he continued to hold his parliamentary seat. An official inquiry was never begun and 
public accountability o f the Shell Oil scandal was never provided (Cargill (interview),
1999). In March 1992, PM Michael Manley resigned due to health reasons and Patterson, 
the newly elected PNP President, ascended to the PM position where he later received 
strong public mandates to continue as PM in the 1993 and 1997 national elections. In 
consonance with constricted elite accountability patterns, Patterson avoided severe 
administrative, electoral, and criminal accountability for his behavior in the Shell Oil
n
scandal. He was instead sanctioned by the PNP governing elite through the loss of his 
Deputy Prime Minister appointment. Then, only two months later, he was forgiven by 
both the PNP leadership and Jamaican masses and returned as the head o f Jam aica’s 
government. This is a classic case o f circular accountability within a governing elite.
Mass Participation. There is little mass participation in the Jamaican Westminster 
system. Every four to five years Jamaican citizens are allowed to vote in national 
elections within their constituencies for their choice of a ruling party (disguised as a vote 
for an MP). The effectiveness o f these national elections is often in question, as 
discussed above. Other than national elections, Jamaican citizens have virtually no input 
to the public policy process as a result o f Jamaica’s authoritarian-democratic governing 
structure. Mass participation in public policy is strongly paternalistic as the vast majority 
of the Jamaican masses wait for the government to solve their problems and tell them 
what is in their best interests. In a moment o f rare candor, in a May 1999 speech, PM 
Patterson highlighted this paternalistic situation when he urged Jamaicans to become 
more involved in nation building and not wait for the government to provide every single 
job and solve every single problem (,Jamaica Observer, 1999a).
There are few avenues to follow for Jamaican citizens that do want a public policy 
input. Stone’s (1980, p. 223) analysis o f Jamaican politics reveals that the main influence 
on public policy from outside the government is confined to elite interest groups (see 
Figure 5-1). The clientelistic structure o f the political party system is optimized for 
distributing patronage downward to the masses, not for allowing substantive public policy 
input from the masses to flow upwards. The sources o f patronage resources, the 
economic elite and party officials that run the state bureaucracy, have generally open 
access to government officials and exert at least some influence on the public policy 
process. Stone (1980, p. 76), however, argues that the political power o f the economic 
elite, i.e., the private business sector, diminished considerably in the 1970s as the state 
became more and more involved in economic planning and policy-making. With only 
limited middle and upper class influence, the principal public policy-making power 
resides in the closed-circle o f government ministers.
Outside o f the Jamaican political party system, citizens must rely on trade unions, 
churches, miscellaneous social organizations, or as is more commonly seen, radio talk 
shows and street protests, to make their political inputs known to the governing elite. 
Trade unions are the most visible component o f Jamaican civil society (Hillman & 
D ’Agostino, 1992, p. 133). Trade unions represent 16 percent o f Jam aica’s formal work 
force. This does not include the thousands o f informal workers that exist within 
Jamaica’s enormous informal economy. (As much as 78 percent o f all Jamaican 
economic transactions occur within an enormous informal sector that runs the gamut from 
the ever-present unlicensed street vendors (higglers) to an immense illegal drug trade
(Bennett, 1995, p. 235).) Eighty percent o f workers who do belong to trade unions 
belong to the BITU and NWU that are allied closely with the JLP and PNP, respectively. 
Any influence the BITU and NWU may have on public policy-making is a component of 
Jamaica’s Figure 5-1 clientelistic system. Since the early 1990s, a growing trend is for 
new trade unions to emerge outside the political party structure such as the University and 
Allied W orker’s Union (UAWU). Despite this trend in independent union growth, a 
Jamaican labor leader offers that Jamaican trade unions have become “a less significant 
factor in civil society” (Munroe, 1999b, p. 82).
Jamaican churches play only a peripheral role in addressing the state’s most 
critical political and social problems. Jamaica’s historical churches, the Anglicans, 
Roman Catholics, and Methodists, traditionally ally with the state’s socio-economic elite 
and are generally supportive o f the status quo. Over the past 50 years, however, there has 
been significant growth in fundamentalist denominations such as the Church o f God and 
Seventh Day Adventists. Taking an anti-socialist, anti-statist, and pro-market stance, the 
fundamentalist sects generally align on the side o f the JLP, against the PNP supportive 
center-left leaning historical churches. In the 1990s, both the historical and 
fundamentalist churches have been relatively silent on Jamaica’s vast societal problems 
(Munroe, 1999b, p. 87). The two exceptions to this silence are the church opposition to 
casino gambling and the Roman Catholic Church’s interests in electoral reform, which 
helped, spark the 1997 formation o f CAFFE (Munroe, 1999b, p. 88).
The political role o f other social organizations in Jamaica is questionable. On one 
hand, membership in and the number o f nongovernmental social groups with limited
political purposes, such as neighborhood watches, police youth clubs, 4H clubs, soccer 
clubs, music clubs, etc., have been on the rise in the 1990s. On the other hand, there is a 
consensus that overall civil society political activism and volunteerism is on the decline 
(see Robotham, 1998). A World Bank study offered, “that social unity has always existed 
within the [Jamaican] communities, but its level has decreased over the years, influenced 
by the political warring o f the 1980s” (World Bank, 1999, p. 32).
One encouraging trend from the 1990s is the emergence o f several organizations 
focused specifically on Jamaican political reform. These include CAFFE, Citizens for a 
Civil Society, Impact Jamaica, Jamaicans for Justice, and the Jamaican chapter o f 
Transparency International. Members o f these new organizations are predominantly 
middle class and mainly include professionals and members o f the intelligentsia. These 
organizations are lobbying for reforms to Jamaica’s constitutional, justice, and electoral 
systems, and for the implementation o f good governance and anti-corruption measures. 
Through a combination o f public meetings, protests, and media campaigns, these groups 
have been effective at raising societal awareness about these issues.
These emerging civil society groups are hampered by two key factors. First, being 
predominantly middle class (from the affluent uptown neighborhoods o f northern 
Kingston), these groups have only begun to built bridges to Jam aica’s majority lower 
classes (from the poor downtown neighborhoods o f central and southern Kingston and 
most rural areas) whose support is held by the JLP and PNP through the clientelistic 
patronage-based political structures. Second, in the post-1970s Jamaican tradition o f 
politicizing every societal issue, the ruling PNP attacks these groups in the media as no
more than fronts for the emerging NDM political party. The PNP attacks hinder these 
groups from building bridges to the lower classes as they submerge important societal 
issues in acrimonious political debate that frames issues as a political PNP versus NDM 
conflict. The final effectiveness o f these groups in influencing Jamaican public policy­
making and governmental reform depends upon their abilities to keep important reform 
issues in front o f the Jamaican public and recruit support from the lower classes.
With limited trade union, church, and formal social organizations to act as 
representational vehicles, the Jamaican public resorts to radio talk shows and street 
protests to air their public policy concerns. Radio talk shows have become a vital part o f 
Jamaican civil society (Munroe, 1999b, p. 94). Radio talk shows are a favorite o f many 
lower class Jamaicans. The talk shows allow citizens to call in and discuss a wide array 
of Jamaican societal issues. Some believe that radio talk shows have become 
replacements for the Jamaican Parliament’s lack of a loyal opposition, as at least on the 
airwaves all pending public policy decisions are thoroughly debated (Aub & Aub 
(interviews), 1999a, 1999b; Perkins (interview), 1999). One talk show host reported that 
since most o f his listeners have limited education, he sees his role to help Jamaican 
citizens build critical thinking skills so that they would not just blindly accept the 
ideological drivel that the traditional political parties present as their party platforms 
(Perkins (interview), 1999).
With limited channels o f organized civil society to present their complaints, the 
most common method for Jamaican citizens to send messages to the governing elite is 
through street protests. The reliance on street protests traces its roots to the 1930s labor
riots that started Jamaica on its road to independence. Street protests remain a frequent 
occurrence in Jamaica, spawned by everything from unpopular government policies to 
local government’s inability to provide basic citizen service (water, roads, etc.). In a 
1995 poll, respondents indicated they believed protest action was the most effective 
means o f sending a message to the Jamaican government, winning handily over other 
choices such as contacting their MP, a ministry, or the media (Rodrigues, 1996, p. 83). 
Rodrigues (1996, p. 83) concludes that there is “occurring a shift within society away 
from faith in and reliance on state and political actors.”
The downside o f Jamaican street protests is that they can quickly become violent. 
For example, in April 1999 the ruling PNP government announced a 50 percent hike in 
gasoline taxes. The announcement led to three days o f island-wide protests by thousands 
o f citizens. With no parliamentary or public debate on the pending gas tax increase, PM 
Patterson thought he could get away with its implementation without facing the wrath o f 
the people. He was wrong. The final costs o f these gas riots were six people dead, 
dozens injured, and 150 arrested, along with an estimated US$350 million in damage and 
lost production. In response, the PNP government did partially rollback the gas tax. 
These particular riots were unique in two ways. First, they were the most costly o f any 
previous post-independence riots, both in terms o f deaths and value o f damages. Second, 
they included not only lower class protesters, but also many middle class citizens who for 
the first time were seen protesting in middle and upper class (uptown) neighborhoods.
The level o f social trust is a primary indicator o f the nature o f mass participation 
in a state. Jamaica has a deep problem with its levels o f societal trust that runs from little
trust in government to individual disdain for other citizens. One study o f Jamaican
political culture found:
Surveys and other research data indicate that by and large people neither trust 
politicians nor each other. Social commentators lament the atomistic society 
that they see being created and the fragmentation and decay o f the 
communitarian culture that existed in the past....the lack o f a strong internal 
community trust and cooperation precludes community solutions to problems 
(Rodrigues, 1996, pp. 179-180).
Rodrigues’s (1996) study found only 13 percent o f survey respondents trusted the 
Jamaican government to place the interests o f the people above those o f political parties 
(Rodrigues, 1996, p. 108). Similarly, he found only 5.8 percent of respondents felt MPs 
could be trusted to serve the interests o f the people most o f the time (Rodrigues, 1996, p. 
111). Similar societal mistrust surrounds the Jamaican police who are seen by citizens as 
ineffective, unresponsive, and uncaring (Moser & Holland, 1997, pp. 8-9). One report 
found that residents were angered at what they saw as the divide-and-rule tactics o f the 
JLP and PNP which undermined attempts at community cohesion within constituencies 
(Moser & Holland, 1997, p. 8).
There is also a deep distrust between Jamaican trade unions and management (see 
Carter, 1997). Throughout Jamaica, workers see management as untrustworthy and 
believe that enterprises universally conceal their true profits in order to justify paying 
workers low wages (Rodrigues, 1996, p. 180). Trade unions respond to this distrust by 
presenting management a constant threat o f strikes.
There is also a deep distrust among individual Jamaican citizens. Interpersonal 
violence in Jamaican society is so widespread that it pervades everyday life (Moser & 
Holland, 1997, p. 16). Much o f the worst violence (murders, etc.) takes place in the
garrison constituencies or lower class neighborhoods and is related to either JLP-PNP 
political conflicts or Jamaica’s serious problem with the drug trade. The violence also 
includes widespread women-on-women conflicts over petty jealousies (fights over hair 
styles, clothes, etc.) and those locally dubbed matey wars (fights over men) and pickney 
wars (fights between mothers sparked by their children) (Moser & Holland, 1997, p. 17). 
Tenant wars, fights over the use of common spaces in multi-household buildings, are 
another common form of interpersonal violence. These fights are often worsened by what 
is often described as grudgefulness— Jamaican societal tendencies toward revenge and 
resentment at the good fortune o f others. One author characterized Jamaican 
interpersonal relations as one o f crab antics, the desire to “behave like crabs in a barrel 
who are constantly trying to climb on each other’s backs, and in the process only succeed 
in pulling down the nearest to the exit, in order to achieve the ultimate goal o f getting out 
o f the barrel” (Wilson, 1973, p. 58ff). In an atmosphere of extreme societal distrust, it is 
easy to see how the Jamaican masses take a paternalistic view toward the governing 
elite— the one source o f resources and security for most citizens.
Material Resource Factors. Material resource factors, i.e., how the Jamaican governing 
elite direct and manage their societal resources, is a key element in assessing a society’s 
potential for political corruption. This not only includes routine resource factors related 
to how the economy and state-owned resources are managed, but also extraordinary 
resource factors that may become available to the governing elite. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, how a state manages societal resources helps define the opportunities a 
governing elite have for corrupt behavior.
Today’s Jamaican economy is not well diversified, relying on four principal 
industries, and is highly dependent on world markets for its economic livelihood. 
Tourism is the most important industry and is the largest source o f foreign exchange. 
However, in the latter 1990s tourism stagnated because o f rising crime levels in Jamaica 
and the lack o f investment in tourist infrastructure. The second most important industry, 
and the second largest source o f foreign exchange, is the production o f bauxite and 
alumina. Jamaica is the third largest producer o f bauxite ore in the world, after Australia 
and Guinea. The 1980s and 1990s decline in world bauxite ore prices, plus uncertainty 
over poor productivity and conflictive Jamaican labor-management relations, decreased 
the demand for Jamaican bauxite ore and impeded investment in this vital industry. The 
third major Jamaican industry encompasses the export o f tropical agriculture products 
(sugar cane, bananas, coffee, and citrus), which during the 1990s had a mixed 
performance, based on shifting US and European demand. The fourth key sector o f 
Jamaican industry is textile production. An outgrowth o f the US 1980s Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), the textile industry has been severely damaged by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that devastated the Caribbean textile industry as 
manufacturers relocated to Mexico. Therefore, several factors, including the effect o f 
crime on tourism, foreign investors that are suspect o f Jamaican labor-management 
relations, NAFTA, the lack o f financial stability (see previous FINSAC discussion), and 
declining world markets for its traditional export commodities, all contributed to the 
stagnation o f the Jamaican economy during the 1990s (Political Risk Services, 1998b).
In assessing Jamaican economic management, the Heritage Foundation rates
Jam aica’s economic openness at 2.7 (mostly free) on a scale o f 1 (free) to 5 (not free)
(Johnson et al., 1999, p. 231). This places Jamaica solidly among a number o f Caribbean
states that, while recently opening their economies, remain largely statist. On the positive
side, the Heritage Foundation gives Jamaica scores o f 2 (on a scale o f 1 (low) to 5 (h igh))
for its low levels o f external trade protection and government intervention in the
economy— both the result o f neoliberal economic reforms begun in the 1980s by the JLP.
The Heritage Foundation reports:
Jamaica seldom uses free-market approaches to economic policy. During the 
1970s and 1980s, the government was the primary player in the economy, and it 
did not encourage entrepreneurship.... Until recently, a high level o f 
protectionism and government intervention characterized Jam aica’s economy. 
The government has opened the economy to foreign investment in the past 
several years...and has reduced both taxes and tariffs. (Johnson et al., 1999, p. 
231).
Jamaican state-owned resources appear to suffer greater government 
mismanagement than does the overall economy. As discussed previously, Jamaican 
government Auditor-General and Contractor-General annual reports are replete with 
examples o f how state-owned resources are regularly mismanaged. Everything from the 
issuance o f professional licenses to the sale o f state-owned lands smacks o f the 
intervention o f the ruling party elite. The situation o f the 1990s government Urban 
Development Corporation (UDC) provides a good example. Dr. Vincent Lawrence, a 
major construction contractor and childhood friend o f PM Patterson, heads the UDC.
The UDC regularly takes control o f state-owned land for lease, resale, or development. 
The negotiations for the lease, sale, or construction on state-owned lands, like other
government business, are conducted behind closed doors with no public input. Lawrence 
has been implicated numerous times in incidents where the UDC let contracts to 
businesses he owned or in which he held partnership (Aub, 1993). Numerous UDC land 
leases and sales were also suspected o f directly benefiting key members o f the PNP. On 
several occasions, the Contractor-General questioned the UDC’s inappropriate, if  not 
illegal, actions in his annual reports, only to have no follow-up by the PNP-controlled 
Parliament (Contractor-General, 1997, 1998). This one example is typical o f how state- 
owned resources are mismanaged in Jamaica. Thus, while the overall economy may be 
statist, state-owned resources are managed patrimonially (see Chapter 2).
During the 1990s, extraordinary sources o f government resources primarily 
originated from the privatization o f state-owned entities and Jamaica’s large drug trade. 
Privatization efforts from 1981 to 1997 included the sale o f 70 state-owned enterprises 
that raised US$284 million (Political Risk Services, 1998b, p. A-8). In accordance with 
Jamaican government secrecy, there has been no public accounting for the receipt and 
distribution o f these funds.
The second major source o f extraordinary resources, funding from the drug trade, 
is an extremely complex issue. No senior political officials and only one recent judge 
have ever been indicted for collusion with the drug lords. Munroe (1999b, chap. 4) 
argues that senior politicians are not directly associated with the drug trade because, in 
part, it takes place in the lower levels o f the state’s clientelistic political structure (see 
Figure 5-1). In fact, MPs benefit greatly from the drug trade, although they never have to 
dirty their own hands by dealing with the powerful drug dons in person. The connection
between Jamaican politics and drugs occurs among the drug dons, constituency political 
dons, and the Jamaican police.
Drug dons that control Jamaican drug gangs enjoy great power and high social 
status among many sectors o f Jamaican lower classes (see Gunst, 1995; Headley, 1996). 
The Jamaican drug trade includes the production o f Jamaican-grown marijuana (ganga) 
crops and the shipment o f not only ganga but also cocaine and other drugs originating in 
South America to illegal markets in the US and Europe (see Khan-Melnyk, 1994). 
Jamaica also has a high level o f domestic drug use. Involvement in the lucrative illegal 
drug trade is seen as a quick way out o f the rampant poverty in Jam aica’s urban slums 
and rural areas. Stone (1994, p. 154) offers that “ [t]he drug industry, starting with ganga 
and developing into hard drugs, has corrupted large sections o f society with a kind o f “get 
rich quick” mentality and has made living by means o f illegality a normal mode o f 
operation in Jamaica.”
At the local level, the Jamaican drug dons help insure the security o f their illegal 
business by hiring their own heavily armed security forces and bribing local police, or 
both. However, just buying off the police is not enough. They must also buy o ff the 
political structure to: (1) keep additional state law enforcement resources from being 
applied to their territory, and (2) to pacify political dons who often have their own organic 
security forces separate from the police. The resulting alliance o f drug dons and political 
dons, especially in the highly armed garrison communities, provides the political system a 
lucrative source o f patronage benefits (see Munroe, 1999b). The political dons act as go- 
betweens. Political dons disburse resources obtained from the drug dons as part o f the
normal political patronage system. It matters little where the patronage benefits originate, 
as long as the political party gains citizen voting support from its disbursal. These 
activities are all carried out clandestinely. MPs remain free to display public outrage at 
the drug trade, while, at the same time, the powerful drug dons help cultivate MP political 
support among the masses behind the scenes. Thus, the extraordinary resources provided 
by the drug trade are often a key component o f Jamaica’s paternalistic politics.
The rise o f Jamaica’s drug dons is an unintended consequence o f the political war 
that erupted between the JLP and PNP in the 1970s. Jamaican drug gangs, referred to as 
posses, are the remnants o f political-based gangs originally recruited to fight for the JLP 
and PNP in the 1970s constituency power struggles (Gunst, 1995). In the 1980s, many of 
the posse members, under threat o f death from other posses or the Jamaican police, 
immigrated to Canada, the US, and Great Britain— coinciding with the wave o f crack 
cocaine crack problems in those states. The Jamaican posses proceeded to capture much 
o f the crack production and distribution business in these developed states while 
simultaneously strengthening their ties with Jamaican-based posses. The result was the 
establishment o f posse networks where cocaine and ganga were smuggled from Jamaica 
to Canada, the US, and Great Britain, in return for arms and money shipped back to 
Jamaica (Headley, 1996, pp. 3-5). During the 1990s, many o f the posse members were 
deported back to Jamaica from Canada, the US, and Great Britain, only to strengthen their 
hold on the local Jamaican drug trade. Many feel that the power o f the Jamaican drug 
dons— measured by their monetary and property resources, tendencies toward violence, 
and territorial control— has created a second parallel system o f informal government in
Jamaica (Aub, 2000). Currently the liaison between the drug dons (posse leaders) and 
political dons present the greatest source o f extraordinary resources fueling the 
entrenchment o f the Jamaican political corruption structure.
Findings
Table 5-2 summarizes the above discussion o f the contemporary causes o f 
Jamaican political corruption. The institutional structure causing Jamaican political 
corruption patterns is directly related to its authoritarian-democratic governing system. 
This system has spawned a form o f rule that manifests mixed hegemonic and hierarchical 
characteristics, a mixed collectivist-individualistic political culture, and a mix o f 
constricted and oppositional factors in its elite competition. Jamaica displays little elite 
accountability outside o f political party circles (circular characteristics) and has an 
extremely low level (paternalistic characteristics) o f  mass participation. Jam aica’s most 
positive structural factor concerning political corruption is its statist material resource 
system relating to its low levels o f protectionism in its external trade and low level o f 
government intervention in its domestic economy. As Table 5-1 displays, Jamaica 
maintains a predominantly white evaluation in its societal boundaries established between 
public office and private interests. These conditions lead to the prediction o f Jamaican 
political corruption patterns occurring in the area between systemic and institutional—  
corresponding to the TI 1999 rating o f 3.8. Thus, this chapter’s hypothesis is supported 
by the above analysis and dem onstrates that Jam aica’s institutions associated with the 
causes o f political corruption are constructed primarily o f instruction or directive rules, or 
combinations o f both.
Dominant Social Rules Instruction Directive Comm itment
Forms o f  Societal Rule Hegem ony 1— S M  Hierarchy Heteronomy
Political Cultures C ollectivist  1______ 1 Individualistic Egalitarian
Elite Competition Constricted | 1 Oppositional Corporatist
Elite Accountability Circular Vertical Horizontal
M ass Participation Paternalistic Pluralistic Cosm opolitan
Material Resource Factors Patrimonial Statist Market
Public/Private Boundaries W hite Gray Black
Corruption Patterns System i I Institutional Incidental
Corruption Index:
JM (3 .8)
Jamaican conditions.
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This chapter provides background information as to why Jamaica came to exhibit 
an authoritarian-democratic governing system leading to the Table 5-2 institutional 
structure. The British left the newly independent Jamaica with strong boundaries 
between public office and private interests as was manifest in the honest values o f the 
native-born Jamaican civil service, the Corruption Prevention Act o f 1931, and a strong 
rule o f law. However, the British also left Jamaica with the easily corruptible 
Westminster governing framework, including a scarcity o f mature political, economic, 
and social institutions needed to make the Westminster system work properly. It took the 
Jamaican governing elite less than a decade to determine that they could manipulate the 
Westminster system toward their own private ends, resulting in the rise o f the an 
authoritarian-democratic governing system supported by a strong clientelistic system (see 
Figure 5-1).
With the Jamaican economy limited in size, even during the economic boom of 
the 1950s-1960s, the Jamaican governing elite could not have constructed the Table 5-2
institutional structure without some external resource assistance. During the early to mid- 
1970s, this resource assistance came from the international banking community in the 
way o f loans and from the US in economic and social aid programs. During the 
late 1970s, the international loans and aid largely dried up as the US resisted PNP PM 
Michael M anley’s attempts at installing a socialist economy in Jamaica. With the JLP’s 
return to power in 1980, and PM Edward Seaga’s becoming a favorite o f US President 
Ronald Reagan, the US ensured that Jamaica received an abundance o f international 
assistance— fueling the solidification o f the corrupt Jamaican state. The Jamaican 
privatization efforts during the 1980s and 1990s were another source o f extraordinary 
resources that contributed to the governing elite’s largess. Finally, in the post-Cold War 
period, with little international financial support and privatization opportunities declining, 
Jamaica’s governing elite turned to the international drug trade to provide the resources 
needed to maintain their patronage-based political systems. With few other sources o f 
extraordinary resources readily apparent, the Jamaican governing elite may have to rely 
on the drug dons for their patronage-support for some time to come.
Although this chapter’s discussion and Table 5-2 focus primarily on structural 
causes o f Jam aica’s political corruption, we cannot forget that the main responsibility for 
contemporary Jamaica’s high levels o f political corruption lies with a self-interested 
Jamaican governing elite who capitalized on opportunities to exploit the Jamaican 
masses. The Jamaican governing elite constructed the Table 5-2 institutional structure. 
Instead o f strengthening the Westminster structure they inherited from the British, as was 
their early option, the governing elite molded it to their own corrupt purposes— i.e., to
gain power and wealth. Instead of using the extraordinary resources from international 
sources for the benefit all the Jamaican masses, the governing elite used them to 
strengthen their clientelistic power structures and foster violent competition between JLP 
and PNP supporters. While it may be easy for Jamaica’s governing elite to blame their 
corruption on colonialism, US interventions, and neoliberal reforms, the real cause o f the 
corruption problems was the conscious decisions of Jamaica’s governing elite to 
manipulate their state’s political and economic development toward their own private 
interests.
Endnotes
1. The content analysis included Panton (1994), Rodrigues (1996), Mills (1997), and 
Munroe (1999b); author interviews with Jamaican journalists, politicians, and academics 
(see references); reviews o f the annual reports of the Jamaican Auditor-General (1997,
1998) and Contractor-General (1997, 1998); reading o f Caribbean Insight (1995-1999), 
the Daily Gleaner on-line (1998-1999), and Jamaica Observer on-line (1998-1999), and 
data base searches of Info-LatinoAmerica (1988-2000). There was a high correlation 
among all these sources concerning the nature of Jamaican political corruption.
2. Although the employment o f a parliamentary coalition is possible, there has never 
been coalition government in Jamaica.
3. Party members are allowed to hold both party and government positions. MPs are not 
required to live in their constituencies. There are no primaries for citizens to select 
constituency candidates.
4. For example, because their negotiations are carried on by government officials behind 
closed doors, the Jamaican public is not told what prices the state receives for its bauxite 
or coffee exports (Aub & Aub (interview), 1999b).
5. The opposition JLP did not join in the outcry over FINSAC transparency and 
accountability as several senior JLP officials, including party leader Edward Seaga, were 
also suspected of having been bailed out by FINSAC (Cargill (interview), 1999).
6. The Jamaican police’s brutal attitude has been influenced by a Suppression o f Crime 
Act dating from the 1970s, which was in force for over two decades (now repealed). This
act applied to all the areas around the capital city o f Kingston and suspended many legal 
guarantees (i.e., illegal search, privacy o f the home, need for warrants, etc.). A whole 
generation o f police officers were recruited and trained in the climate o f  this act. The 
violence this act encouraged in the police still prevails, despite the act’s repeal.
N um erous reports, including the Hirst Report by British police advisers, have criticized 
the brutal attitude o f the Jamaican police, but no reforms have been im plem ented (Aub & 
Aub (interview), 1999b).
7. This was not the first time P.J. Patterson escaped responsibility for his behavior as a 
Jamaican minister. In 1975, then PNP M inister o f Industry and Tourism Patterson 
negotiated a deal to sell 50,000 tons o f  sugar to Iran. Later it was revealed that two US 
corporations were acting as middlem en in the deal whereby Jamaica sold them  the sugar 
for US$330 per ton and it was then sold to Iran for US$1,040 per ton (a US$35.5 m illion 
profit for the US middlemen) (Cargill, 1987). Despite a media call for accountability in 
the Iran Sugar Deal, none was ever given.
Costa Rica: Democracy Manipulated
Costa Rica prides itself on being the Little Switzerland  o f the Western 
Hemisphere. Costa Rica is exceptional among Caribbean states in terms o f its admirable 
levels o f development (see Table 1-1). Most remarkable, however, is that while 
surrounded by instability and authoritarian rulers in other Central American states for the 
past 200 years, Costa Rica managed to build a stable representational democracy. In light 
o f its propitious development and strong democracy, it should be expected that Costa 
Rica experiences relatively low levels o f political corruption. This is true to a certain 
extent. On the one hand, compared to other Caribbean developing states, Costa Rica 
possesses one o f the lowest corruption ratings in the entire region (see Table 4-1). On the 
other hand, Costa Rica’s corruption ratings are much worse than those o f Switzerland or 
other strong democracies.
Transparency International (TI) assigns Costa Rica a 1999 corruption perception
index rating o f 5.1 on their scale ranging from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (no corruption)
(see Table 4-1). Placing this Costa Rican TI rating on the corruption index in Table 2-4
(the coordinates o f political corruption) leads to the following hypothesis that is tested in
this disciplined-configurative case study o f Costa Rica:
Hypothesis: Costa Rica’s coordinates o f political corruption causal factors 
(form of societal rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability, 
mass participation, market resource factors, boundaries between public and 
private) are dominated by directive rules, or near equal combinations o f 
directive rules with either instruction or commitment rules, resulting in 
institutional political corruption patterns.
This chapter investigates the above hypothesis using the framework o f my 
interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political corruption developed in Chapter 2. It 
first provides a historical survey o f institutional development in Costa Rica. Second, it 
assesses the nature o f contemporary Costa Rican political corruption patterns, including 
determining the boundaries Costa Ricans have established between their public duties and 
private interests. Third, it investigates contemporary institutional factors that cause Costa 
Rican political corruption. Finally, the chapter summarizes the interdisciplinary causes o f 
Costa Rican political corruption. This chapter demonstrates that the main cause o f 
political corruption in Costa Rica is a self-interested governing elite that, while largely 
concerned for the greater good o f the Costa Rican populace, have manipulated their 
state’s political and economic development to serve their own personal interests.
Historical Setting
Costa Rica’s modern history began with Columbus’s arrival in 1502.
Impressed with the gold decorations worn by the local Indians, Columbus christened the 
area the rich coast. Despite initial Spanish interest, it took until the 1560s for the first 
permanent Spanish settlement to be established. Exploration and settlement o f Costa 
Rica assumed a low priority once the Spaniards determined the gold Columbus found 
came from either inconsequential local deposits or from pre-Columbian Indian trade 
networks that linked Costa R ica’s Indians to those further north and south on today’s 
Central American isthmus. The Spaniards also discovered that there were few Costa 
Rican Indians to exploit as laborers in mining and agricultural ventures. Spanish 
settlement was also delayed by the presence o f Costa R ica’s dense coastal jungles,
debilitating tropical diseases, rugged mountains, and pockets o f Indian resistance that 
obstructed the Spaniards’ exploration o f the region. In 1561, Spanish conquistadors 
finally established permanent settlements in Costa Rica’s fertile and salubrious central 
highland valleys where the vast majority o f Costa Rican citizens reside today (see Wilson, 
1998, chap. 2; Biesanz et al., 1999, chap. 2).
The low priority the Spaniards gave Costa Rica between Colum bus’s arrival and 
initial settlement continued throughout the Spanish colonial period. Costa Rica was the 
tail-end, literally and figuratively, o f the Spanish Guatemalan captaincy-general 
encompassing today’s Southern Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. With the northern sections o f the captaincy-general 
containing more precious metal deposits and greater numbers o f exploitable Indian 
laborers, Spanish conquistadors o f higher noble rank flocked to the areas that constitute 
present-day Guatemala and El Salvador. These Spaniards eventually established the 
captaincy-general’s audiencia in today’s Guatemala City (Haring, 1947, p. 76). The more 
southern and resource poor Costa Rica was settled by Spanish conquistadors o f lower 
noble rank. Even the church officials and commoners who made their way to Costa Rica 
tended to be o f lower rank or status than those who settled Spanish lands further north. 
Costa Rica became the Cinderella province o f the Guatemalan captaincy-general— one 
that was taxed, scolded, ignored, and kept miserably poor (Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 17).
Hoping to find some means to exploit Costa R ica’s natural resources, Spaniards 
migrating to Costa Rica were forced instead to establish a settler society. Knight (1990, 
pp. 66-87) defines a settler society as one where the Europeans’ primary activities were to
recreate the institutions and relationships o f the metropolis, unlike the exploitation 
societies in the rest o f the Guatemalan captaincy-general that were primarily interested in 
profiting from the resources and peoples o f the region. Caribbean history reveals that 
settler colonies only prospered under climatic conditions similar to Europe, like those in 
Costa R ica’s central highlands (Knight, 1990, p. 76). The leaders o f settler societies 
sought to recreate the social arrangements o f the metropolis— in Costa Rica’s case the 
Spanish system o f nobles and commoners.
Settler societies were pragmatic and adapted freely to their conditions, no matter 
how much some settlers might deplore such actions (Knight, 1990, p. 86). In Costa Rica, 
a noble-commoner duality o f status and power arose— one based upon birth and the size 
o f land holdings and not upon differences in wealth or standards o f living. During most 
o f the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries, the standard o f living o f Costa Rican nobles 
was similar to that o f the general populace, as both noble and commoner alike were 
forced to work the land simply to survive (Wilson, 1998, p. 11). In 1719, the local 
governor o f Costa Rica complained in writing to the Spanish crown about the miserable 
local conditions as even “he had to undergo the humility o f tilling the land to feed his 
family” (Stone, 1990, p. 17). Many trace the roots o f modern Costa Rican institutions to 
the harsh conditions faced by those who built the settler society.
Costa Ricans take pride in explaining their state’s present-day political, economic, 
and cultural exceptionalism as the result o f societal values that emerged from a culture o f 
rural democracy that took root in the colonial period. Rural democracy is said to result 
from the mix o f individualistic and egalitarian values that sprang from Costa R ica’s small
farmer society. Unlike in the northern parts o f the Guatemalan captaincy-general
dominated by large noble-owned haciendas, colonial Costa Rica displayed a patchwork o f
small isolated farms worked by Spanish and creole commoners. The idealized history of
rural democracy, today part o f the Costa Rican psyche, can be seen in a passage from a
school text widely used in Costa Rica:
[Each farm was] a small world in which the family was bom  and raised far from 
other farms. Their simple life, without ambitions and desires, gave the 
inhabitants a rude, mistrustful, very individualistic character. They were 
without exception peasants who had to till the soil for their food: as a result 
Costa Rica became a rural democracy. Unlike other Spanish colonies, Costa 
Rica had no social classes or castes, no despotic functionaries who looked down 
on others, no powerful creoles owning land and slaves and hating the Spaniards, 
no oppressed mestizo class resentful o f the maltreatment and scom o f the 
creoles. (Monge, 1976, p. 192; quoted in Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 19)
M odem scholars studying Costa Rica have shown rural democracy to be more 
myth than reality (see Stone, 1990; Booth, 1998; Wilson, 1998). Colonial and post­
independence Costa Rica was far from a classless, stable, and democratic society. Like 
most myths, however, there is some tm th to it. Colonial Costa Rica experienced few o f 
the societal tensions that arose in other Caribbean colonies. The encomienda system o f 
abusing Indian labor lasted only briefly in the early years o f the Costa Rican colony, with 
at most a few hundred Indians employed by Spanish masters (Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 18). 
There was also little exploitation o f African slaves. At its peak, no more than 200 
African slaves were ever present in colonial Costa Rica (Biesanz et al., 1999, 18). With 
few Indians and Africans to intermarry with the Spanish settlers, the colonial Costa Rican 
populace remained more racially homogeneous (white) than most other Spanish colonies.
Contrary to the rural democracy thesis, there were class differences among Costa 
R ica’s settlers. Nobles descending from the Spanish conquistadors claimed the largest 
tracts o f land and constituted an upper class. With the few middle class professionals 
present in the colony, i.e., merchants, doctors, etc., the upper class, along with Spanish 
colonial officials, formed a governing elite that wielded political power. The large mass 
o f small farmers had no say in colonial government, just as the commoner had no say in 
the governance o f Spain. Unlike in most other Spanish colonies, major rifts did not arise 
between the Costa Rican governing class and lower class small farmers. The fight for 
daily survival, engaged in equally by all Costa Rican classes, drew the population 
together, fostering societal values o f cooperation and brotherhood (Wilson, 1998, p. 12). 
This is seen even today where Costa Ricans affectionately refer to themselves and other 
countrymen as part o f one large family o f hermanitos (little brothers), locally shortened to 
Ticos.
Societal cooperation that developed during the colonial period was a boon to the 
start-up o f Costa R ica’s nineteenth century coffee industry. From its earliest days as a 
colony, the Costa Rican upper class searched for a profitable export crop that would 
generate wealth similar to that flowing into the northern parts o f the Guatemalan 
captaincy-general from their exploitative mining and agricultural ventures. Cattle 
ranching and cacao exports brought limited prosperity to a few large Costa Rican 
landowners, but it was not until coffee was developed as an export product that Costa 
Rica found its first consistent source o f wealth.
Coffee trees were introduced into Costa Rica as early as 1740, but were seen as 
more o f  a novelty as most Costa Ricans drank mainly cacao and sugar drinks (Booth, 
1998, p. 36). By the 1820s, spurred by increasing European demands for coffee, Costa 
Rica developed coffee into a full-fledged export industry. The Costa Rican central 
highlands provide the perfect climate and fertile volcanic soil for growing high quality 
coffee. The Costa Rican economic and social structure that supported the emerging 
coffee industry grew from the colonial Tico relationships. Costa R ica’s small farmers 
could easily grow and pick their own coffee, but needed money to finance their crops, 
mills to remove the coffee bean husks, and the means to transport the coffee to Costa 
Rica’s Pacific Coast seaports. The large landowners, on the other hand, needed workers 
to help tend and pick their larger coffee crops.
A mutual dependence, if  not partnership, arose among the small and large early 
nineteenth century landowners.1 The large landowners financed the small farmers’ crops, 
built coffee mills (beneficios), provided the mules and wagons to transport the crops, and, 
from their position as the governing elite, employed the Costa Rican state to provide the 
roads and port infrastructures needed to facilitate the coffee industry. The small farmers 
provided the large landowners both excess labor and the crops from their own coffee 
harvests, which together ensured the quantity o f coffee the large landowners needed to 
make their coffee businesses profitable. The new wealth the coffee industry provided the 
Costa Rican upper class cafetaleros changed the landscape of Costa Rican politics and 
economics.
Costa Rica obtained its independence from Spain in 1821, almost simultaneously 
with the emergence o f the coffee industry. Being the tail end o f the Guatemalan 
captaincy-general, and having played virtually no role in the revolutionary struggle, it 
took Costa Rica almost a month to even learn o f its freedom from Spain. Over the next 
two decades, Costa Rica was little more than a spectator as various northern creole 
caudillos fought among themselves to gain power and unite the former Guatemalan 
captaincy-general as the Central American Federation (CAF). Costa Rica abandoned the 
CAF in 1838 and became an autonomous state. During these first two decades o f 
independence under the CAF, the upper class cafetaleros became increasingly wealthy 
and assumed total political, economic, and military control over Costa Rica (see Stone, 
1990). Infighting among the cafetaleros led to over a century o f political instability in 
Costa Rica, far from the democratic and peaceful times that the rural democracy thesis 
offers.
During the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, similar to other Central 
American states, Costa Rica was engulfed in a wave o f political instability. Costa R ica’s 
governing elite, like those in other former Spanish colonies, adopted a republican form o f 
government with a presidential system similar to that o f the United States. However, 
there was little agreement as to who should rule Costa Rica. Elections were regularly 
held, but only males from the propertied upper and middle classes were allowed to vote, 
limiting suffrage to only 2-3 percent o f the Costa Rican populace. Palace political 
intrigue and political and military coups became constant elements o f the Costa Rican 
political landscape— the result o f cafetalero disputes over who should brandish political
power. Political parties that first formed in the late nineteenth century were based on 
personalistic cliques that supported one powerful cafetalero over another. Costa Rica 
dates its true democracy to the 1889 elections where, for the first time since its 1821 
independence, a winning opposition presidential candidate was allowed to peacefully take 
office (Wilson, 1998, p. 22). Even this milestone did not end the cafetalero struggle for 
political power, as military coups remained a constant part o f Costa Rican politics 
through the 1920s.
Despite the sense o f  Tico brotherhood among the populace, neither colonial nor 
post-independence Costa Rica escaped the scourge o f political corruption. Costa Rica 
was designated a gobernacion (province) o f the Guatemalan captaincy-general in 1542 
and along with it came a Spanish governor and other colonial officials, many who had 
purchased their crown positions. With little Costa Rican economic activity beyond 
subsistence farming, Spanish colonial officials’ main source o f income was to either dip 
into the provincial treasury or to exploit Crown property (land grants, etc.). Local 
colonial alderman (regidores) were initially elected from the Costa Rican populace, but 
by the seventeenth century “patronage and graft [was so widespread]...[that] local 
officials came to be appointed rather than elected, and the office o f regidor usually went 
to the highest bidder” (Creedman, 1991, p. 234).
In the post-independence period, the sense o f Tico brotherhood between the 
cafetaleros and small coffee farmers only went so far. Commercial houses that were 
owned by the politically and economically powerful cafetaleros financed the small 
farmers’ coffee crops and commonly practiced usury— borrowing money from foreign
bankers and then loaning it to the small farmers at much higher interest rates (Wilson, 
1998, p. 25). The post-independence personalistic governments that arose from the 
cafetalero political power struggles were also wracked with graft and patronage. Thus, 
Costa Rica was not spared the political corruption rampant in other Spanish colonies or in 
other regional caudillo-govemed  post-independence states.
The cafetaleros, direct descendants o f the original Spanish conquistadors, wielded 
political control over Costa Rica’s government for the first 125 years after independence 
(see Stone, 1990). As the coffee industry expanded in the early 1820s, Costa R ica’s 
population was predominantly rural and totaled only 60,000 to 65,000 settlers. In the 
early years o f the coffee boom, the interests o f the upper class cafetaleros, small middle 
class (especially the merchants and coffee exporters), and lower class small farmers all 
coincided— to strive for maximum exploitation o f the coffee crop to generate wealth. 
Soon, Costa Rica, the poor colonial Cinderella province, rose to become the wealthiest 
independent state in Central America. The governing cafetaleros effectively co-opted the 
lower class by paying the small farmers a fair price for their coffee harvests and excess 
labor and by instituting a national system o f free education for all Costa Rican citizens. 
They did not, however, develop social programs— health, housing, etc.— and did little to 
protect w orkers’ rights. Over the course o f the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Costa R ica’s increasing wealth, combined with the ignoring o f social programs and 
workers’ rights by the governing elite, led to widening class distinctions and growing 
societal tensions (see Vega, 1990).
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Costa Rican societal tensions grew— the 
unintended consequences of cafetalero efforts to improve Costa Rican society and the 
coffee industry. First, improving levels o f education sparked societal tensions. The 
compulsory post-independence primary education programs instituted by the cafetaleros 
created a “citizenry ever more politically aware and desirous o f participating in elections” 
(Vega, 1990, p. 204). The base o f middle class professionals also expanded as children 
o f the governing elite, fresh from their time in European or US universities, brought a 
liberal approach to solving the problems o f rapid modernization and urbanization taking 
place in Costa Rica (Vega, 1990, p. 204). The desire for mass participation and the push 
for liberal reforms soon conflicted with the interests o f the more conservative cafetaleros. 
Second, the late nineteenth century completion o f the Atlantic Railroad created a mini­
exploitation society along Costa Rica’s Caribbean Coast. With the mini-exploitation 
society came societal tensions common to other Caribbean developing states.
Prior to the 1870s, coffee could only be shipped to Europe from Costa R ica’s 
Pacific Coast seaports, requiring a five to six month voyage around Cape Horn at the 
southern tip o f South America before reaching Europe or the US East Coast. In the 
1870s, the government began a project to build an Atlantic Railroad that would connect 
the Costa Rican central highlands with the Atlantic Coast port o f Limon. This railroad 
would cut three months off the shipping time from Costa Rica to its European and US 
markets. Unable to make significant progress on the railroad, in 1883 the Costa Rican 
government hired US railroad engineer Minor Keith to complete the project that traversed 
both the steep cliffs o f the central mountain range and the malaria infested tropical
jungles o f Costa Rica’s Atlantic Coast. With few available Costa Rican laborers, Keith 
imported Chinese, Italian, and West Indian laborers to build the Atlantic Railroad. To 
defray the railroad costs, the government awarded Keith long-term leases to 800,000 
acres along the railroad’s coastal right o f way. Keith later used this coastal land grant to 
establish Costa Rica’s banana industry. Under the control o f the Boston-based United 
Fruit Company, bananas soon became Costa Rica’s second most important export crop 
after coffee (Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 24).
With the banana industry came increasing societal pressures. First, to finance the 
railroad, the Costa Rican government went deep into debt with British and other foreign 
bankers. Paying this debt placed major constraints on Costa Rican government budgets. 
Second, many o f the Chinese and West Indian railroad laborers remained in Costa Rica, 
and many more West Indians, mainly from Jamaica, were brought in to work in the new 
banana industry. Costa Rican labor from the central highlands showed little interest in 
working on the tropical banana plantations. This created a separate labor market, one not 
built on a sense o f Tico brotherhood as in the coffee industry, but one where the US 
industrial giant United Fruit exploited immigrant laborers. Having been co-opted by the 
ruling cafetaleros, Costa Rica’s small farm coffee growers never presented an organized 
labor threat. This was not the case with the banana laborers. Worker grievances began 
with the railroad project and banana industry and became a source o f societal tension that 
eventually led to a 1934 strike by the Communist Party led union, Bloc o f W orkers and 
Peasants— the first major labor disorder in Costa Rican history (Biesanz et al., 1999, p.
28). This strike signaled the demise o f the cafetalero monopoly on Costa Rican political 
power.
The cafetaleros did not completely relinquish their grip on Costa Rican political 
power continued until the mid-1900s when rising political, labor, and social tensions led 
to the 1948 Civil War. In 1940, Rafael Calderon, hand-picked by the cafetaleros to 
succeed President Leon Cortes (1936-1940), was elected Costa R ica’s president.
President Calderon (1940-1944) soon turned on the coffee oligarchy and began a series of 
liberal social and economic reforms that “reoriented the state as an instrument o f the 
working and middle groups “ (Rosenberg, 1981, p. 279). Allying with the Catholic 
Church and the Communist Party, Calderon introduced reforms that included a social 
security program, an eight-hour workday, a minimum wage, and workers’ rights to 
organize (Wilson, 1998, p. 31). Calderon’s enlightened elite approach to social 
legislation was consistent with his view that enacting social reform was the best method 
to prevent later societal conflict (Wilson, 1998, p. 31). Calderon’s social and economic 
reforms continued throughout the presidency o f his successor Teodoro Picado (1944- 
1948), considered a puppet o f Calderon who was prevented by the Costa Rican 
Constitution from succeeding himself. In 1948, Calderon ran again for the presidency 
and lost to moderate-conservative candidate Otilio Ulate, a respected newspaper 
publisher. Calderon’s loss provided the spark that set o ff Costa R ica’s Civil War.
Costa Rican scholars still debate the exact causes o f the 1948 Civil War. Soon 
after U late’s election victory over Calderon, the Costa Rican Congress, dominated by 
Calderon supporters, cited election disparities and voted to annul the election results, the
equivalent o f a political coup. Jose “Pepe” Figueres, a social democrat who had been 
exiled from Costa Rica for speaking out against Calderon in 1942, raised an army and 
declared war on the Calderon-Picado led government. Different factions fought in the 
war for different reasons (Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 32). Calderon-Picado supporters 
thought they were fighting for continued social reforms that were best accomplished by 
returning Calderon to power. Figueres and Ulate supporters thought they were fighting 
against government corruption and communism. In the end, the disorganized and poorly 
trained Costa Rican military were no match for Figueres’s volunteer force, and, after six 
weeks o f fighting and nearly 2,000 deaths, a peace treaty was signed.
The Civil War shook the foundation of a Costa Rican society that prided itself on 
values o f consensus, tolerance, and non-violence. Two important political ramifications 
came from the war. First, the historical cafetalero hold on Costa Rican political power 
ended as the middle class assumed a larger role in Costa Rican politics. Second, the new 
Costa Rican governing elite, led ostensibly by Figueres, was forced to regroup and devise 
a governing structure that could regulate elite conflict and prevent another bloody Civil 
War.
The elite pact emerging from the Costa Rican Civil War established the political 
structure that remains in place today. At the end o f the war, Figueres was installed as the 
head (president) o f a ruling junta. He immediately called national elections to pick a 
Constituent Assembly to write a new Costa Rican Constitution. Three-quarters o f the 
elected Constituent Assembly members turned out to be moderate-conservative 
supporters o f  Ulate. The Assembly rejected a draft constitution presented by Figueres
and his social democratic supporters. Instead, they used Costa Rica’s 1871 Constitution, 
combined it with social reforms instituted under Presidents Calderon and Picado, and 
then added several reforms o f their own.
The Constituent Assembly maintained the four-year terms for elected officials and 
the prohibition on the immediate re-election o f presidents or diputados (legislators).
They provided for a strong governmental balance o f power. The new constitution 
formalized many o f Calderon and Picado’s social and economic reforms. The assembly 
also initiated universal suffrage for those over 20 years old— women had been denied the 
vote before 1949. (A later amendment lowered the voting age to 18 years.) They 
formalized the autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that organizes and directs 
all elections, another Calderon-Picado initiative. The assembly instituted a professional 
civil service to replace the corrupt patronage system used to fill government positions. 
They also created, following the Uruguayan government model, autonomous government 
institutions to resolve Costa Rica’s technical, economic, and social problems (Vega,
1990, p. 208). Most significantly, the assembly disbanded the Costa Rican armed 
forces— forever removing a historical source o f instability from the Costa Rican political 
scene. Costa Rica became the only state in Central America without a standing military. 
After the 1949 ratification o f the new Constitution, Figueres’s ruling junta returned the 
presidency to the previously elected Ulate to serve a four-year term (1949-1953).
From the beginning o f the 1950s to the mid-1970s, Costa Rica experienced a 
period o f peace and prosperity. The 1949 Constitution provided a commendable 
blueprint for sharing political power. Figueres, founder o f the new National Liberation
Party (PLN), replaced Ulate as elected president in 1953. Then in 1958, the PLN 
opposition party, Union Nacional, won the national elections and took office without 
incident, revealing both the TSE’s effectiveness and the PLN’s (Figueres’s) commitment 
to democratic processes. Since 1958, there have been regular peaceful turnovers o f 
power between the PLN and its opposition. Economically, strong world market demands 
for Costa Rica’s coffee and banana crops and the emergence o f a tourism industry fueled 
economic prosperity. Costa Rica’s economy grew at a phenomenal rate during the 1950s 
to mid-1970s— including a more than doubling (from US$400 to US$900-in 1970 prices) 
o f per capita gross domestic product (Wilson, 1998, p. 82).
Using the proceeds o f their economic boom, successive Costa Rican governments 
(both PLN and opposition) worked to install and strengthen an extensive social 
democratic system. The Costa Rican state played the major role in economic planning as 
it upgraded economic infrastructure (roads, ports, etc.,) and, through the autonomous 
institutions, assumed ownership o f most state services (electricity, telephone, etc.) and 
many basic commodities (food, alcohol, cement, etc.). Costa Rica implemented an 
import-substitution industrialization model that protected domestic producers. Most 
importantly for working and lower class standards of living, Costa Rica developed into a 
strong benefactor (welfare) state that improved education and health services, subsidized 
basic commodities and housing, and kept real wages on the rise. The legacy o f Tico 
brotherhood, the 1949 elite constitutional pact, and the rise o f the benefactor state, 
resulted in a Costa Rica that today leads most o f the Caribbean in political, economic, and
social statistics (see Table 1-1). Propitious Costa Rican development did not, however, 
prevent the emergence o f moderate levels of political corruption.
Assessing Contemporary Costa Rican Political Corruption
TI’s 1999 corruption perception index (CPI) rating o f Costa Rica at 5.1 (on a scale 
o f 0 to 10) drew local reactions far different from those in other Caribbean states. The 
immediate reaction o f most regional states with far worse TI CPI ratings than Costa 
Rica’s was to attack TI’s credibility. In Costa Rica a more cosmopolitan reaction 
occurred. First, the head o f TI’s Costa Rican chapter was asked in the press to explain the 
methodology o f the ratings and their general meanings. Second, government officials, 
including those that head government watchdog agencies, responded that the TI CPI 
rating “coincided closely with the perception o f Costa Rican citizens” and “provided 
evidence to the international community o f the [Costa Rican] national problem with 
corruption” (Villalobos, 1999c, p. 5A). Costa Ricans generally agree that there is both a 
serious problem with political corruption and a need to address the problem.
Costa Rican citizens are candid about their corruption problems. In a 1989 survey 
that asked whether “corruption penetrates all the powers [executive, legislative, judicial] 
o f the Republic,” 64 percent responded yes. When the same survey question was asked in 
1993, 72 percent responded yes, an indication that citizens perceived corruption as 
increasing {Proyecto Estado de la Nacion , 1996, p. 152). This was reconfirmed in 1997, 
when Costa Ricans were asked whether there was more corruption now than 10 years ago 
and 85.7 percent responded yes (Barometro Centroamericano, 1997). In a 1997 survey, 
Costa Ricans who said their country was not democratic gave the existence o f corruption
as the principal reason (Rodriguez et al., 1998, p. 297). In the last two decades o f Costa 
Rican public opinion polls by CID-Gallup, corruption became a factor mentioned as a 
Costa Rican societal problem only in the 1990s (CID-Gallup, 1980-1999). This new 
corruption awareness largely grew in the aftermath o f severe economic recessions that 
racked Costa Rica in the 1980s and out of renewed post-Cold W ar international interest 
in corruption. During the 1990s, public opinion polls consistently placed corruption 
among Costa Rican society’s four or five most serious problems, along with the cost of 
living, drug trafficking, crime and violence, and loss o f societal values (CID-Gallup, 
1980-1999).
Political corruption is far from a recent Costa Rican problem. Charges o f 
corruption were one o f the reasons that Figueres gave for declaring war on the 
government in 1948. During Presidents Calderon (1940-1944) and Picado’s (1944-1948) 
administrations, their enemies created an image o f government officials “as depraved 
self-seekers who sought public office manly to enrich themselves at the expense o f the 
nation” (Bell, 1971, p. 63). While corruption was not the equal o f other major issues 
leading to the Civil War, it was o f sufficient importance that it helped lower the public’s 
confidence in government (Bell, 1971, p. 62).
Corruption did not end with the Civil War. Stone (1990, pp. 125-129) documents 
a continual string o f political corruption affairs beginning in 1958 and continuing into the 
1980s that involved the top echelons o f the Costa Rican government. This included, 
among several other affairs, the suspicious personal relationship between President 
Figueres and US fugitive financier Robert Vesco in the early 1970s and a reported theft o f
US$10 million from the National Emergency Fund during the administration o f President 
Luis Monge (1982-1986).
The administration o f President Jose Maria Figueres (1994-1998), Pepe Figueres’s
son, was also marred by a string o f corruption affairs (Latin America Institute, 1997). In
summarizing the problems o f corruption that surfaced in the 1980s and continued into the
1990s, Stone (1990) concludes:
These incidents have shaken national society to its bones and lead to 
questioning the legitimacy o f the political system. Costa Rica has known 
corruption in the past....Today, however, illegal activity is so frequent that in 
spite o f the huge quantities o f money involved, the ruling class and the populace 
take it for granted....Giving and receiving bribes becomes increasingly a way o f 
getting around cumbersome requirements. Members o f the ruling class set 
examples for other social categories and promote corruption. (Stone, 1990, pp. 
127-128)
Table 6-1, developed from a content analysis, characterizes the current incidence
'y
and evaluation o f Costa Rica’s political corruption problems. Table 6-1 correlates 
closely with the 1999 TI CPI 5.1 rating o f Costa Rica. The content analysis o f Costa 
Rican political corruption reveals a governing elite that regularly engages in acts o f 
political corruption, however, they do so in a strategic manner so as to avoid having 
members o f the elite and/or masses (predominantly gray evaluation) condemn their 
behavior if  it becomes public knowledge.
The content analysis reveals that not all Costa Rican government institutions are 
corrupt. Those dealing with state-owned resources or handling public moneys— e.g., 
Ministry o f Public Works and Transport, Costa Rican customs, and autonomous 
institutions administering public housing, social security, and pension funds— are steeped 
in corruption. Government institutions that do not handle large amounts o f state-owned
resources or public moneys, such as the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, experience very little
if  any corruption.
Table 6-1. The Incidence and Evaluation of
Costa Rican Political Corruption Behavior
111pes of Political Corruption Behavior Incidence Evaluation
1. Governing elite deviate from the rules for
the benefit of friends or supporters. SOP W
2. Large gifts, or other benefits, accepted by 
governing elite for private gain. SOP W
3. Unregulated campaign contributions 
solicited and accepted by governing elite. SOP W
4. Nepotism or political cronyism in govern­
ment appointments and contract awarding. FI G
5. Governing elite profit from state decisions 
through sideline occupations or kickbacks. FI G
6. Citizens compensate governing elite for 
advancing administrative due process. OI G
7. Governing elite tolerate or cooperate with 
organized crime for private gain. 01 G
8. Governing elite ignore convincing proof of 
political corruption. 01 G
9. Governing elite misuse state resources 
(land, property, etc.) for private gain. 01 B
10. Governing elite misuse state treasury for 
private gain. OO B
^  ~  ~    o  * v    5 *  *  - — i  —  
01 = Occasional Incidence; 0 0  = Rare Incidence, Without Regular Pattern.
W = White Corruption Boundaries, G = Gray Corruption Boundaries;
B = Black Corruption Boundaries.
Source: Content Analysis (see Endnote 2).
As described by several knowledgeable Costa Rican citizens, Costa Rican elite 
and masses take corruption as a part o f everyday life and overlook corrupt behavior that 
involves one-on-one informal contract exchanges (bribes, speed money, etc.) between 
government officials and private citizens. On the other hand, the Costa Rican elite and 
masses are not tolerant o f corruption when the corrupt behavior: (1) affects the ability o f a
government institution to function properly, or (2) results in the accumulation o f excess 
wealth with no visible contract or reasonable explanation (Carazo (interview), 1999; 
Hidalgo (interview), 1999; Vargas (interview), 1999). Thus, the Costa Rican governing 
elite must conceal their corrupt behaviors so as not to breach the threshold that will 
energize elite or mass condemnation.
The Table 6-1 behaviors persist in present day Costa Rica in spite o f a number of 
anti-corruption laws and regulations. Costa Rica’s 1949 Constitution mandates that the 
president, government ministers, and managers o f government funds, must declare their 
assets annually. The Costa Rican penal code also lists a variety o f corruption offenses 
which public employees may be charged with, including the abuse o f authority, receipt o f 
bribes, illicit enrichment, and aggravated or judicial corruption. The penal code offense 
o f illicit enrichment, however, was declared unconstitutional in 1995 because, as written, 
it places the burden o f proof on the defendant and not the state (Umana, 1995). A 1998 
independent review o f Costa Rica’s anti-corruption measures found that while there were 
established standards o f official conduct, asset disclosure rules, and anti-corruption 
oversight bodies, Costa Rica was missing: (1) a resolution to the constitutional problem 
surrounding illicit enrichment, (2) rules mandating the denouncement o f subordinates 
caught in illegal acts by superiors, (3) a system o f witness immunity to facilitate 
corruption prosecutions, and (4) rules prohibiting nepotism and political cronyism 
(University o f Texas at Austin, 1998). Also in 1998, to re-emphasize the standards o f 
conduct for executive branch officials, President Miguel Rodriguez issued a directive
further prohibiting conflicts o f interest and other measures that could be construed as 
corrupt (Rodriguez Echeverria, 1998).
Despite the formal structure o f rules mandating that Costa Rican officials separate
their public business from their private interests, political corruption continues as a
serious societal problem. Costa Rica’s governing elite continue to selectively enrich
themselves through their access to public resources. La Nacion columnist Julio
Rodriguez captured the essence o f the corruption problem when he wrote:
There it [corruption] is, serpentine, encrusted in the convolutions o f public 
administration and the private sector. Its power is colossal. It mobilizes 
dormant desires, stalled procedures, productive projects. It is the lubricant o f 
the system, to the point where the honorable citizen, if  he does not play the 
game, loses out (Rodriquez, 1993, as quoted in Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 83).
Explaining Costa Rican Political Corruption
There are only a handful o f studies addressing the causes o f Costa Rican political 
corruption. Those authors speculating on its causes usually point to the 1970s as the 
beginning o f Costa R ica’s contemporary problems with political corruption. Those 
taking a moralist position see Costa Rica’s corruption problems as starting with the third 
administration o f President Pepe Figueres (1970-1974) whose supporters began a 
systematic pillage o f state resources and fostered Costa Rica’s reputation as a safe-haven 
for international criminals such as financier Robert Vesco (see Sunol, 1974, 1977; Araya 
et al., 1982). Others see corruption as a result o f the loss o f Costa Rican societal values 
(Comision Nacional de Rescate y Formacion de Valores, 1992). Still others trace 
contemporary corruption problems to the rise o f the Costa Rican entrepreneurial state
and the emergence o f societal values o f self-interested consumerism (see Araya et al., 
1982; Corrales, 1999).
The Costa Rican entrepreneurial state solidified in the 1970s. During the 1950s
and 1960s, Costa Rica established an increasing number o f autonomous institutions (AIs)
that heightened state intervention in the economy and expanded social programs as part o f
the benefactor state (Wilson, 1998, pp. 99-103). This effort to involve the state in Costa
Rican economic and social affairs was lead by social democratic PLN governments
(1953-1958, 1962-1966, 1970-1974, 1974-1978) and continued by the more conservative
PLN-opposition governments (1958-1962, 1966-1970, 1978-1982). With the burgeoning
number and size o f AIs, came attempts to centralize their control in the Costa Rican
executive (Wilson, 1998, p. 102). The result was a bloated government bureaucracy with
an executive branch having near monopoly control o f Costa Rican economic and social
welfare programs— the perfect environment for widespread rent seeking (see Corrales,
1999). Costa Rican citizens raised little resistance to the increasing level o f state
economic involvement and control as they were delighted by the state’s stable democracy,
booming economy, and increasing standards o f living. By the mid to late 1970s,
however, the rise o f Costa Rica’s entrepreneurial state led to increasing levels o f political
corruption. One Costa Rican scholar laments:
In Costa Rica, in the 1970s,...we see the ultimate mix: politics, paternalism, 
centralism, consumerism, and dependent business. The result has been 
corruption that affects our entire political apparatus. Many [PLN supporters] 
did not intend for this situation to happen...the ideology that guided the country 
so well for years went up in smoke and was carried away by the wind (Araya, 
1991, p. 56; author’s translation).
The causes o f Costa Rica’s political corruption are more complex than just the 
rise o f  the entrepreneurial state. Beginning in the 1970s, the monopolistic hold the Costa 
Rican state held over economic and social programs contributed to increased levels o f 
political corruption. Just as important, however, was the lack o f elite accountability that 
emerged from the political structures that trace their roots to the 1949 Constitution. What 
arose in Costa Rica after 1949 was an opportunistic governing elite-controlled political 
and economic system that was maximized for rent seeking. This chapter now investigates 
this rent seeking structure.
Form of Rule. On paper, and to a lesser extent in operation, the Costa Rican government 
structure presents one o f the best-developed presidential systems in the world. It allows 
for strong democratic checks and balances, not only among the three traditional branches 
(powers in Costa Rican parlance) o f democratic government— executive, legislature, 
judiciary— but also with the autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) that is 
considered a fourth branch o f government. The governmental system has a mix o f 
hierarchical and heteronomous characteristics (see Chapter 2). The government structure 
is partly hierarchical because o f its extreme legalistic nature. It is also partly 
heteronomous because the roles and responsibilities o f each branch o f government are 
clear and respected by not only other branches o f government but also by the Costa Rican 
population. The government structure accepts the legitimacy o f opposition views and 
reaches most major decisions through a consensus process. Popular support for the Costa 
Rican government structure is among the strongest o f all regional states (see Rodriguez et
al., 1998). To understand the roles and duties established in the Costa Rican governing 
system requires a description o f the evolution o f its core institutions.
One goal o f the 1949 Constitutional Constituent Assembly was to restrict the 
power o f the executive. Costa Rican political values include a strong societal distrust for 
the concentration o f power in one person or branch o f government. Such concentrations 
o f power were believed responsible for the instability in Costa Rican politics from 1821 
to the 1948 Civil War. The 1949 Constituent Assembly kept the 1871 Constitution’s 
prohibition against presidents succeeding themselves— but they could run for future 
terms. (A subsequent 1969 constitutional amendment limited presidents to a single term.) 
Presidents are elected every four years in national elections. Presidents select their own 
cabinets, without legislative approval, and maintain oversight o f  the almost 200 AIs. 
Costa Rican presidents oversee each o f the AIs through their appointment o f the Al 
executive president and the majority (four) o f Al directors (three directors are selected by 
the second largest party in the legislature— or the first largest if  the president is not from 
the largest legislative party). The Al executive president and directors report directly to 
the president.
The Costa Rican executive can submit legislation for consideration and can veto 
acts passed by the legislature, except the annual budget act that only requires the 
legislature’s approval. Like many other Latin American presidential systems, the 
president can bypass the legislature and issue executive decrees (legislate by decree). 
Unlike many other Latin American presidential systems, the president cannot issue 
decrees unilaterally, but must do so in conjunction with the minister responsible for the
issue area the decree addresses. Costa Rican presidents are very resolute about using the 
decree power to avoid charges o f abuse o f power from the legislature, media, or public 
(Solis (interview), 1999b).
The 1949 Costa Rican Constitution designates the legislature (Congress) as the 
supreme power in the land. The legislature is unicameral and consists o f 57 diputados 
(legislators) elected from seven geographic districts simultaneously with the president. 
Legislators cannot succeed themselves, but can be elected for multiple terms as long as 
they sit out four years between terms. The legislature can impeach the president, but only 
censure government ministers. The legislature also has no disciplinary power over sitting 
Supreme Court or lower court judges.
The judicial branch consists o f the Supreme Court and lesser courts. The 
autonomous judicial system has a Constitutional mandate to receive six percent o f the 
annual government budget. Twenty-two Supreme Court justices are elected by the 
legislature for eight-year terms (with an all but automatic re-election to a second term). 
The Supreme Court elects judges to the lesser courts. The Supreme Court has 
disciplinary power over its own and lower court judges. The Supreme Court apportions 
its work among four sections (Salas) with individual justices rotating among the Salas. 
Sala  IV provides judicial constitutional review. Since 1949, Costa Rica has had the 
power o f judicial constitutional review. However, starting with its creation in 1989, the 
separate Sala  IV Constitutional Court has become a more active player in the Costa Rican 
governmental system o f checks and balances. Differing from most presidential systems 
with judicial review, Costa Rica’s Sala IV is a regular part o f the legislative process,
ruling on the constitutionality o f legislative projects and presidential decrees while they 
are still in the drafting and staffing stages. Sala IV also rules on thousands o f citizen 
complaints brought before it each year. In its short existence, Sala IV has become one o f 
the most respected Costa Rican government institutions.
The autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) consists o f three magistrates 
and six alternates appointed by the Supreme Court. The TSE is responsible for Costa 
R ica’s reputation o f having some o f the most free and fair elections in the entire 
hemisphere. The TSE oversees the political parties and the course o f electoral 
campaigns, including the allocation o f state campaign funds authorized for political 
parties. The TSE provides judicial review and interpretation o f all electoral legislation. It 
also directs and manages the entire quadrennial national election process, including the 
counting o f votes and verification o f election results. The TSE also acts as the state’s 
official recorder, registering births, deaths, marriages, and divorces. At birth, every Costa 
Rican citizen is assigned a single identification number (cedula) that follows them 
through their entire lives, e.g., bank account number, social security number, voter 
registration number, passport number, etc., all in one. On turning 18 years of age, all 
Costa Rican citizens are automatically registered to vote.
The Costa Rican governing system works well to control the abuse o f power, but 
is not without its problems. First, despite restrictions on executive power, the system 
remains strongly presidential— due mainly to the president’s control over the large 
executive bureaucracy, including the AIs (Urcuyo, 1999, pp. 168-170). Due to their 
inability to gain legislative subject matter expertise, because o f a combination o f their
short terms in office and small personal and committee staffs, legislators are often at the 
mercy o f the executive branch bureaucracy for drafting legislation, especially highly 
technical legislation. This results in over half o f all proposed legislation being submitted 
by the executive (.Proyecto de la Nacion , 1999, p. 250).
A second problem with the Costa Rican governing system concerns the weak 
political party discipline the Costa Rican system fosters. Even when a president’s 
political party has a majority in the legislature, there is no guarantee that the president’s 
legislative agenda will be successful. This is an unintended consequence o f the rules that 
do not allow either presidents or legislators to succeed themselves. Instead o f supporting 
a lame duck president, who can do them few future political favors, legislators o f the 
president’s political party regularly ally with the candidate they believe will be successful 
as their party’s next presidential candidate. The incentive for legislators to abandon their 
party’s setting president concerns the fact that if the next presidential candidate is elected, 
he/she will be in a position to appoint the then ex-legislator to a ministerial or Al 
position— thus continuing their career in Costa Rican politics. This often causes the best 
interests o f the Costa Rican people to get lost in the process o f legislators maneuvering 
for what is best for their future political careers. The weak party discipline this situation 
promotes means that on every major legislative issue the executive branch must work to 
muster the needed legislative votes. This often stresses even the Tico capacity for 
consensus and cooperation. It also makes the legislative process slow and laborious, 
especially if  a controversial issue is being addressed. Despite these flaws, the Costa
Rican presidential system contains strong checks and balances against the abuse o f 
political power.
Political Culture. Costa R ica’s political culture is strongly individualistic. Costa Rican 
citizens tend to be conservative, cautious, and formalistic. M ost o f all, they are very 
individualistic in their outlook toward not only political affairs but also life in general. 
Costa Ricans greatly value individual liberty (Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 9). W hile generally 
averse to forming associations and collectives, Costa Ricans recognize the value o f 
political and economic participation to advance their self-interests. Costa Rica 
consistently posts some o f the highest voter turnouts in the region. Costa Ricans also 
tend to be extremely legalistic; constantly passing laws, creating institutions, and holding 
meetings to solve problems— if not concretely then at least symbolically (Biesanz et al., 
1999, p. 10). In explaining or justifying their behavior, Costa Ricans invariably tie their 
actions to a legal document o f one form or another. Large sections o f books containing 
legal codes and government regulations are found in even the smallest bookstores in the 
capital city o f  San Jose. Costa Ricans are constantly trying to work the government 
system, both formally through the hierarchy o f state bureaucracy and informally through 
the influence o f personal contacts in high places, to advance their political, economic, and 
social self-interests (Solis (interview), 1999b).
One paradox in Costa R ica’s individualistic political culture is their reliance on 
the state. Despite their individualistic natures, Costa Rican citizens have developed a 
dependent relationship with the Costa Rican benefactor state. Costa Ricans rely on the 
state for alm ost everything from employment; to direct benefits such as health care,
education, and pensions; to government subsides on food and gasoline; to basic services 
such as housing, electricity, and telephones. The state provides employment in two 
primary ways. First, the swollen state bureaucracy, especially the AIs, provides one-tenth 
o f all employment. As most o f these jobs are part o f a professional civil service, citizens 
are not subjected to the political patronage o f a ruling party (the president’s party) to 
ensure their government employment. Political patronage (spoils) does, however, play a 
role in the staffing o f the 9,500 person national police (substantially replaced with each 
change in the ruling government party) and in some jobs requiring state licenses, e.g., 
taxis, etc., where the influence o f an elected or appointed government position is 
important in securing license approval. Second, because o f the state’s dominate role in 
economic planning, Costa Rican citizens rely on the state to establish economic 
conditions that lead to employment opportunities. As a taxi driver told the author “Ticos 
will vote for whichever party they think will provide them work.”
Costa Ricans place extremely high trust in their democratic state institutions. 
Contrary to the situation in many developing states, Costa Ricans expect their formal 
state institutions to work (Vargas (interview), 1999). This helps explain why there is both 
mass and governing elite condemnation o f political corruption behaviors (per Table 6-1) 
that affect the functioning o f state institutions. It also helps explain the extremely high 
utilization o f and high trust in state watchdog agencies, including the Contralaria 
General (state comptroller), Defensoria (ombudsman), and the Supreme Court Sala IV, 
that are responsible for overseeing state institutions. The strong confidence Costa Ricans
place in their democratic institutions does not, however, extend to their political parties or 
to individual government officials.
As the result o f the decline in the standard o f living during the 1980s and 1990s, 
Costa Rican citizens are generally frustrated with their politicians. The oil shocks o f the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, combined with the world debt crisis o f the 1980s, arrested the 
almost three decade Costa Rican economic boom which began in the 1950s. During the 
1950s to 1970s, Costa Rican governments borrowed heavily to fuel the rise o f their 
benefactor state. Borrowing, combined with the economic boom after the 1948 Civil 
War, resulted in an ever-expanding pie  o f Costa Rican material resources. The cost o f oil 
after the mid-1970s (Costa Rica has no domestic oil production), restrictions on 
developing state loans after the 1980s world debt crisis, and the dwindling o f US 
economic aid programs after the end o f the Cold War (especially after the end o f Central 
American conflicts outside Costa Rica), all combined to shrink the Costa Rican material 
pie (Vargas (interview), 1999). The result was a flattening o f economic growth in the 
1980s and 1990s and a scaling back in the amount o f social benefits the benefactor state 
could provide individual citizens— thus lowering overall standards o f living.
Remembering the good times o f the 1950s to early 1970s, Costa Rican citizens 
became frustrated at the inability o f the current political parties and politicians to provide 
the same standards o f living. This frustration is seen in citizen opinion surveys. In a 
1997 poll, 59.1 percent o f respondents indicated that the Costa Rican political parties 
provided little or no representation o f citizen interests and aspirations. The same poll 
found high percentages o f either little or no citizen confidence in government personnel,
including civil servants (67.4 percent), judges (53.9 percent), and legislators (71.4 
percent) (Rodriguez et al., 1998, p. 307). The polls also show that citizen confidence in 
the government has decreased steadily over the course o f the 1990s (Rodriguez et al., 
1998; CID-Gallup, 1980-1999). This lack o f citizen confidence in government is 
consistent with the Costa Rican political culture steeped in individualistic self-interest.
Elite Competition. Costa Rican elite competition presents a mix o f constricted and 
oppositional characteristics (per Chapter 2). The constriction results from the fact that, in 
spite o f the facade o f Costa Rica’s two major competitive political parties and several 
smaller ones, there is really only one Costa Rican governing elite. The majority o f elite 
members from all parties grow up in the same neighborhoods, attend the same schools 
and universities, belong to the same social clubs, and marry within the same small circle 
o f elite families (Solis (interview), 1999b). Despite efforts to establish a difference in 
ideologies between the liberal PLN and its major rival the conservative Social Christian 
Unity Party (PUSC), both parties are populist, centrist, and, due to the consensus nature 
o f Costa Rican politics, tend to follow the same general policy agendas when in office. 
Political competition, while presenting an illusion o f vigor, is restricted to a relatively 
small circle o f  governing elite and becomes no more than a friendly game between friends 
with little real competition over ideas or issues occurring.
The existence o f the small circle o f Costa Rican governing elite can be seen in 
President Oscar A rias’s (1986-1990) 1976 doctoral thesis, Who Governs in Costa Rica. 
Arias investigated which social classes actually held Costa Rican government positions. 
He found that “in the majority, formal leaders belonged, since 1948, to the upper class
when they entered the executive or legislative branches for the first time” (Arias, 1976, p. 
241; author’s translation). Surprisingly, even with the 1948 Civil War ending the 
cafetalero grip on Costa Rican political power, Arias determined that the percentages of 
upper and middle class legislators did not substantially change from the 1920s through 
1970s. He further discovered the Costa Rican executive has always been the province of 
the upper class, with only limited middle class participation. The Costa Rican legislature, 
on the other hand, was much more open to the middle class, but remained closed to the 
lower classes (Arias, 1976, p. 242). Stone (1990) took Arias’s study a step further and 
revealed that a substantial number o f Costa Rican executives and legislators are 
descendants o f Costa R ica’s original conquistadors. Overall, the governing elite in Costa 
Rica consists o f a few thousand closely linked individuals from the upper and middle 
classes.
W ithin the small governing elite, there is substantial political openness that fuels 
the oppositional characteristics o f Costa Rica’s elite competition. The 1969 
Constitutional amendment preventing presidents from running for a second term helps 
ensure that one or two powerful individuals do not dominate Costa Rican politics. From 
the 1950s to early 1970s, Pepe Figueres and his small circle o f PLN confidants were the 
power behind Costa Rican politics. Even after stepping down from the presidency in 
1958, Figueres remained a powerful PLN official and behind-the-scenes power broker 
through the 1960s and leading up to his second full term as president (1970-1974) (the 
1969 amendment prohibiting presidential re-elections did not apply to this election). 
Today, once a Costa Rican president’s term is over, he returns to the private sector,
accepts a role as an informal senior statesman, and has only a peripheral presence in 
national politics. An ex-president’s immediate advisors either return to the private sector 
or assume other party or governmental positions. This results in continual rotation o f 
party and government leadership among the governing elite.4
Other factors also lead to an environment o f openness in the small Costa Rican 
governing elite circles. First, individuals are prohibited from holding both party and 
government positions, resulting in a larger number o f governing elite positions being 
available and providing flexibility for those frequently changing between party and 
government positions. Second, because o f Costa R ica’s moderately strong economy, 
there is sufficient employment for younger members o f the upper and middle classes not 
desiring government careers. In Costa Rica, education is seen as a path to economic and 
social betterment (Proyecto Estado de la N ation, 1996, p. 53), and the economy is 
generally able to absorb the student output from Costa Rican universities. For young 
professionals o f the upper and middle classes desiring a political career, there are entry- 
level opportunities within the party structures or within the large Costa Rican civil 
service. However, for the lower class, even those obtaining university degrees, becoming 
a member o f the small governing class is extremely difficult.
Costa Rican electoral processes, both in the selection o f legislative candidates and 
funding o f elections, also constrict elite competition, if  only slightly. The tight TSE 
control o f  national elections removes any doubt about their freedom or fairness. Internal 
elections o f the major parties are a different story. PLN and PUSC presidential 
candidates are selected through a system o f primaries and national conventions (see
Lehoucq, 1997, chap. 2). There is considerable rank-and-file participation by registered 
party members in the selection o f presidential candidates (Booth, 1998, p. 73). In electing 
legislators, however, Costa Rica employs a closed-list proportional representation system. 
The major political parties utilize a system o f primaries and conventions to select 
legislative candidates. However, the process o f determining a candidate’s exact position 
on the closed-list o f party candidates, and thus their chances o f being elected, is often 
manipulated by party insiders— restricting the public’s real say in selecting their 
representatives (Booth, 1998, p. 73). The same is true o f parties outside the PLN and 
PUSC, where insiders in party executive councils substantially determine both their 
presidential and legislative candidates (Booth, 1998, p. 73).
How Costa Rican elections are funded adds to the constricted elite competition. 
Costa Rican elections are funded by a combination o f state and private resources, a 
system that is open to political corruption. To reduce the impact o f wealthy candidates or 
parties on the electoral process, Costa Rica allots two percent o f the national budget in 
election years to support electoral campaigns. Any party receiving at least five percent of 
the presidential votes in a national election may receive a share o f the national election 
funds in the next election. Since 1949, only the PLN and its major opposition party, now 
the PUSC, have garnered sufficient votes to receive the national election funds. The 
national election funds fall far short o f supporting a major party’s overall presidential and 
legislative campaigns. Additional funds are required from private sources. There are no 
restrictions on either the receipt of private campaign funds or the total amount a party can 
spend on running a campaign. The lack o f regulation and lack o f transparency in the
administration o f private campaign funding results in a system o f political patronage 
within the governing elite.
The need for private campaign funding begins with the presidential pre­
candidates, those vying for their respective party’s presidential nomination. Some pre­
candidates start their campaigns as much as four years in advance o f national elections 
and must use either personal funds or private contributions to support their campaigns 
leading up to their respective party’s national convention. It is often beneficial for 
interest groups to contribute to pre-candidates as they frequently control large voting 
blocs o f setting legislators. The need for private campaign funding increases after the 
party national conventions as Costa Rican election campaigns have come more and more 
to resemble US elections where vast amounts o f resources are spent on extensive media 
campaigns that include significant radio and television advertising.
Costa Rican politicians rely on interest groups, both legal and illegal, to provide 
the private campaign funding. Legal interest groups supplying campaign support 
encompass wealthy business owners, powerful business associations, and labor 
organizations that provide funds in expectation o f favorable post-election considerations 
from winning candidates. As contribution sources and amounts are never published, 
some interest groups support both major parties. Because o f the open nature o f the Costa 
Rican political system, there are numerous entry points for interest groups to funnel 
campaign support. Funds may be given directly to a presidential candidate (or pre­
candidate), to candidates for the 57 legislative seats, or to the party itself. Funds may also 
be funneled to either candidates or parties through party members holding ministerial or
Al director positions. There is also a growing perception in Costa Rica that both major 
parties receive campaign-funding support from illegal drug traffickers (discussed in detail 
later). In return for campaign funding, contributors, both legal and illegal, expect 
favorable treatment by the winning candidates or party. The result is a system o f 
patronage that occurs largely within governing elite circles. The closed and non­
transparent nature o f both legal and illegal campaign funding makes it all but impossible 
to determine the exact amounts and sources o f the private contributions.
Elite Accountability. The lack o f elite accountability is a major cause o f Costa Rica’s 
political corruption problems. Elite accountability displays a mix o f vertical (within the 
government hierarchy) and circular (intra-elite) characteristics. On paper, Costa Rica 
meets almost all the answerability and enforcement measures expected o f a system with 
vertical elite accountability (see Chapter 2). On closer inspection, however, it can be seen 
that these accountability measures apply only to the Costa Rican masses, and not to the 
governing elite.
Costa R ica’s answerability problems begin with the lack o f freedom o f 
information regulations and the absence o f investigative journalism. Information on 
Costa R ica’s government is generally available, even with the lack o f freedom of 
information rules. Most government entities, including AIs, publish annual operating 
reports that include detailed budget summaries. A United Nations and Costa Rican 
government sponsored development program, Proyecto de la Nacion, gathers government 
and other open-source political, economic, and social data on Costa Rica and issues an 
annual report on the state o f Costa Rican development. While government reports can
easily be altered to disguise corrupt behaviors, there is a general attitude that the public 
not be denied information on their government entities. One journalist reports few 
problems gathering data on the Costa Rican government. When there are problems in 
getting data, she explains it is either (1) due to someone trying to hide something that is 
wrong, or (2) due to the administrative disorganization common in government agencies 
(Pratt (interview), 1999).
When the government is trying to hide something from the public, there is no 
limit to the tactics it will use. For example, in 1996 the media questioned the use o f  Civil 
Aviation Funds to purchase Israeli-made arms for the Costa Rican police. To stop further 
journalist investigation and avoid accountability, President Jose Maria Figueres declared 
the arms purchase a national security matter and therefore closed to all further reporting 
and open discussion (Latin America Institute, 1997). The lack o f freedom o f information 
laws, plus the government’s ability to manipulate information that is released, hinders 
elite answerability. This is also the case with Costa Rican press freedom.
Freedom House rates Costa Rica as a 16 (scale 0 to 100, 0 being freest) in press 
freedom (Sussman, 1999). This rating is one of the best in the Caribbean, surpassed only 
by a few o f the small Anglophone Caribbean island states, and far better than the ratings 
o f other former Spanish colonies in the region. Costa Rica’s written press, radio, and 
television are all privately owned and free to criticize public figures (Sussman, 1999). 
Despite the appearance o f press freedom, several government measures are regularly used 
to dampen press reporting and restrict investigative reporting. First, reporters have no 
right to keep their sources secret (Biesanz et al., 1999, p. 84). If  named in a libel suit,
journalists are forced to identify their sources in court. Second, government agencies are 
known to cancel their advertising when they disagree with a media outlet’s reporting.
The loss o f government advertising revenues, a principal funding source for many small 
media outlets, becomes a significant factor in editors deciding what to report (Biesanz et 
al., 1999, p. 83). Third, restrictive libel laws dampen the full exercise o f press freedom 
(US Depart, o f State, 1999a). Libel suits against media outlets that report misbehavior of 
individuals in the governing elite are common. Fourth, the media is prohibited from 
printing the names o f persons or entities under investigation for crimes (Biesanz et al., 
1999, p. 84). Fifth, a 1996 right to response law provides persons criticized in the media 
the right to respond with equal attention and equal length in the same media (US Depart, 
o f State, 1999a). Finally, media owners and senior staff are often part o f the governing 
elite and come under considerable pressure form their peers to control the reporting o f 
information harmful to other members o f the governing elite (Biesanz et al., 1999, pp. 83- 
84). This last point is the real core o f the problem with Costa Rican elite accountability 
that leads to political corruption: members o f the Costa Rican governing elite, whether 
elected officials, part of the government bureaucracy, sitting judges, or members o f the 
media, are all averse to condemning other governing elite members for misconduct. This 
is especially evident in matters o f enforcement surrounding elite accountability.
Costa Rica does have a good system o f electoral enforcement. Citizens can 
punish dishonest politicians at the voting polls. Because the major parties differ only 
slightly in their ideologies or issue stances, Costa Rican presidential campaigns often 
become personal popularity contests between the PLN and PUSC candidates. Thus,
candidate values, including their perceived honesty, become major factors in presidential 
elections. This might appear less important in legislator elections, where party leaders 
determine a candidate’s place on the closed-lists and voters are only allowed to vote for 
their preferred legislative party and not individual candidates. Although the party leaders 
have a major say in developing the closed-lists, the process o f legislative primaries, 
including party consultations with community leaders, ensures all candidates placed on 
the closed-lists are acceptable to their constituencies. The major parties will not promote 
a legislative candidate who has questionable honesty as it may cause voters to vote for 
another legislative party. Thus, elections are one area where enforcement works. That is 
not the case with Costa Rican administrative and criminal justice enforcement.
Administratively, Costa Rica possesses what appears to be a model system. The 
1949 Constitution established the office o f Contraloria, a government watchdog office 
that reports directly to the Costa Rican legislature. The Contraloria periodically inspects 
and audits all government agencies, including the AIs. It also conducts special 
investigations either requested by individual legislators or initiated by the Contraloria 
itself (Contraloria , 1994; Hidalgo (interview), 1999). Most government entities also 
have their own small contraloria staffs for internal investigations and to respond to public 
complaints. In the face o f rising interest in government agency performance and the need 
for additional government oversight, in 1989 the Supreme Court Sala  IV Constitutional 
Court was formed, followed in 1993 by the Defensoria (ombudsman), an office where 
private citizens can file their complaints against government agencies or individual 
government officials. Along with the establishment o f these new agencies, Costa Rica
began a coordinated public information campaign to teach citizens their rights and to 
inform them how to use the various public watchdog agencies (see Blanco, 1997; Salazar 
et al., 1999). This public information program, combined with the performance o f the 
public watchdogs, have made the Contraloria, Sala IV, and Defensoria the most 
respected government entities in public opinion polls (Rodriguez et al, 1998; CID-Gallup, 
1980-1999).
Despite the public respect given the Costa Rican public watchdogs, they do very 
little to address political corruption. First, the Defensoria, in full operation only since 
1995, receives few public complaints about political corruption. Even though the 
Defensoria declared public corruption one o f its primary focuses in its 1997 annual 
report, there has been no public rush on the Defensoria offices to renounce acts o f public 
corruption (Esquival (interview), 1999). Even with public opinion polls that see 
corruption as a major societal problem, Costa Ricans appear averse to publicly reporting 
corrupt acts to the authorities. This problem is amplified by the government system’s 
overall aversion to holding the governing elite accountable.
Once the Defensoria investigates a complaint, it can either go directly to the 
government agency involved for corrective action, or in more serious cases, it can refer 
the complaint to the Contraloria or criminal justice system. Defensoria referrals and 
recommendations for corrective action are only advisory. The Defensoria has no power 
to force follow-up action (.Defensoria, 1994). The Contraloria falls under different 
political constraints. The Contralaria is forced to balance its recurring inspections and 
audits with the action it takes on complaints referred by the Defensoria or individual
legislators. This is especially difficult when individual legislators, in a sense o f political 
vindictiveness, report every rumor they hear about opposition party members and demand 
Contraloria investigations (Hidalgo (interview), 1999). When the Contraloria does find 
grounds for criminal prosecution, it refers the case to the Costa Rican criminal justice 
system, which has its own set o f political constraints.
A 1980s US Agency for International Development study o f the Costa Rican 
criminal justice system found it lacking in several areas (see Rico et al., 1988). Because 
o f the patronage-based re-staffing o f the Costa Rican police each time a president from a 
different party takes office, the rating given the police force was far from professional. 
Once a case entered the Costa Rican criminal justice system, resource constraints 
continually delayed the case’s final resolution, sometimes for years. The delay in case 
resolutions strained the already overcrowded prison system with defendants awaiting 
trial. The rich were perceived to manipulate the system through their ability to afford the 
most expensive lawyers and to bring political pressure on judges. As a result, in the 
1980s, the public, defense attorneys, prosecutors perceived the Costa Rican criminal 
justice system, and even judges, as one wracked with corruption (Rico et al., 1988, p.
195).
During the 1990s, major emphasis was placed on professionalizing the Costa 
Rican criminal justice system (see Proyecto de la Nacion, 1995-1999). The investigative 
arm o f the police, the Office o f Criminal Investigations (OIJ), is now professionalized and 
does not change personnel after presidential elections. Court proceedings are now 
computerized and delays in case adjudication have been reduced substantially. Legal
ethics are stressed and the overall perception o f judicial corruption lowered. However, at 
least two areas that degrade the Costa Rican criminal justice system did not change. First, 
neither the police nor the courts developed the technical expertise to prosecute complex 
corruption cases. Second, the rich are still able to avoid prosecution through their 
abilities to afford the most expensive lawyers and to place political pressure on judges. A 
review o f two recent political corruption cases demonstrates the lack o f elite enforcement 
within the Costa Rican criminal justice system.
In 1998, just after PUSC President Miguel Rodriguez took office, it was 
discovered that from January 1998 to May 1998, the Costa Rican Family Assistance and 
Disaster Relief Fund (FODESAF) had been illegally investing state funds in a private 
brokerage firm. O f the US$61.3 million illegally invested, state auditors were unable to 
account for US$4.8 million which was believed to have been siphoned-off by either the 
fund’s managers or the private brokerage firm (Pratt, 1999). It took over a year for this 
case to come to trial. Before trial, the FODESAF treasurer confessed to the illegal 
investments and agreed to repay a portion o f the losses (amount unknown). The majority 
shareholder in the private brokerage firm involved in the illegal investments was found 
guilty at trial and sentenced to 16 years in prison.
The lack o f elite accountability in the FODESAF case concerns several issues. 
First, the majority o f the lost US$4.8 million was never found and the end o f the trial 
terminated the search for these government funds (Villalobos, 1999b). Second, the 
convicted majority shareholder o f the private brokerage firm denies any wrongdoing and 
paints herself as a scapegoat for FODESAF or other government officials who pocketed
the US$4.8 million (Villalobos, 1999b). Third, the FODESAF director and sub-director, 
members o f the governing elite who both signed off on the illegal investments, were 
found not guilty at trial— basing their defenses on the fact their administrative role in the 
investments was minor and that they placed too much trust in the FODESAF treasurer 
(Villalobos, 1999b). Fourth, only two weeks after the FODESAF trial ended, the PLN 
ethics committee exonerated the former PLN Labor minister, the Vice-President, and 
President Jose Maria Figueres, who were directly responsible for FODESAF operations 
(Villalobos, 1999a). This was just one o f several corruption scandals involving the illegal 
use o f government funds that arose during Jose Maria Figueres’s (1994-1998) PLN 
administration. The PUSC are, however, not without their own corruption scandals.
In June 1994, President Figueres’s PLN Council o f Government, with the 
approval o f the legislature, closed the Banco Anglo Costarrincense (BAC), Costa Rica’s 
oldest state-run bank (see Wild, 1998). The resultant investigation found that over 
US$100 million had been lost due to mismanagement and theft of the bank’s investment 
portfolios. Although the investigation revealed that BAC had been poorly managed since 
the 1980s, the most significant losses occurred during the PUSC administration o f 
President Rafael Calderon, Jr. (1990-1994), son o f former President Rafael Calderon, Sr. 
(1940-1944), and were associated with loses from the purchase o f risky Venezuelan and 
Brazilian bonds meant to reduce Costa Rica’s foreign debt.
The BAC closure severely rocked the confidence o f Costa Rican citizens in their 
state-run financial institutions. It took over five years for the BAC case to come to trial—  
mainly due to the government’s inability to investigate the complex case and determine
exactly what crimes had been committed (Webster (interview), 1999). During the five- 
year delay, BAC’s ex-president died in a plane crash and two Chilean businessmen 
involved in the BAC investments skipped bail and escaped to their home country. 
Avoiding the implication o f any senior members o f President Calderon’s economic team, 
only the BAC’s ex-general manager and six directors stood trial for the US$100 million 
loss (Segnini, 1999). (The case is ongoing at this writing as the defendants base their 
defense on the principle that it was not a crime to make bad investments.) Additionally, 
the investigation revealed BAC’s possible involvement in political influence peddling as 
it uncovered large outstanding unsecured loans to many o f the influential governing elite, 
including several former and setting legislators (Segura & Solis, 1999).
FODESAF and BAC are just two o f several major political corruption affairs that 
surfaced in Costa Rica in the 1990s. Government reactions to these scandals, including 
the role o f the criminal justice system, followed a disturbing trend. First, the missing 
government funds were seldom if  ever recovered. Second, efforts were made to shield 
the governing elite from accountability for the losses. In the FODESAF case, a private 
investment broker and the FODESAF treasurer were punished but members o f the 
governing elite were exonerated. In the BAC case, only the general manager and 
directors stood trial, while members o f the governing elite, some owing hundreds o f 
thousands o f dollars in outstanding loans, were not called to task. Further evidence o f the 
governing elite avoiding accountability over corruption issues can be seen in presidential 
and legislative campaigns. Although the FODESAF and BAC affairs were the topics of 
frequent media reports, neither became an issue in the 1998 national elections. Costa
Rican governing elite have thus created a system that largely protects them from 
accountability, no matter to which political party they belong.
Mass Participation. Costa Rica has developed a system o f mass participation that is 
strongly pluralist (see Chapter 2). An astonishing 70 to 80 percent (71 percent in 1998) 
of eligible Costa Rican citizens regularly vote in national elections, providing an 
indication o f the importance that citizens place on political participation (Rodriguez et al., 
1998, p. 300). Groups from a variety o f societal interests have regular and open access to 
the Costa Rican government hierarchy. Citizens and interest groups with complaints 
about government services or performance have easy access to the contralorias in 
government ministries and AIs. Additionally, they may go outside these direct channels 
to file complaints with either the Defensoria or the Sala IV Constitutional Court. Costa 
Rican citizens and interest groups also have easy access to Costa Rican legislators who 
spend a significant amount o f their time interacting with constituents both in their San 
Jose capital offices and in public and private meetings in Costa Rica’s seven provinces.
This system o f open access to the Costa Rican government hierarchy dates back to 
the early nineteenth century and is rooted in the ideology o f rural democracy. The Costa 
Rican governing elite have always felt a strong responsibility for the well being o f the 
lower classes— the sense o f Tico brotherhood (Wilson, 1998, p. 162). At the same time, 
however, the Costa Rican governing elite have always been afraid that the citizens would 
organize to an extent that would challenge the governing elite’s hold on power (Wilson, 
1998, p. 136). The fear o f an organized citizenry helps explain the nineteenth century co­
optation o f small farmers by the cafetaleros, the 1940s social reforms by Presidents
Calderon and Picado, and the late twentieth century rise o f the benefactor state, all 
welfare-related actions designed to limit organized mass citizen participation. It also 
explains why, although Costa Rica has the largest number of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) o f any Central American state, strong interest groups that might 
challenge the governing elite’s power still do not exist.
Costa Rica hosts 304 NGOs, almost a third more than Honduras (210) which has 
the next highest number o f NGOs in Central America (Arias Foundation, 2000). These 
NGOs represent a variety o f societal interests. None o f the Costa Rican NGOs are 
particularly large and they also tend not to coordinate among themselves. Instead, like 
individual Costa Rican citizens, they work one-on-one with elements o f the Costa Rican 
government hierarchy to advance their group’s private interests.
Absent in Costa Rica are the powerful military, student, trade union, worker, and 
church interest groups found in some Caribbean states (see Wilson, 1998, pp. 66-75). 
Costa Rica lacks a military, and the non-professional police, with most officers acquiring 
their jobs through political patronage, are neither organized nor a threat to their governing 
elite patrons. University students tend to be more self-interested than activist and 
normally remain on the campuses. Trade unions and worker organizations, having been 
co-opted by the benefactor state, are also weak, representing only 15 percent o f all Costa 
Rican workers. With few human rights and poverty problems, the Catholic Church, to 
which 85 percent o f the Costa Rican people belong, has no incentive and little money to 
pursue an activist role. Thus, Costa Rica’s governing elite have been successful at 
accommodating individual citizen and small interest group (NGO) access to government
decision-makers, while keeping traditional powerful interest groups weak. The Costa 
Rican governing elite’s success in fostering this version o f mass participation can also be 
seen in the levels o f Costa Rican societal trust.
As discussed earlier, Costa Ricans place high levels of trust in their government 
institutions. They also tend to trust their immediate neighbors and fellow Ticos. A 1997 
poll found that 47 percent o f Costa Rican’s felt their neighbors would approve o f them 
personally (CID-Gallup, 1980-1999). Also as discussed earlier, Costa Ricans do not trust 
individuals in the government or the major political parties to act in the citizenry’s best 
interests. This distrust o f government officials was made clear in a series o f protests that 
occurred in March 2000 regarding the reorganization o f the Costa Rican Electricity 
Institute (ICE).
The March 2000 ICE protests were a watershed in both mass participation and 
societal perceptions o f political corruption in Costa Rica. Small-scale strikes and isolated 
peaceful street protests have been a regular part o f Costa Rican politics for the last 20 
years. Despite the frequency o f such protest action, a 1997 poll found that 90.5 percent o f 
Costa Ricans were against protest actions that blocked streets and damaged buildings and 
vehicles (Rodriguez et al., 1998, p. 299). This societal attitude did not seem to matter in 
March and April 2000, as thousands o f Costa Ricans took to the streets over a two-week 
period to protest the Costa Rican legislature’s passage o f a bill to reorganize ICE. ICE, a 
wholly state-owned Al, maintains a monopoly hold on Costa Rican electric and 
telecommunications services. In March 2000, the Costa Rican legislature voted to
separate the electric and telecommunications services into separate AIs and to allow 
private investment in each o f the new AIs (up to 49 percent o f each project’s value).
The ICE legislation precipitated the largest street protests in post-Civil War Costa 
Rican history. The protests spread across the state and involved several NGOs and 
thousands o f individual citizens. The protests saw the uniting o f many previously 
uncoordinated NGOs and interest groups. Each interest group had its own self-interested 
reasons for protesting. ICE worker unions protested because the reorganization 
threatened many o f their jobs. Environmental groups protested because the new law 
allowed new power generation projects in sensitive environmental areas. Individual 
citizens protested because the reorganization would raise the price o f  electricity and 
telephone service. Even university students came off the campuses for the first time to 
protest the perceived social injustices in the ICE reorganization.
Costa Rican commentators noted that while individual groups had their own 
reasons for protesting, the protests went beyond the issue o f ICE reorganization (see 
Herrera, 2000). Many commentators felt that NGOs and individuals were coming 
together, for the first time in Costa Rican history, to protest legislation they perceived as 
benefiting the minority governing elite at the expense of the majority population. 
Newspapers documented that several Costa Rican legislators already held interests in 
companies that were set to profit from the ICE reorganization (Espinoza, 2000). Mass 
participation in the ICE protests was thus a watershed awakening o f societal concerns— a 
possible first step in changes to the accepted boundaries between public office and private 
interests as seen by the Costa Rican masses.
M aterial Resource Factors. Costa Rica exhibits a mixed patrimonial and statist material 
resource system (see Chapter 2). It is partly patrimonial because citizens look to the state 
for their material support. It is also partly statist because it maintains moderately strong 
protectionist measures for external trade and significant government intervention in the 
domestic economy. The economic shock that rocked Costa Rica in the early 1980s began 
a slow process o f changing the import-substitution and protectionist economic policies 
adopted in the building o f Costa R ica’s social democratic benefactor state. In spite o f 
pressure from international financial institutions for Costa Rica to open its economy and 
accept free trade and other neoliberal measures, actual reform has been extremely slow.
As the owner o f extensive Costa Rican economic enterprises, the Costa Rican 
government retains a strong hand in economic planning. As the above ICE protests 
demonstrate, the Costa Rican populace has little desire for this mix o f patrimonial and 
statist economic structures to change.
By the beginning o f the twenty-first century, the Costa Rican economy had 
diversified from its previous dependence on coffee and banana exports (see Political Risk 
Services, 1998a). The tourism industry, despite suffering from a lack o f infrastructure, 
had become the main source o f foreign exchange. Along with tourism, the cut flower 
business and textile and light manufacturing industries now account for over two thirds o f 
export earnings. In the late 1990s, computer chip manufacturing by the Intel Corporation 
quickly became a significant portion o f Costa Rica’s exports, a venture Costa Rica hopes 
is an initial step toward an expanded high-technology sector that can take advantage o f 
Costa R ica’s educated work force. Traditional agricultural products, including coffee,
bananas, and beef, remain important to the Costa Rican economy but do not hold the 
prominent place they did prior to the 1990s.
The Heritage Foundation rates Costa Rica as 2.80 (scale 1 to 5, 1 being freest) on 
its index o f  economic freedom (Johnson et al., 1999). Since the mid-1980s, Costa Rica 
has been slowly moving to open its economy by lowering tariff and tax rates, reducing the 
state role in banking, and reducing government intervention in the economy. Despite 
external pressures to adopt neoliberal reforms, Costa Rica retains a high level o f trade 
protectionism and is a difficult market for new businesses to penetrate (Johnson et al., 
1999).
Costa Rica’s internal economy has been slow to reform. Corrales (1999) 
describes how the Costa Rican internal economy is permeated with state intervention, 
state monopoly ownership o f significant economic sectors, bloated bureaucratic 
procedures, and wide discretion o f public officials involved in economic regulation. The 
result is an opportune system for governing elite rent seeking— a system that evolved 
during the social democratic reforms o f the 1950s and 1960s and one that now supports 
the majority o f Costa Rican middle class citizens through either direct or indirect 
employment. Costa Rica presents a perfect example o f a system where the economic and 
political elite formed an alliance (Statist Bargain-see Chapter 4) where both directly 
benefit from the significant role o f the state in the economy. The governing elite forged 
this alliance at the same time they co-opted the lower classes through the expanded 
welfare benefits o f the Costa Rican benefactor state.
Over the past two decades, extraordinary material resources (see Chapter 2) have 
entered the Costa Rican political corruption equation via three principal methods, 
through: (1) funds from privatization o f government owned enterprises, (2) international 
financial institution loans and international aid, and (3) drug trafficking. The amounts of 
extraordinary resources are minimal from privatization efforts. In 1988, a government 
owned aluminum plant was privatized, followed by fertilizer, cement, and sugar plants in 
1994 and 1995 (Corrales, 1999). However, none o f the largest state-owned monopoly 
enterprises, including electricity, telecommunications, petroleum refinement, insurance, 
airports, or seaports have been privatized. The reasons for not privatizing these larger 
state-owned enterprises are three-fold. First, non-ruling parties want to avoid the 
privatization o f the largest state-owned enterprises to prevent the ruling party access to 
funds which may be turned into electoral support in the next national elections. For 
example, if  ICE were privatized, an extraordinary influx o f several hundred million 
dollars would allow the PUSC ruling party to pay off part o f Costa R ica’s external debt, 
providing more funding for state infrastructure and social welfare programs that could 
then result in more PUSC support in the next election (Solis (interview), 1999b). Second, 
by privatizing large state-owned enterprises, the governing elite reduce their opportunity 
structures for obtaining rents from state-owned monopoly industries. Rents obtained 
from Costa R ica’s extensive system o f parastatal enterprises (the AIs) are the source of 
much o f the governing elite’s corrupt gains. Third, the Costa Rican populace, dependent 
on the outputs o f the benefactor state, is against privatization. In a 1999 poll by CID- 
Gallup, the largest percentage o f respondents was for the continuation o f state-owned
monopolies in the enterprises o f insurance (46 percent for, 41 percent against), electricity 
and telecommunications (57 percent for, 33 percent against), and petroleum refining (47 
percent for, 40 percent against) (CID-Gallup, 1980-1999). Thus, privatization is only a 
minor factor in assessing extraordinary resource effects upon Costa Rican political 
corruption.
International financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, and US Agency for International Development, are a second source o f 
extraordinary resources. This was particularly true from 1983 to 1987, when the US 
provided aid in the amount o f US$175 million to US$225 million annually. This US aid 
was critical to Costa Rica’s survival o f the 1980s recessions. The aid was provided as an 
incentive for Costa Rica to renounce the communist-led Sandinista regime in Nicaragua 
and for Costa R ica’s support o f US efforts to aid the Nicaraguan contras. With the end o f 
the Nicaraguan war and the overall end o f the Cold War, Costa Rican external aid, 
especially from the US, plummeted to its current annual levels o f less than US$25 million 
annually. Like privatization efforts, these current levels o f IFI aid are a minor factor in 
assessing extraordinary resource effects on Costa Rican political corruption. However, 
this was not so during the 1980s, when the huge amounts o f US aid corresponded with 
the increasing concern over Costa Rican political corruption levels.
The 1980s also saw the establishment o f Costa Rica as a drug trafficking transit 
country for cocaine shipments headed from Colombia to the US (see Weir, 1994). The 
Costa Rican cocaine connections first began with the Nicaraguan Contra factions 
operating along Costa Rica’s northern border. These connections developed around the
relationship between the Panamanian dictator and convicted drug trafficker, Manuel
Noriega, and the Costa Rican-based Contra factions, who flew arms and cocaine from
Panama to airstrips in northern Costa Rica— the arms meant for the Contras and the
cocaine for further transshipment to the US (Scott & Marshall, 1991). This cocaine
trafficking could not have continued without the support o f the Costa Rican police and
high government officials. Scott and Marshall (1991) summarize the US involvement in
the cocaine smuggling:
The US government did not invent this Contra-drug symbiosis, which...indeed 
reflects much older realities o f political power in Latin America. But there are 
documentary indications that, as far back as 1983, Washington used or at least 
condoned many or all o f these different Contra drug connections to maintain 
Contra support operations. At a minimum, the US Government and the CIA 
were well aware o f the drug problems. (Scott & Marshall, 1991, p. 106).
The Costa Rican drug trafficking connections continued after the Contra war 
ended with the help o f the newly emerging relationships between the Colombian and 
M exican drug cartels. Contacts between the Mexican traffickers and Costa Rican 
officials are believed to have first begun during the PUSC presidency o f Rafael Calderon, 
Jr., (1990-1994) (Carazo (interview), 1999). During Calderon’s presidency, several 
M exican investors became prominent in Costa Rican economic enterprises. One major 
Mexican investor, Hank Gonzalez, is a known drug trafficker and money launderer in 
Mexico (Matute & Solorzano, 1999). The Mexican cartels use Costa Rica as a 
transshipment point for drugs bound from Colombia to Mexico (and eventually destined 
for the US), as a safe-haven for meetings between Colombian and Mexican cartel 
members, and as a quiet vacation spot and refuge when Mexican or US law enforcement 
pressure cartel operations.
During Calderon’s administration (1990-1994), rumors emerged that politicians 
from both the PLN and PUSC were being supported by drug money (see Weir, 1994). In 
1997, with his pre-presidential campaign short on cash, current President Miguel 
Rodriguez was a guest, along with other PUSC officials, at Hank Gonzalez’s home in 
Mexico. During the public outcry that arose over this visit, then candidate Rodriquez 
denied that he knew o f Gonzales drug-tainted background and that the visit was only 
social in nature. In August 1998, a Costa Rican court handed down a guilty verdict 
against former legislator Leonel Villalobos for his participation in international 
trafficking o f  cocaine to the United States and sentenced him to twelve years in prison 
(US Depart, o f State, 1999b). The Villalobos case is the only confirmed evidence o f the 
linkage between senior Costa Rican government officials and drug trafficking. However, 
the perception that the linkages exist is strong. When asked in 1990 by CID-Gallup what 
was the biggest problem with drug trafficking, 40 percent o f Costa Rican respondents (the 
largest percentage) answered that it was the cause o f official corruption (CID-Gallup, 
1980-1999).
Findings
Table 6-2 summarizes the above discussion o f the contemporary causes o f Costa 
Rican political corruption. Costa R ica’s mix o f a hierarchical and heteronomous form o f 
rule and its individualistic political culture create a democratic structure that includes 
pluralistic (moderate) levels o f mass participation. Coinciding with this democratic 
structure is an elite competition characterized by a mix o f constricted and oppositional 
conditions— a situation that may largely be an unintended consequence o f  the small size
o f the Costa Rican governing elite. The Costa Rican governing elite also constructed a 
m ixed circular (intra-elite) and vertical (within the government hierarchy) system o f elite 
accountability, which, when combined with the mixed patrimonial-statist material 
resource factors, allows the governing elite significant opportunities for corrupt behavior 
(per Table 6-1). W ith gray (moderately strong) boundaries established between public 
office and private interests, the Costa Rican governing elite must hide their corrupt 
behavior so that they do not energize elite or mass condem nation o f  their actions.
The above conditions lead to a Costa Rican political corruption pattern in the 
institutional area— corresponding with the TI 1999 rating o f  5.1. Thus, this chapter’s 
hypothesis is supported by the above analysis and demonstrates that Costa R ica’s 
institutions associated with the causes o f  political corruption (per Table 2-4) are 
constructed prim arily o f  directive rules, or near equal combinations o f  directive rules with 
either instruction or com m itm ent rules.
Table 6-2. Coordinates o f  Costa Rican Political Corruption
D om inant  Social Rules  
Forms o f  Socie ta l  Rule  
Political Cultures  
Elite C om petit ion  
Elite A ccoun tab ili ty  
M ass Participation  
Material R esou rce  System  
Public /Private Boundaries  
Corruption Patterns
Corruption Index:
Instruction
H egem on y
C ollectiv ist
Constricted
Circular
Paternalistic
Patrimonial
W hite
S ystem ic
Directive  
Hierarchy 1 
Individualistic  
O ppositional  
Vertical  
Pluralistic 
Statist 
Gray 
Institutional
C om m itm ent
H eteronom y
Egalitarian
Corporatist
Horizontal
C osm opolitan
Market
Black
Incidental
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=  Costa  Rican conditions.
This chapter demonstrates how Costa Rica came to exhibit a paradox o f a strong 
democratic system coinciding with elite accountability and material resource conditions 
that allow significant rent seeking. The Costa Rican colonial experience, whether one 
accepts the rural democracy thesis or not, established the foundation for the contemporary 
democratic system. However, it was the 1948 Civil War, and the political and economic 
development occurring in its aftermath that most affected contemporary Costa Rican 
institutions. The Civil War wrested political power from the upper class cafetaleros and 
placed it in the hands o f a growing middle class. With the middle class only able to 
peripherally tap Costa Rica’s traditional coffee and banana wealth, they had to find 
another system o f wealth generation— i.e., they used their new political power to 
manipulate their democracy and construct the entrepreneurial state composed largely o f 
the network o f parastatal AIs. In building their entrepreneurial state, whether out o f a 
sense o f Tico brotherhood or the need to co-opt the lower class for electoral support, the 
new middle class governing elite simultaneously constructed the benefactor (welfare) 
state.
The Costa Rican governing elite could not have constructed the causal structure in 
Table 6-2 without some external assistance. This first came in the 1950s and 1960s 
where Costa Rica borrowed heavily on the international market to finance the 
construction o f both the entrepreneurial and benefactor states. This international 
financing was also a major source o f the benefits received from political corruption 
behavior. With international financing dwindling after the 1982 world debt crisis, US 
economic aid during the 1983-1987 period (in return for the Costa Rican anti-Sandinista
stance) allowed the Costa Rican governing elite to keep their economy and political spoils 
system running through the 1980s. With US economic aid gone in the post-Cold War 
1990s, the Costa Rican governing elite found themselves in a quandary. With a good 
international credit history, some financing was available from international sources. 
However, to finance large media-intensive electoral campaigns, the perception o f many in 
Costa Rica is that the governing elite turned to international drug traffickers for support.
Thus, in the post-1948 period, the Costa Rican governing elite constructed a 
system with two dimensions that result in moderate levels o f political corruption. First, 
they developed institutions that present a minimal amount o f elite accountability and 
maximum access to state-owned resources (via the parastatal AIs), which increase 
opportunities for political corruption. Second, they hid this opportunity structure for 
political corruption behind the trappings o f a strong democracy. The overall result is a 
serpentine institutional corruption pattern whereby the governing elite are relatively free 
to adopt corrupt behaviors, provided they do not cross the threshold that energizes elite 
and mass condemnation. It is the Costa Rican governing elite that constructed these 
structures. Thus, it is the Costa Rican elite’s manipulation o f their democratic structures, 
and not aspects o f the international system, that cause Costa Rica’s problems with 
political corruption.
Endnotes
1. Some argue that it was not a system o f mutual dependence that arose but a case o f the 
large landowners paying off the small farmers and peasants to work on the larger coffee 
farms. This co-optation o f the working and lower classes by the governing elite remains a 
characteristic o f present-day Costa Rica.
2. The rough content analysis included a literature review, primarily o f the Costa Rican 
press {La N ation  1998-1999; Tico Times 1998-1999) on political corruption in Costa 
Rica; author interviews with Costa Rican journalists, politicians, government officials, 
and academics (see reference list); reviews o f the annual reports o f the Proyecto Estado 
de la Nacion  (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999) and the Defensoria (1998, 1999); the 
general descriptions o f Costa Rican political corruption found in Stone (1990), Biesanz et 
al. (1999), and Corrales (1999), and data base searches o f Info-LatinoAmerica (1988-
2000). There was a high correlation among all these sources concerning the nature o f 
Costa Rican political corruption.
3. Costa Rican scholars have been relatively quiet on the subject o f political corruption. 
This is understandable for two reasons. First, the major universities are government 
financed and scholarly corruption studies are likely to offend powerful government 
officials. Second, Ticos by nature are not confrontational and tend to shy away from such 
acrimonious subjects.
4. Even ex-President and Noble Peace Prize winner Oscar Arias (1986-1990), although 
highly popular with the Costa Rican populace, plays only a minor player in national 
politics. In 2000, Arias began a movement to rescind the Constitutional amendment 
baring the reelection o f presidents, arguing that Costa Rican democracy had matured to 
the point that this check on power was no longer needed.
Conclusion
This study investigates the complex problem of political corruption in the states 
and territories o f the Caribbean. It argues that we cannot understand the many puzzles 
about political corruption unless we first have a comprehensive theory o f its causes. This 
study develops an interdisciplinary theory of the causes o f political corruption. It then 
presents a historical survey of Caribbean political corruption and a review of 
contemporary Caribbean institutional factors theorized to contribute to a state’s political 
corruption problems. Finally, the theory is advanced through qualitative disciplined- 
configurative case studies o f political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica. The study 
demonstrates how international factors such as colonialism, neo-imperialism, 
transnational corporations, foreign businesses, drug trafficking, etc., contribute to the 
region’s political corruption problems. The study concludes, however, that there are 
more significant domestic factors that cause today’s high levels o f Caribbean political 
corruption. Specifically, the major cause o f political corruption is Caribbean governing 
elite who manipulate their society’s political and economic institutional development and 
provide themselves the opportunities to plunder state resources for their own benefit at 
the expense o f their citizenry.
This chapter presents the findings from this study’s analysis o f Caribbean political 
corruption. First, it assesses the interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political 
corruption in light o f the Jamaican and Costa Rican case studies. Second, it answers the 
research questions concerning Caribbean political corruption that were raised in
Chapter 1. Third, it presents a discussion o f the study’s location within the larger context 
o f  corruption scholarship. Finally, it summarizes the study’s key contributions and 
lim itations, and provides an outline for an expanded research program in political 
corruption.
A ssessing the Theory
Table 7-1 (reprinted from Table 2-4) provides the basis for this study’s 
interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political corruption. Table 7-1 ’s coordinates o f 
political corruption were developed using O n u f s (1989) constructivist analytic frame 
(Figure 2-1) and theory o f  social rules (Table 2-1) to link several com peting agency and 
structural explanations for the causes o f political corruption. In developing Table 7-1, 
this study’s constructivist analysis dem onstrated how agency and structural factors are 
both im portant in revealing the causal m echanism s associated with political corruption. 
Chapter 2 ’s Political Corruption Game analysis dem onstrates how a governing elite’s 
behavior (i.e., agent status and corruption patterns) are partially explained through a 
rational choice (agency) model that includes the causal factors o f form o f societal rule, 
political culture, boundaries between public and private, and agent interests. Chapter 2 ’s 
structural analysis then develops how differing corruption patterns are further explained 
through the additional causal factors o f  elite com petition, elite accountability, mass 
participation, and m aterial resource factors. Table 7-1 displays the key agency and 
structural factors that cause political corruption and characterizes each as to its dom inant 
category o f  social rules (instruction, directive, or com mitment).
Dominant Social Rules Instruction Directive Commitment
R ule’s Purposes Principles, beliefs Specificity, sanctions Create roles
R ule’s Function: What agents: should do must do right/duty to do
Forms o f  Societal Rule Hegemony Hierarchy Heteronomy
Political Cultures Collectivist Individualistic Egalitarian
Elite Competition Constricted Oppositional Corporatist
Elite Accountability Circular Vertical Horizontal
M ass Participation Paternalistic Pluralistic Cosmopolitan
Material Resource Factors Patrimonial Statist Market
Public/Private Boundaries White Gray Black
Agent Interests Standing Security Wealth
Agent Status Pirates Pariahs Paragons
Corruption Patterns Systemic Institutional Incidental
Corruption Index:
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Table 7-1 is probabilistic and not deterministic. By investigating the 
characteristics o f the Table 7-1 causal factors (form of societal rule, political culture, elite 
competition, elite accountability, mass participation, material resource factors, and 
boundaries between public and private), and using vertical and horizontal interpolation, 
an analyst can estimate the probable conditions o f agent status and corruption patterns in 
the society. Thus, by investigating a society’s social-ruled make-up— as is done in the 
Jamaican and Costa Rican case studies— Table 7-1 provides a vehicle to explain and 
predict a state’s overall corruption levels along the corruption index situated below the 
table.
The Jamaican and Costa Rican case studies advance the theory of the causes of 
political corruption derived from Table 7-1 by demonstrating how the structural (social- 
ruled) conditions in these two states closely correlate with the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index (TI CPI) rating o f each state. The Jamaican case study
supports a hypothesis derived from the theory’s first m ajor proposition:
Proposition One: Societies with coordinate o f political corruption causal factors 
(form o f societal rule, political culture, elite com petition, elite accountability, 
mass participation, m arket resource factors, boundaries between public and 
private) that are dominated by instruction rules, or near equal com binations o f 
instruction and directive rules, will likely experience systemic political 
corruption patterns (3.8 on the TI CPI in Jam aica’s case).
The Costa Rican case study supports a hypothesis derived from the theory’s second m ajor
proposition:
Proposition Two: Societies with coordinate o f political corruption causal 
factors (form o f societal rule, political culture, elite com petition, elite 
accountability, mass participation, m arket resource factors, boundaries between 
public and private) that are dom inated by directive rules, or near equal 
com binations o f  directive rules with either instruction or com m itm ent rules, will 
likely experience institutional political corruption patterns (5.1 on the TI CPI in 
Costa R ica’s case).
This study does not test a hypothesis derived from the theory’s third m ajor proposition:
Proposition Three: Societies w ith coordinate o f political corruption causal 
factors (form  o f  societal rule, political culture, elite com petition, elite 
accountability, mass participation, market resource factors, boundaries between 
public and private) that are dom inated by com m itm ent rules, or near equal 
com binations o f  com m itm ent rules and directive rules, w ill likely experience 
incidental political corruption patterns.
W ith only two em pirical case studies o f  this study’s theory, and with the lack o f 
hypotheses tests from the theory’s third m ajor proposition, we are som ew hat lim ited in 
our ability to m ake inferences about the causes o f  political corruption in states other than 
Jam aica and Costa Rica. A t best, we can make only broad generalizations about how the 
theory applies to other Caribbean states and territories. Jam aica presents an authoritarian- 
dem ocratic governing system characterized by a m ixed hegem onic-hierarchical form o f
rule. While the social rule mix differs in societies, the structural characteristics related to 
political corruption found in Jamaica are likely similar to those in other Caribbean states 
with authoritarian-democratic systems (roughly the bottom two-thirds o f the states and 
territories listed in Table 4-1). Costa Rica, on the other hand, presents a non-authoritarian 
democratic governing system characterized by a mixed hierarchical-heteronomous form 
o f rule. Again, while social rule mixes differ, the structural characteristics related to 
political corruption found in Costa Rica are likely similar to those found in the stronger 
democratic Caribbean states (roughly the top one-third o f the states and territories listed 
in Table 4-1). In the remainder o f this chapter, it is assumed that Table 7-1 can be 
generalized to all states and territories in the Caribbean.
Not contained in the Table 7-1 coordinates o f political corruption, but a key factor 
found in this study’s theoretical and case study analyses, is the important domestic agency 
role o f a society’s governing elite in constructing its structural characteristics. A key 
constructivist tenet is that agents (people) create institutions (structure). Additionally, 
constructivism offers that the social rules that make up institutions are constantly 
changing. These constructivist tenets were particularly evident in the case studies of 
Jamaica and Costa Rica, where, in both cases, the governing elite constructed structures 
that resulted in increased levels o f political corruption. Just after its 1962 
independence— with generally honest political leaders and a British-trained civil service 
embracing moderate to strong boundaries between public duties and private duties—  
Jamaica experienced political corruption levels between the institutional and incidental 
corruption patterns in Table 7-1 (likely 6.5 to 7.5 on the corruption index). However, as
Chapter 5 reveals, over the next 30 years the Jamaican governing elite corrupted the 
British-provided Westminster system and built an institutional structure resulting in 
today’s systemic corruption patterns. Costa Rica experienced its lowest levels o f political 
corruption in the 1950s, the period just after its 1948 Civil War when the government was 
implementing a new constitution containing several anti-corruption measures. However, 
as Chapter 6 reveals, by the 1970s, the Costa Rican governing elite had molded the 
institutional structures surrounding their entrepreneurial state, thus manipulating their 
democratic structures so as to allow them substantial opportunities for influence peddling 
and rent seeking. Therefore, although Table 7-1 appears to emphasize the importance of 
structural factors as the causes o f political corruption, we must not forget the key agency 
role o f a society’s governing elite in building these structures. This study concludes that 
this domestic role o f the governing elite is the major cause o f today’s Caribbean political 
corruption problems.
A significant contribution o f this study’s theory is its ability to deal with the 
cultural relativity problem in political corruption studies. This study takes 
H eidenheimer’s (1970, 1989) linkage o f differing political cultures to varying boundaries 
between public duties and private interests (see Table 2-2), and situates them among the 
larger Table 7-1 structural factors that cause political corruption. Societies with 
collectivist political cultures and white (weak) boundaries between public and private 
have significantly different views o f political corruption than societies with egalitarian 
political cultures and black (strong) boundaries. However, the fact that most o f the 
w orld’s states, including all those in the Caribbean, have signed international or regional
agreements accepting Western (black) boundaries as an international or regional standard, 
allows us to make normative assessments about societal corruption patterns. It is 
recognized, as Heidenheimer highlights, that societies with collectivist political cultures 
may not condemn their governing elite’s corrupt behavior. However, the international 
community— using Western (black) standards— will still assess collectivist societies with 
white (weak) boundaries between public and private as having systemic corruption 
patterns.
A major challenge to this study’s theory development was to include all the 
relevant variables (agency and structural causal factors) that contribute to differing 
political corruption levels. Johnston’s (1994) comparative theory o f political corruption 
was o f significant help in this endeavor as he identified elite competition, elite 
accountability, mass participation, material resource factors, and boundaries between 
public and private as key causal variables. This study builds on Johnston’s analysis by 
expanding the conceptualization o f these variables and by placing them into the larger 
Table 7-1 structure o f the causes o f political corruption. The use o f the constructivist 
analytic frame allowed the linkage of Heidenheimer and Johnston’s works, along with the 
works o f numerous other corruption theorists, resulting in the Table 7-1 coordinates that 
include the major causes o f political corruption. The constructivist analytic frame also 
allowed the identification o f specific causal mechanisms, i.e., the social rules that explain 
the political corruption phenomenon.
A measure o f this study’s usefulness concerns how well it develops causal 
mechanisms that can contribute to anti-corruption policy development. The real test is
whether this study’s theory improves upon the policy relevance o f Klitgaard’s (1988) 
stylized formula (C = M + D -  A) that is used worldwide as the framework for 
developing anti-corruption programs like the 1996 Organization o f American States 
(OAS) Inter-American Convention Against Corruption. This study contributes to anti­
corruption policy development in two primary ways.
First, this study’s analysis reveals that to reduce political corruption a society must 
change its Table 7-1 social-ruled structure. Specifically, constructing commitment rules 
is the key causal mechanism leading to incidental corruption patterns. This finding is in 
consonance with the theory’s third major proposition reprinted above. To reduce political 
corruption, a society must build commitment rules in the key areas o f form o f societal 
rule, political culture, elite competition, elite accountability, mass participation, market 
resource factors, and boundaries between public and private. Table 7-2 summarizes the 
middle-level structural (causal) factors developed in Chapter 2 that must be the target o f 
anti-corruption commitment rule development.
Table 7-2. Summary o f Political Corruption Structural Factors
Structural Factors for Anti-Corruption 
Commitment Rule Development
Ideal Commitment-Ruled 
Anti-Corruption Conditions
Form of Societal Rule Heteronomy
Political Culture Egalitarian
Elite Competition 
Elite Mobility
Electoral Freedom and Fairness 
Election Finance Sources 
Elite Consensus
Corporatist
Elite Accountability 
Answerability Factors:
Freedom of the Press 
Freedom of Information 
Public Access to Governing Elite 
Enforcement Factors:
Administrative Transparency/Efficiency 
Election Efficiency (Can We Throw the Crooks Out?) 
Criminal Justice System Efficiency 
Sovereignty/Political Asylum
Horizontal
Mass Participation 
Civil Liberties/Human Rights Status 
Civil Society Organization/Strength 
Levels of Social Trust
Cosmopolitan
Material Resource Factors 
Routine Factors:
External Trade/Economic Management 
Domestic Economic/Business Management 
State-Owned Resource Management 
Extraordinary Factors:
International Aid/Finance 
Neoliberal Reform (privatizations, etc.) 
Organized Crime (drug traffickers, etc.)
Market
Boundaries Between Public and Private 
Anti-Corruption Laws and Regulations (focused on the Table 2-2 
governing elite political corruption behaviors)
Elite and Mass Citizenry Views of Corruption
Black (Strong)
Building anti-corruption commitment rules in the Table 7-2 structural factors is 
the key to reducing political corruption, but doing so presents significant challenges.1 
While commitment rules creating roles and establishing rights and duties can be 
legislated or implemented by regulation, more often commitment rules are built over time 
through the formal and informal interactions o f agents (elite and masses) who see that,
once established, the intended roles, rights, and duties will be honored. A first step in 
building stable commitment rules is usually to implement a strong system o f directive 
rules and their corresponding sanctions. To reduce political corruption, this means 
establishing directive rules and their associated sanctions in the key Table 7-2 areas. 
Strengthening anti-corruption directive rules, i.e., increasing the frequency a governing 
elite follows the directive rules, allows a society to build stable anti-corruption duties and 
rights that constitute commitment rules. Within a robust directive-ruled structure, anti­
corruption commitment rules will not only develop and become stronger, but will also 
increase in formality, i.e., they will assume a status and importance o f their own. This 
process o f  building commitment rules takes time and is far from easy.
To construct effective anti-corruption commitment rules, a society must first have 
the political will and political capacity to establish a full range o f anti-corruption directive 
rules and their associated sanctions. Political will concerns the society’s (elite and/or 
citizenry’s) acceptance o f the Western (black) standards o f boundaries between public 
and private and their willingness to take action to change conditions not congruent with 
these W estern (black) standards. Political capacity concerns the ability o f a society to 
follow through on their political will and fully implement a comprehensive array o f anti­
corruption directive rules, including the enforcement o f directive-ruled sanctions when 
members o f the governing elite do not follow these rules. Additionally, over time, a 
society m ust evolve to where the incentive for the governing elite to follow the anti­
corruption directive rules is not just based on the threat o f  directive-ruled sanctions, but 
where following the rules becomes the moral commitment (duty) o f the governing elite.
Simultaneously, over time, a society’s citizenry assumes it is their right to be represented 
by an honest governing elite. The difficulty in building commitment rules explains why 
this process takes significant time.
Second, this study contributes to anti-corruption policy development by 
highlighting that the process of building anti-corruption commitment rules has both 
technical and social aspects. Technical aspects include the implementation and 
enforcement of anti-corruption directive rules and their corresponding sanctions. 
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
have focused the bulk o f their anti-corruption efforts in technical areas. In developing 
states, IGOs and NGOs have made major efforts to establish anti-corruption legislation; 
initiate transparency in government budgeting, accounting, and contract administration; 
reform state criminal justice systems; advance freedom of the press and freedom of 
information; and strengthen other aspects of the Table 7-2 structural factors associated 
with elite competition, elite accountability, and boundaries between public and private. 
The 1996 OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption is constructed largely of 
such technical anti-corruption measures. This study’s theory o f the causes o f political 
corruption reveals that technical anti-corruption measures are necessary to reduce 
political corruption levels, however, they are not sufficient. Also needed are social 
measures that address issues o f social trust— primarily those pertaining to improving the 
levels o f a society’s mass participation.
Mass participation leading to high levels of social trust includes citizen freedom 
to organize into a number of political, economic, and social interest groups; to foster
frequent horizontal communications among societal groups and the government; and to 
generate an atmosphere of social trust among individual citizens, their state institutions, 
and the ruling government. While a government cannot legislate social trust, it can 
establish a societal framework (i.e., in accordance with Table 7-2’s structure) that allows 
social trust to emerge. By not including social measures that build social trust in anti­
corruption programs, policy makers undermine efforts to build anti-corruption 
commitment rules. The need to include social measures in anti-corruption programs is a 
major finding o f this study and helps explain why IGO and NGO anti-corruption 
programs that do not address social measures have experienced only limited success.
While not in the Caribbean, Singapore and Hong Kong present two cases that 
appear to contradict the above finding that successful anti-corruption programs must 
include both technical and social anti-corruption measures. Singapore and Hong Kong, 
both small city-states with a history o f British colonialism, emerged from World War II 
with serious corruption problems. By different routes, both generated the political will 
and political capacity to address their corruption problems. In Singapore, it was 
enlightened despotism , i.e., leaders ascending to power in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
that were committed to honest government who sparked their anti-corruption efforts 
(Girling, 1997, p. 170). In Hong Kong, it was a 1973 corruption scandal surrounding the 
police superintendent that coalesced societal anti-corruption support (Johnston, 1999, p. 
221). In both Singapore and Hong Kong, autonomous government anti-corruption 
agencies took the lead in implementing and enforcing a wide array o f anti-corruption 
directive rules and their associated sanctions. By the 1990s, the construction o f stable
anti-corruption directive-ruled and commitment-ruled institutions led to Singapore and 
Hong Kong being rated two o f the least corrupt states in the annual Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Indexes.2
With both Singapore and Hong Kong exhibiting authoritarian governing 
structures— structures that normally engender little social trust— they appear to contradict 
the need for anti-corruption social measures. However, looking deeper at the conditions 
surrounding Singapore and Hong Kong’s corruption reforms, it can be seen that social 
measures played a major role in their successes. Despite their authoritarian governing 
structures, both Singapore and Hong Kong exhibit political cultures with individualistic 
(self-interested) and egalitarian (public good) values that led both to accept the Western 
(black) standards for boundaries between public and private interests. Both states 
developed strong political (authoritarian) and economic institutional structures with stable 
and well-defined duties and rights for both the governing elite and masses. Both states 
also developed strong market economies resulting in high per capita income levels 
(Weder & Brunetti, 1999). Both states also included programs for public participation in 
the development and enforcement o f anti-corruption rules. These conditions combined to 
provide a framework that produced moderate to high levels o f social trust in both 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Thus, both states adopted not only the technical measures but 
also the social measures required for their anti-corruption programs to be successful.
Singapore and Hong Kong went beyond Klitgaard’s (1988) stylized formula (C = 
M  +  D  - A) in arresting their corruption problems. They both adopted comprehensive 
anti-corruption programs that took into account most o f the technical and social measures
developed in this study’s theory. This study’s theory includes the monopoly (M), 
discretion (D), and accountability (A), components o f Klitgaard’s formula in its Table 7-2 
structure. Additionally, it addresses causal factors associated with forms o f societal rule, 
political culture, elite competition, and mass participation that K litgaard’s work excludes. 
The m ajor difference between this study’s theory and Klitgaard’s, however, is that his 
theory addresses only technical measures associated with the causes o f political 
corruption. By identifying the social measures that must be included in anti-corruption 
programs, this study’s theory is potentially more policy relevant than K litgaard’s.
Answ ering the Political Corruption Questions
A first test o f this study’s policy relevance is to use the theory o f the causes o f 
political corruption and this study’s analysis to answer several questions concerning 
Caribbean political corruption that were raised in Chapter 1. Are the causes o f Caribbean 
political corruption primarily international as many Caribbean leaders argue? Do 
neoliberal economic and good governance reforms increase opportunities for Caribbean 
political corruption? Are there deeper domestic or international factors that cause 
political corruption? W hat contributes to the lack o f political will and/or political 
capacity that undermines Caribbean interest in anti-corruption reforms? These questions 
capture the main contemporary issues in Caribbean corruption reform.
Are the Causes Primarily International? This study’s theoretical and historical 
analyses dem onstrate that a variety o f past and present international factors contribute to 
contemporary Caribbean political corruption problems. To review briefly the key points
presented in Chapters 3 and 4, the period o f European colonialism helped established the 
foundation for many contemporary Caribbean institutions. The legacy o f caudillo or 
strongman rule in the former Spanish colonies and Haiti, and the British oligarchic local 
assembly and one-man (governor) Crown Colony governing systems, remains evident in 
the contemporary authoritarian-democratic governing systems in many Caribbean states. 
Despite almost 200 years o f independence in some o f the former Spanish colonies and 
Haiti, the region has not been able to overcome these authoritarian governing tendencies 
that are usually accompanied by weak political institutions and high levels o f political 
corruption. N ineteenth and early twentieth century US interventions in Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua did little to lessen those states’ corruption 
problems. Despite US intentions to restore stability and implement government 
efficiency in those states, the US actions played directly into the hands o f later 
authoritarian rulers that used the US-provided security forces and bureaucratic structures 
to seize power and misuse state resources for their private interests.
The US interventions were only the first US contribution to contemporary 
Caribbean political corruption problems. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s S.O.B. policy, “He 
may be an S.O .B ., but he is our S.O.B,” ensured corrupt Caribbean rulers that after the 
1930s the US would not intervene in regional states as long as they remained anti-Fascist 
(and later anti-Communist). By the 1940s, new international rules concerning 
sovereignty and non-intervention strengthened Roosevelt’s S.O.B. policy as they kept the 
international community from looking closely at illicit internal behaviors in Caribbean 
states. The new rules concerning sovereignty and non-intervention were reinforced by the
Western and Soviet Cold War competition for spheres of influence that further allowed 
political corruption activity in Caribbean states to be ignored in the name of larger 
political objectives.
Additionally, many of the resources supporting post-World War II Caribbean 
political corruption came from international sources. This includes routine material 
resources associated with transnational corporations and foreign businesses that regularly 
bribe Caribbean government officials to obtain preferences in government contracts and 
access to foreign markets. It includes extraordinary material resources provided by 
international banks and international aid organizations, much o f which were tied to a 
state’s Cold War allegiance in the Western and Soviet competition. It also includes the 
extraordinary material resources now being provided to some Caribbean governing elite 
to help facilitate the international drug trade and its associated activities o f arms 
smuggling and money laundering.
From a populist Caribbean viewpoint, this study supports Caribbean leaders’ 
accusations that the international community not only provided the basis for 
contemporary Caribbean corrupt institutions (i.e., facilitated the corrupt institutional 
(rule) development) but also largely funded the corruption through their transnational 
corporations, foreign businesses, international loans, or international aid. However, as 
seen in the evidence provided by the Jamaican and Costa Rican case studies, these 
international factors, while contributing to contemporary Caribbean political corruption 
problems, are overshadowed by a more significant domestic cause— i.e., the region’s self- 
indulgent governing elite who manipulate their society’s political and economic
institutional development to plunder state resources for their own benefit at the expense 
o f their citizenry.
Do Neoliberal and Good Governance Reforms Cause Corruption? This study offers 
that instituting market material resource systems should lessen a society’s political 
corruption levels. In the Caribbean, instituting market systems includes the adoption of 
neoliberal economic reforms which include measures to privatize state-owned enterprises, 
remove external trade barriers, open a state’s economy to international competition, 
increase foreign direct investment, allow the entry o f multinational corporations, and 
institute a plethora o f other reforms focused on reducing the state’s role in the economy 
and increasing the overall economic output. Despite such actions, most Caribbean 
neoliberal reforms have been accompanied by increased political corruption.
The issue o f privatization, the total or partial sale o f state-owned enterprises to 
private entities, provides a good example to explain why Caribbean neoliberal reforms 
have generated increased political corruption. This study presents privatization activities 
as a source o f extraordinary resources. This is due to the large dollar values in most 
privatizations. In most developing states, privatization processes are carried out in 
institutional structures that are already corrupt— i.e., where new directive rules are usually 
not issued to manage the privatization process. According to Johnston’s (1986) cost- 
benefit analysis presented in Chapter 2, the effects o f placing large amounts o f 
extraordinary resources into an already corrupt governing system are disintegrative and 
tend to make the system unstable. In such situations, a governing elite displays a greater 
w illingness toward corrupt behavior because o f the potential high payoffs from the
misuse o f the extraordinary resources. In states with existing systemic or institutional 
corruption patterns, extraordinary stakes from privatization processes tend to strengthen 
the existing instruction and directive rules causing political corruption while also 
destroying any anti-corruption commitment rules that may have existed. Therefore, this 
study’s theory offers that it is not neoliberal reforms, like privatization efforts, that cause 
increasing Caribbean political corruption, but the fact the neoliberal reforms are being 
carried out in already corrupt systems.
The problem with good governance reforms is related. All reforms, whether 
neoliberal economic reforms or good governance reforms, change existing social-ruled 
structures. Reforms are usually accompanied by the issuance o f new instruction and 
directive rules. Reforms may also include the destruction o f old com mitment rules, 
however weak, that established societal duties and rights. Rule changes, o f whatever 
form, are contentious issues in most societies. Until new commitment rules emerge from 
the reform process, political animosity between competing groups may arise and it may 
become difficult to foster societal cooperation. W here public disagreement on important 
issues occurs, it can quickly be replaced by political corruption (see Huntington, 1968, p. 
64). Therefore, this study’s theory would explain that it is normal, on a short-term basis, 
to see political corruption problems worsen after neoliberal economic or good governance 
reforms.
The utility o f establishing a new directive-ruled structure to accompany neoliberal 
econom ic reforms can be seen in Panam a’s attempts to privatize its state-owned 
telephone company. In 1996, Panama, which experiences serious problem s with systemic
corruption (see Table 4-1), decided to sell 49 percent of its state-owned telephone 
company, Intel S. A. In the Intel S.A. privatization process the Panamanian government 
desired to eliminate corruption accusations by creating a special Privatization Board to 
manage the sale. The Intel S.A. privatization process included outside 
(nongovernmental) technical and commercial advisers and close monitoring by the 
Panama chapter o f Transparency International which wrote weekly newspaper bulletins 
explaining the status o f the process to the public. In the end, it was deemed by all parties 
that the Intel S.A. privatization process was fair and transparent and no claims of 
corruption emerged (Transparency International, 1999b). The use o f autonomous 
privatization agencies established within strict directive-ruled frameworks, as was done in 
the Panamanian Intel S.A. privatization, is not normal in the Caribbean.
Are There Deeper Domestic and International Causal Factors? This study reveals 
the complex domestic and international factors associated with the causes o f Caribbean 
political corruption. Tables 7-1 and 7-2 delineate the complex array o f domestic and 
international factors that contribute to a society’s levels o f political corruption. While 
accepting the role o f the key international factors discussed above in causing Caribbean 
political corruption, this study concludes that they are far from the most important cause. 
Again it is important to point out that this study’s analysis finds that the major cause of 
Caribbean political corruption is domestic governing elite who manipulate their society’s 
political and economic development to plunder state resources for their own benefit at the 
expense o f their citizenry. The Jamaican and Costa Rican case studies both support this 
conclusion.
At key times in the post-World War II period, Caribbean governing elite faced 
opportunities to either strengthen non-corrupt institutions or to reform corrupt institutions 
and provide for more transparent and honest government. In Jamaica, this opportunity 
arose in the period just after their 1962 independence when the governing elite could have 
strengthened, rather than corrupted, the Westminster system. In Costa Rica, this 
opportunity was after the 1948 Civil War, but instead the governing elite manipulated 
their new democratic structures for their own self-interested purposes. Other Caribbean 
states and territories had similar opportunities to reform their governing systems. 
However, like Jamaica and Costa Rica, Chapter 4 ’s analysis supports the argument that 
Caribbean governing elite normally chose to manipulate the construction o f their political 
and economic institutions for their own self-interest. The main responsibility o f 
Caribbean governing elite in causing their political corruption problems is a topic seldom 
discussed in international anti-corruption forums.
W hy the Lack o f Caribbean Corruption Reform? Caribbean states have been unable 
to muster the political will or political capacity to implement anti-corruption reforms, 
including ratification o f and compliance with the 1996 OAS Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption. This lack o f compliance is largely explained by elite competition 
factors concerning the threat anti-corruption reforms present to the Caribbean’s self- 
interested governing elite. Geddes (1991, 1994) and Peters (1992) found that the primary 
motivation o f Caribbean politicians was staying in office (see Chapter 4). The 
im plem entation o f corruption reforms would significantly undermine the processes (e.g.,
political patronage and other corrupt behavior) that Caribbean governing elite use to 
collect the resources they need to support their electoral campaigns.
This study’s theory predicts that Caribbean governing elite will not support 
corruption reform programs because such reforms undermine their power base by 
changing the methods by which the elite gather resources to gain or retain office. 
Caribbean leaders are usually quick to embrace anti-corruption platforms in international 
forums, where the issue o f their immediate standing (reputation) among other regional or 
international leaders is their primary interest. However, when faced with the domestic 
political realities o f implementing the anti-corruption measures, their reform willingness 
quickly wanes. Their motivation to implement corruption reforms subsides because in 
domestic issues their primary interest is not standing, as in international forums, but 
security, i.e., ensuring their job security— their ability to gain and retain political power.
The lack o f political will to implement real corruption reforms does not keep the 
Caribbean governing elite from taking weaker anti-corruption actions. For example, in 
1999, the Jamaican cabinet attempted to force a Corruption Bill through the Parliament. 
The Jamaican cabinet justified the bill as one needed to comply with the 1996 OAS Inter- 
American Convention Against Corruption. In actuality, the bill did little to comply with 
the elements o f the 1996 OAS Convention, but instead focused on controlling corruption 
among mid- and low-level employees in the Jamaican government bureaucracy (see 
Munroe, 1999a). The bill also caused a media and public outcry when it attempted to 
restrict press reporting on government corruption cases. Thus, the Jamaican Corruption 
Bill did not restrict the governing elite’s opportunities for corrupt behavior, but did
attem pt to lim it the press’s ability to investigate and report such behavior.3 Similar 
cosm etic attem pts to comply with the 1996 OAS Convention may be expected from other 
Caribbean states w ith authoritarian-democratic systems that see real corruption reform 
m easures as threats to their power structures. Even non-authoritarian dem ocratic states in 
the Caribbean, like Costa Rica, will likely be slow in complying with the 1996 OAS 
Convention as to do so would place significant restraints on governing elite behavior.
Situating the Study W ithin a Larger Context
The interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f political corruption developed in this 
study m ight seem to fit best in the no longer fashionable m odernization school. As a 
society’s institutions progress from the left to the right o f  Table 7-1, it is assum ed that a 
m odernization process takes place. This study’s results differ from other m odernization 
school approaches in two significant areas. First, this study goes beyond the limited 
m acro-level conceptual developm ent o f  m ost m odernization analyses and identifies the 
m iddle-level causal m echanism s (social rules) that allow the design o f anti-corruption 
programs. Second, while this study supports the tenet that political and econom ic 
m odernization generally results in less political corruption, it also highlights the 
m echanism s that lim it certain societies from reaching the Table 7-1 ideal o f  incidental 
corruption patterns.
This study develops that m odernization processes related to a society’s political 
corruption levels are far from linear and may even be som ew hat disconnected from other 
political, econom ic, and cultural m odernization processes underway in the society.4 
W hile m ost analysts would agree that both Jam aica and Costa Rica underw ent political
and economic modernization in the last half of the twentieth century, their case studies 
reveal that during the same period both state’s political corruption levels actually 
increased— a move from the right to the left on Table 7-1’s corruption index indicating a 
de-modernization process occurred. Why Caribbean states have been unable to reduce 
political corruption levels, and are unable to modernize further than they have, can be 
largely understood by looking closer at a state’s political culture— thus also situating this 
study among the structuralist-culturalist corruption literature (see Chapter 1).
This study highlights the importance of political culture in explaining differing 
levels o f political corruption. Reforming a state’s political culture is an area seldom 
addressed in domestic or international forums. One reason for political culture’s neglect 
as an explanatory variable is that there is little agreement as to how political culture fits 
into social science causal models. Some scholars do use political culture as a principal 
independent variable to explain social behavior in developing states (see Huntington, 
1968; Scott, 1972; Putnam, 1993). Others question the usefulness o f political culture as 
an explanatory variable or cluster o f variables. For example, Johnson (1997a, 1997b) 
offers that culture should not be used as an explanatory variable but be seen as a hidden- 
hand-like mechanism that helps govern the outcome o f rational choice models.
W ithin the constructivist framework employed in this study, political culture is 
included as another sub-set o f rules— a sub-set that is closely associated with a society’s 
form o f rule and which influences the rules developed in other Table 7-1 agency and 
structural factors. This study defines political culture as the general process used by a 
society to reach its political goals (i.e., decisions about who gets what, when, and how,
(see Lasswell, 1950)). Categorizing the rule-sets in specific political cultures requires an 
investigation o f  how a society is politically organized, both formally and informally; how 
political decisions are made; how political power flows within the societal organization; 
how both the governing elite and the citizenry view their roles in politics; and how 
citizens interact, both with the government and among themselves, to reach their political 
goals (see Diamond, 1993).
Booth and Seligson (1993) raise the argument that Latin America may not be a 
place for political modernization because the local cultures are so antithetical to liberal- 
democratic values. The analysis in this study supports this somewhat controversial 
argument. M ost Latin American and Caribbean states exhibit collectivist or mixed 
collectivist-individualistic political cultures. Collectivist political cultures are organized 
around social groups and are extremely paternalistic— always looking to the group leader 
for resources or solutions to problems. In collectivist cultures, the good o f the group 
prevails over the good o f individuals or the greater society. Collectivist political cultures 
can act like an anchor that keeps societies from developing the directive and commitment 
rules needed in market-oriented and liberal-democratic states. This study in fact 
demonstrates how collectivist and mixed collectivist-individualistic political cultures are 
associated with hegemonic or mixed hegemonic-hierarchical forms o f rule and provide 
conditions for spawning authoritarian-democratic and not liberal-democratic governing 
systems. In most o f  Latin America and the Caribbean the success o f  implementing 
neoliberal market and liberal-democratic reforms is thus directly related to the success o f 
transform ing a state’s collectivist political culture. Changing the social rules o f a
collectivist political cultures, some steeped in hundreds o f years o f strongman or 
oligarchic rule, is not an easy task.
Political culture has a similar anchoring effect on implementing corruption 
reforms. As long as Caribbean states exhibit collectivist political cultures, they are 
unlikely to develop strong institutions with effective anti-corruption directive and 
com mitment rules. W ithout effective anti-corruption directive and commitment rules, it 
is unlikely that Caribbean corruption reform will ever be successful.
Key Contributions, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research
This study has made several key contributions. First, this study’s findings have 
significant relevance for policy makers working to reduce Caribbean political corruption. 
Tables 7-1 and 7-2 identify the many complex factors that must be considered in 
developing anti-corruption policy. This study’s theory, summarized in these tables, has 
the potential to answer a broad array o f questions about political corruption. Second, this 
study’s ability to develop a comprehensive interdisciplinary theory o f the causes o f 
political corruption, one that includes both important agency and structural factors, is a 
useful contribution to overall corruption scholarship. Third, this study demonstrates the 
utility o f O n u f s (1989) constructivist analytic frame for building social theory. While 
many scholars contribute concepts to the theory o f the causes o f  political corruption built 
in this study, it was O n u f s constructivism that allowed the linkage o f these concepts 
from several different academic disciplines and theoretical approaches.
Like most other modernization approaches to political corruption, this study’s 
contribution is limited by its lack o f empirical support. This study is just the initial step
in a larger research program in political corruption. In order to make more general 
inferences about the causes o f political corruption and to uncover more puzzles about the 
political corruption phenomenon, a next step is to conduct additional qualitative 
disciplined-configurative case studies o f political corruption in Caribbean states and 
territories. Barbados is the leading candidate for a next case study as it is the Caribbean 
state with the best conditions to study society’s with incidental corruption patterns (see 
Table 4-1), thus allowing a first test o f hypotheses resulting from this study’s third major 
proposition. After several additional qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies, 
com parative methodology could be employed among the case studies to uncover 
additional insights about the causes o f political corruption in the Caribbean (see Ragin, 
1987, 2000). Additionally, a quantitative (statistical) test is required o f all Caribbean 
states and territories to reveal the true impact o f Table 7-1 structural factors on variances 
in corruption patterns.
A quantitative test o f this study’s theory requires greater precision in the 
m easurement o f the Table 7-1 structural factors (variables). A first challenge is to 
develop a better measurement for political corruption. W hile the Transparency 
International Corruption Perception Index is an accepted comparative measure o f 
corruption, it includes only corruption related to a state’s foreign business transactions. 
The Transparency International ratings also do not contain all Caribbean states and 
territories (see Table 4-1). Table 2-2 provides the framework for developing an index o f 
political corruption based upon the incidence and evaluation o f the full range o f political 
corruption behaviors found in a society.
Other structural factors in Table 7-1 must also be operationalized and measured. 
Good measures must be developed for the range o f behaviors associated with each factor 
in the table. Some o f these measures may constitute only nominal measurements, e.g., 
form o f rule. Others may be measured on an interval continuum, e.g., an index o f the 
level o f elite accountability. Others may require the employment o f proxy variables. For 
example, Chapter 2 develops how a society’s level of social trust is a good proxy variable 
for its level o f mass participation. Only through a valid quantitative test o f this study’s 
theory o f the causes o f political corruption can we determine the weighted effects o f each 
Table 7-1 factor on a society’s level of political corruption. This then allows revisions to 
the theory and provides for even more informed policy guidance to Caribbean anti­
corruption programs.
Finally, this study’s theory o f the causes o f political corruption requires extension 
to other societies. This study’s unit o f analysis was the Caribbean state or territory. It is 
likely, however, that this study’s theory is equally applicable to the investigation of 
political corruption in other Caribbean polities (cities, provinces, etc.) that have an 
identifiable governing elite (50-100 persons minimum). Because o f similar historical 
experiences and political, economic, and cultural institutions, the theory should be easily 
adaptable to investigating the causes o f political corruption in all Western Hemispheric 
polities. Moreover, because o f the diverse Caribbean structures used in developing this 
study’s theory, it should be useable, with only minor modifications, to the study of 
political corruption throughout the world.
This study demonstrates the extreme complexity encountered in analyzing 
political corruption. It develops a comprehensive theory of the causes of Caribbean 
political corruption. It then uses the theory to answer the most important contemporary 
questions about political corruption in the region. The expanded research program in 
political corruption described above is required to give the theory, and the answers to 
contemporary and future questions about political corruption, more precision and policy 
relevance. A vigorous focus on Caribbean political corruption would hopefully help to 
improve the lives o f citizens across the region. As this study reveals, however, the 
success o f future Caribbean anti-corruption programs is dependent on including social 
measures to improve mass participation and foster social trust— areas largely ignored by 
past policy-makers. Political corruption can be arrested, but as this study demonstrates, it 
requires a combination o f political will and political capacity that have so far eluded most 
Caribbean states and territories.
Endnotes
1. O nuf (1989) does not provide a discussion on how to build commitment rules. The 
process for developing commitment rules provided in this chapter was developed after 
numerous discussions with Dr. O nuf on the subject.
2. 1999 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ratings: Singapore - 9.1 
and Hong Kong - 7.7, on a scale o f 1 (totally corrupt) to 10 (no corruption). Singapore 
and Hong Kong were also selected as examples as these polities experienced the most 
success with anti-corruption programs over the last half o f the twentieth century.
3. M edia and public outcry over the proposed Corruption Bill forced its tabling by the 
Jamaican Parliament in late 1999. By mid-2000 the bill had not been reintroduced.
4. This study does not assume that the Table 7-1 structural factors move in unison from 
the right to left in the modernization process. In fact, as the Jamaican and Costa Rican 
case studies reveal, each individual Table 7-1 structural factor develops its own specific
institutional (social-ruled) characteristics. However, as this study also dem onstrates, the 
T able 7-1 structural factors are influenced and limited by other structural factors, 
including the society’s form o f rule and political culture.
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